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ABSTRACT 
Paranoia across both clinical and non-clinical populations is closely linked with 
the negative self. Recent research has begun to investigate self-affirmation processes 
as a way to target the self and thereby attenuate non-clinical paranoia. For the first 
time, the effects of reflecting on personally meaningful values, and pursuing values-
based goals, on non-clinical paranoia was assessed over time. Using a mixed 
experimental design, an opportunity sample of adults from student and general 
population settings (N = 171) were randomised to either value-affirmation (VA), 
value-affirmation plus goal-setting (VAG), or non-affirmation control (NAC). The 
procedures traditionally used for value-affirmation were adapted to increase clinical 
validity, drawing on methods used for value-clarification in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT). State paranoia and positive affect was assessed pre, 
post, and two-weeks following affirmation. In support of predictions, there was a 
significant interaction between conditions on state paranoia over time. This remained 
significant when change in positive affect associated with completing value-
affirmation procedures was accounted for in the analyses. Decomposing this 
interaction showed that there were significant reductions in paranoia over time in the 
VAG condition. Exploratory analysis indicated that only those participants who acted 
on values-based goals showed significant attenuations in paranoia over two weeks. 
There was no significant reduction in paranoia over time in the VA condition. The 
results are in support of self-affirmation theory, and contemporary theory in clinical 
psychology, which suggest that living in line with personally meaningful values gives 
psychological benefits in buffering against self-threats, over and above reflection on 
personally meaningful values. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Overview 
Paranoia is the belief that others intend to cause oneself deliberate harm (Freeman 
& Garety, 2000). Paranoia is now widely recognised as a relatively common 
experience, occurring along a continuum within both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2013). Whilst much research has typically 
concerned clinical paranoia, investigations into non-clinical paranoia have become 
increasingly important, for two key reasons. Firstly, the prevalence of non-clinical 
paranoia is such that it warrants investigation in its own right. Secondly, paranoia 
elicited in non-clinical samples provides opportunities to investigate paranoia in a 
controlled environment. Non-clinical research therefore makes important 
contributions to the understanding and treatment of paranoia across the continuum. 
One factor that has received much theoretical and empirical attention within the 
literature is the role of negative self-perceptions in the generation and maintenance of 
paranoid thinking (e.g., Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001; 
Freeman et al., 2005). Research has begun to investigate whether targeting the self 
might lead to attenuations in paranoia. One psychological process that has recently 
been studied in relation to non-clinical paranoia is self-affirmation. A self-affirmation 
is any thought or act that enhances the “perceived integrity of the self, its overall 
adaptive and moral adequacy” (Steele, 1988, p.291). Self-affirmations have been 
shown to buffer against a range of perceived threats to the self, leading to improved 
cognitive and behavioural outcomes (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Although still in their 
infancy, initial experimental investigations have provided indications that self-
affirmations may provide an effective buffer for non-clinical paranoia (Atherton et al., 
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2016; Bullock, Newman-Taylor, & Stopa, 2016; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Kingston 
& Ellett, 2014).  
Whilst promising, the real-world and clinical utility of these existing findings is 
currently limited, as no study has assessed whether initial attenuations in paranoia 
observed in the laboratory are maintained over time. Furthermore, to date, all studies 
investigating self-affirmations for non-clinical paranoia have employed only cognitive 
methods of self-affirmation (reflecting on personally important aspects of the self). 
Findings from the self-affirmation literature suggest that self-affirmations may have 
longer-term effects as a result of both cognitive self-affirmations (reflecting on 
important aspects of the self) and behavioural self-affirmations (acting in line with 
personally important aspects of the self). This thesis sought to investigate whether 
behavioural self-affirmations, in the form of setting a goal to live in line with 
personally important values, would enhance the effects of reflection on meaningful 
values in attenuating non-clinical paranoia over time.  
Reflection on personal values (value-affirmation) is the most common empirical 
manipulation of self-affirmation. However, these procedures have limited real-world 
and clinical validity in comparison with values-based exercises used in clinical 
contexts (Czech, Katz & Orsillio, 2011). The values used are typically limited to a 
relatively small number of life domains, which introduces potential confounds in 
understanding the outcomes of value-affirmation research. Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether value-affirmations retain their effectiveness once individuals are aware of 
their purpose. In clinical contexts, guided reflection on personal values forms a 
significant component of treatment in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
Hayes, Strohsal, & Wilson, 2011). In ACT, values are clarified for the purposes of 
identifying intrinsic motivators for committing to act in personally meaningful ways 
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despite life’s challenges. To address some of the limitations of existing value-
affirmation procedures, the procedures for value-affirmation in this thesis were 
adapted, drawing on methods used for values-clarification in ACT. 
The present thesis aimed to 1) investigate whether a value-affirmation 
intervention would attenuate non-clinical paranoia over a two-week time period; 2) 
compare value-affirmation with a value-affirmation plus goal-setting condition, which 
introduces a behavioural component to investigate whether this enhances the effect of 
value-affirmation on paranoia over time; 3) develop existing value-affirmation 
procedures to address some of their limitations, particularly increasing their 
applicability to clinical contexts. 
This chapter begins by introducing the definitions and conceptualisations of 
paranoia, paying attention to theoretical accounts of non-clinical paranoia, and the 
relationship between paranoia and a negative view of the self. The literature related to 
the experimental manipulation of self-affirmation is then presented, and theory 
concerning the potential utility of values-based approaches for buffering against self-
threat in non-clinical paranoia is discussed. Finally, the hypotheses are presented. 
 
1.1. Defining Paranoia 
1.1.1.  Definition.  
Paranoia is the unfounded perception that deliberate harm is intended towards 
oneself and reflects a heightened sensitivity to perceiving threats to the self from 
others. Historically, a number of definitions have been used to describe paranoia, 
ranging from mild social worry to severe persecutory delusions (Freeman & Garety, 
2000). To provide clarification, a criteria-based definition of paranoia has been 
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widely-accepted in the literature for defining paranoia in clinical (e.g., Freeman, 
Startup, et al., 2014) and non-clinical studies (e.g., Atherton et al., 2016). According 
to this definition, paranoia involves perceiving both that harm is occurring, or will 
occur, and that this harm is intended (Freeman & Garety, 2000, Figure 1.1.). These 
criteria will be used to define paranoia in the current thesis.  
 
Criteria A and B must be met: 
A The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or 
her. 
B The individual believes that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm. 
Points for clarification: 
1. Harm concerns any action that leads to the individual feeling distressed. 
2. Harm only to friends or relatives does not count as a persecutory belief, 
unless the persecutor also intends for this to have a negative effect upon the 
individual. 
3. The individual must believe that the persecutor, at the present or in the future, 
will attempt to harm him or her. 
4. Delusions of reference do not count within the category of persecutory 
beliefs. 
Figure 1.1. Paranoia definition. From: Freeman, D. & Garety, P. A. (2000). 
Comments on the content of persecutory delusions: Does the definition need 
clarification? British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39(4), p.142. 
 
  13 
1.1.2.  The paranoia continuum. 
Paranoia is characteristic of several psychiatric disorders, including psychosis, 
schizophrenia, and paranoid personality disorder (American Psychological 
Association, 2013; Carroll, 2009). However, paranoid thoughts are now considered to 
be a common psychological experience, and not solely a symptom of mental illness. 
The notion that paranoia might exist along a continuum of severity within the 
population reflects a paradigm-shift in which categorical definitions of mental illness 
have been replaced by dimensional views of mental health (Esterberg & Compton, 
2008; Strauss, 1969).  
In support of a dimensional view, many studies have shown that psychotic 
symptoms can be studied in non-clinical samples (e.g., Ahmed, Buckley, & Mabe, 
2012; Shevlin, McElroy, Bentall, Reninghaus, & Murphy, 2017; Therman & 
Zeirmans, 2016; van Os & Linscott, 2012; Versmissen et al., 2008). One such study 
was conducted by Rossler et al. (2007), who interviewed 591 young adults five times 
over twenty years. Their findings revealed that psychotic experiences, including 
paranoia, were reported at non-clinical levels, and appeared continuous, varying in 
intensity and persistence among the population over time. Their findings support a 
dimensional view of psychotic experiences. The fact that psychotic experiences 
presented at non-clinical levels also led the authors to advocate for early detection and 
intervention in non-clinical symptoms, to decrease the odds of later psychosis 
(Rossler et al., 2007).  
Recent years have also seen research investigating the prevalence of paranoia 
as a symptom in its own right, rather than as part of the heterogeneous diagnostic 
category of psychosis (Combs, Finn, Wohlfahrt, Penn, & Basso, 2013; Verdoux & 
van Os, 2002). As with the psychosis continuum model, a key argument of the 
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continuum view of paranoia is that clinical and non-clinical paranoia are not 
qualitatively different from each other, but that an attenuated experience of paranoia 
(i.e., lower severity, lower persistence) is present in non-clinical populations 
(Costello, 1994). In keeping with the continuum view, several studies have 
demonstrated that there is etiological continuity across the paranoia continuum, 
whereby clinical and non-clinical manifestations of paranoia are associated with 
similar risk factors (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003). Being younger in 
age, male, situated in an urban environment, facing social adversity, isolation, stress, 
substance misuse and poor mental and physical health have been consistently 
associated with paranoia in clinical and non-clinical populations (e.g., Bebbington, 
2015; Freeman et al., 2011; Rossler et al., 2007). In addition, similar factors also 
appear to be causally implicated in the generation of paranoia across the continuum. 
In one empirical study, Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley, and Slater (2010) found 
that anxiety, depression, worry, and interpersonal sensitivity were implicated in 
paranoid thinking across non-clinical, high paranoia non-clinical, and clinical groups. 
Such findings indicate similarities in affective and interpersonal experiences across 
the paranoia continuum.  
Evidence in support of a paranoia continuum has been obtained from cross-
sectional self-report surveys of large general population samples. Johns et al., (2004) 
found a paranoia prevalence rate of 9% within a general population sample of 8580. A 
systematic review and meta-analysis of 47 published prevalence studies reported 
similar findings, but found the frequency of paranoid thoughts decreased with severity 
(van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009). Between 1-3% 
of the general population experienced paranoid beliefs of similar severity to those 
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seen in clinical samples; 4% had paranoid experiences which were associated with 
distress and dysfunction; and 8% experienced milder paranoid thoughts.  
These findings indicate that milder, non-clinical paranoia is more common 
than clinical paranoia. Taking this further, several authors have sought to investigate 
the structure of paranoia across the continuum. Freeman et al. (2005) conducted an 
internet survey of 1202 students, of whom up to 52% reported having thoughts with 
paranoid content on a ‘weekly’ basis. There was a negative correlation between the 
frequency of paranoid thoughts, and the conviction and distress associated with them. 
The less common paranoid thoughts were held with more conviction and caused more 
distress than the more common, milder paranoid thoughts. These findings supported 
an exponential distribution of paranoia in the population, with milder paranoid 
thoughts being relatively common, and more severe paranoid thoughts being 
relatively rare. In addition, individuals who reported more severe paranoia also 
reported greater conviction, distress, and avoidant coping strategies in response to 
milder paranoid thoughts. In light of these findings, a ‘hierarchy of paranoia’ was 
proposed by the authors. According to this hierarchy, relatively common interpersonal 
concerns about the self, experienced by many and typically expressed as interpersonal 
worry, mild suspiciousness and mild paranoia, form the foundation for more severe, 
odd and distressing beliefs of persecution and conspiracy at the top of the hierarchy, 
which are experienced by relatively few.  
Research by Bebbington et al. (2013) found that severe paranoia predicted 
more common interpersonal worries, providing further empirical support for the 
paranoia hierarchy. Twenty-eight percent of the 8576 individuals surveyed from the 
general population reported frequent wariness of others’ bad intentions against them, 
and over 25% reported frequent interpersonal fears of rejection and criticism. More 
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severe forms of paranoia (i.e., delusions of persecutory conspiracy) had a much lower 
frequency of only 1.5%. In line with prediction, rare paranoid thoughts predicted the 
experience of milder paranoia. The authors concluded in support of a hierarchical 
structure of paranoia, with the prevalence of paranoia distributed exponentially across 
the general population as a function of this hierarchy.   
1.1.3.  Appraisal of the continuum view. 
Whilst it is now widely accepted that paranoia exits within the general 
population, whether a true paranoia continuum exists remains up for debate (David, 
2010). For example, cross-sectional self-report methodologies have been criticised for 
inflating prevalence rates of paranoia in the general population, as they may be 
tapping into real experiences of persecution (Linscott & van Os, 2010). However, 
experimental paradigms such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (e.g., Ellett, Allen-
Crooks, Stevens, Wildschut, & Chadwick, 2013) and the manipulation of 
experimental conditions (e.g., Bodner & Mickulincer, 1988), have demonstrated that 
non-clinical paranoia can be triggered in neutral social situations. The development of 
the virtual reality (VR) paradigm has maintained external validity by enabling 
researchers to replicate naturalistic social scenarios whilst ensuring the environment is 
controlled and neutral (e.g., Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008). A series of studies using VR 
have demonstrated incidence rates of paranoid thinking in the non-clinical population 
as cross-sectional surveys, providing further empirical evidence in support of the 
paranoia continuum view (e.g., Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2010). 
Despite some degree of etiological continuity, it is however, important to note 
that important differences between the experience of clinical and non-clinical 
paranoia are likely to exist. Clinical paranoia is characterised by greater persistence, 
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conviction, distress, and behavioural avoidance (Freeman et al., 2005). In addition, 
the content of paranoia, such as beliefs about the power and omnipotence of the 
persecutor, may also be different (Freeman et al., 2010). Freeman et al. (2010) have 
further suggested that individuals with clinical paranoia are more likely to experience 
additional clinically significant affective and perceptual experiences (e.g., 
hallucinations). The experience of paranoia, and therefore the factors that elicit and 
maintain it, may therefore occur within a qualitatively different context in clinical 
samples. In particular, cognitive processes, such as data gathering biases and belief 
inflexibility, are typical of clinical but not non-clinical paranoid groups (Freeman et 
al., 2010). This provides evidence for some differences between clinical and non-
clinical paranoia.  
Some researchers have argued that mild paranoia is more similar to socially 
anxious fears than persecutory ideation. This is due to the finding that paranoia stems 
from common interpersonal concerns, and is strongly related to measures of social 
anxiety (Wigman et al., 2012). However, research has demonstrated that mild 
paranoia and social anxiety are distinct constructs. In one experimental study, 
Freeman, Gittens et al. (2008) found that perceptual anomalies increased paranoia, but 
decreased social anxiety. Similar findings have been recently reported following a 
large cross-sectional assessment of paranoia and social anxiety in undergraduate 
students (Cooper, Klugman, Heinberg, Anglin, & Ellman, 2016). These findings 
indicate that social anxiety and mild paranoia are associated, but distinct experiences. 
As a result, mild, non-clinical paranoia can be conceptualised as part of a paranoia 
continuum, and not as social anxiety. 
Despite this, questions remain concerning how movements along the paranoia 
continuum are mediated. Longitudinal research suggests that the presence of non-
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clinical psychotic-like experiences, including paranoia, increases the odds of later 
presenting with a psychotic disorder (Kaymaz et al., 2012; Dominguez, Wichers, 
Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os, 2011; Poulton et al., 2000), indicating that non-clinical 
paranoia may increase one’s vulnerability to movements up the continuum. This 
vulnerability appears to be increased by genetic and social risk factors (including 
adversity, psychoactive drug use, and migrant status) (van Os et al. 2009). However, 
these findings are limited in that research to date has measured outcomes relatively 
broadly in terms of psychosis, and therefore has not tracked movements along the 
paranoia continuum directly.  
Nonetheless, that paranoia is found in the general population suggests that 
non-clinical paranoia may require intervention in its own right. Even mild and fleeting 
non-clinical paranoid thoughts are associated with distress and dysfunction (Freeman 
et al., 2005). Across the continuum, paranoia is associated with lower levels of 
wellbeing, reduced social functioning, poor physical health, and increased incidence 
of stress, anxiety, depression, and suicide (Freeman et al., 2011; Freeman, Startup, et 
al., 2014; Melo & Bentall, 2010). In addition, given that non-clinical psychotic 
symptoms are linked with increased odds of later experiencing clinical paranoia (e.g., 
Kaymaz et al., 2012), developing the understanding and management of non-clinical 
paranoia represents a valid area of investigation.  
Accepting the paranoia continuum means that non-clinical samples provide a 
theoretically valid population within which to investigate paranoia (Garety & 
Freeman, 2013). This is advantageous for a number of reasons. Non-clinical samples 
provide the opportunity to study and manipulate paranoia as an isolated phenomenon. 
In particular, the confounding variance typically introduced by clinical samples, such 
as psychotropic medication and comorbid mental health difficulties, is minimised. 
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Furthermore, there are less ethical and practical constraints to recruitment, resulting in 
larger sample sizes and greater internal reliability. Whilst direct generalisation to 
clinical populations would be inappropriate given the differences inherent between 
clinical and non-clinical populations, non-clinical samples provide an important 
analogue group within which to investigate factors that generate and maintain 
paranoia (Freeman, 2006; Kazdin & Rogers, 1978; Lincoln & Keller, 2008). 
1.2. Paranoia and the Self 
Empirical investigations into the hierarchical structure of paranoia across the 
continuum have consistently shown that paranoia is linked with negative self-other 
perceptions, such as feeling vulnerable, rejected, or weak (e.g., Freeman et al., 2005; 
Freeman et al., 2010; Bebbington et al., 2013).  
There is evidence among the general population to suggest that non-clinical 
paranoid thinking is linked with a need to defend oneself against perceived threats 
from the social world (Mills, Gilbert, Bellew, McEwan, & Gale, 2007). For example, 
studies have found that social adversity (e.g., Freeman et al. 2011) and social stress 
(Wickham, Taylor, Shevlin, & Bentall, 2014) are risk factors for paranoia. These 
relationships appear to be partially mediated by social exclusion (Wickham et al., 
2014), suggesting that not being accepted and included makes one vulnerable to 
paranoia. A recent study found that having a fear of being discriminated against 
partially explained the link between attenuated psychotic symptoms (including non-
clinical paranoia) and social discrimination in ethnic minority groups (Anglin, 
Greenspoon, Lighty, & Ellman, 2014). In addition, perceiving oneself as being of 
lower social rank than others has been associated with emerging psychotic symptoms 
(Allison, Harrop, & Ellett, 2013). In a cross-sectional study, non-clinical paranoia was 
positively correlated with striving to avoid feelings of exclusion and inferiority 
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(Anderson & Freeman, 2013). Such effects have been replicated in empirical 
research. In one study, feelings of social exclusion were induced in a non-clinical 
sample, causing increased negative self and negative other perceptions, and in turn, 
increased paranoid ideation (Kesting, Bredenphol, Klenke, Westermann, & Lincoln, 
2013). In another study using a student sample, paranoia was associated with 
increased self-criticism and a lack of ability to reassure oneself in response to threat, 
with self-hatred predicting paranoid beliefs (Mills et al., 2007).  Therefore, perceiving 
the self as ‘inferior’ and ‘an outsider’ appears to partially explain the link between 
negative self-perceptions and paranoid thinking. 
Negative self-perceptions are also characteristic of clinical paranoia. 
Individuals with persecutory delusions perceive themselves to be less powerful than 
others (Paget & Ellett, 2014). Self-criticism is also higher among individuals with 
persecutory delusions than both depressed and healthy individuals (Hutton, Kelly, 
Lowens, Taylor, & Tai, 2013). Furthermore, negative self-beliefs combined with 
perceptions of rejection were found to differentiate between depression and paranoia 
in a clinical sample (Lincoln et al., 2010). Further, a longitudinal study has shown that 
negative self-beliefs were significant predictors of clinical paranoia at three and 12-
month follow-up (Fowler et al., 2012).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that there is a causal link between 
paranoia across the continuum and negative appraisals about the self, particularly how 
well one fits in, is acceptable to, and compares with others. The theoretical processes 
by which negative self-beliefs lead to paranoia have been extensively debated within 
the literature. Two key theoretical positions have emerged: paranoia as a defence 
against threats to the self-concept, and paranoia as building directly on negative 
perceptions about the self.  
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1.2.1.  Paranoia as defensive avoidance. 
The paranoia as a defence theory postulates that paranoia is the result of 
attributional biases, which are triggered by increased awareness of self-discrepancies 
and inadequacies. Firstly, high self-awareness is theorised to increase the tendency to 
perceive oneself as the target of other’s intentions by bringing the self ‘online’ in 
social situations (‘self-as-a-target bias’, Fenigstein & Hogan, 1984; Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992). Secondly, the perception of inadequacies in the self is postulated to 
trigger a defensive bias to attribute this to a malevolent other, rather than the self 
(Campbell, 1990). Empirical research has gone some way to support this theory. A 
series of experimental studies have showed that increasing self-awareness in a student 
population (e.g., by being sat in front of a two-way mirror, Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992), led to increased feelings of being the target of another’s attentions. Under 
conditions of high self-awareness, negative and ambiguous feedback increased 
paranoid thinking amongst students (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007, study 1 & 2). These 
findings suggest that the perception of discrepancies and inadequacies in the self is 
implicated in the generation of paranoid thinking.  
Bentall et al. (2001) have proposed that paranoia may function as a defence 
against low self-esteem, triggered by awareness of self-discrepancies between the 
‘actual’, ‘ideal’, and the ‘public’ perceptions of the self. Due to self-serving 
attributional biases, paranoid ideation functions to externalise the cause of the 
discrepancy to malevolent others. As a result, self-esteem is protected. However, 
cross-sectional studies investigating the link between self-esteem and paranoia have 
often yielded inconsistent results. For example, patients with psychosis have been 
shown to have, in general, low levels of self-esteem (Freeman et al., 1998), and a 
similar pattern has been reported in non-clinical samples (e.g., Combs & Penn, 2004). 
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On the other hand, others have reported relatively high or normal levels of self-esteem 
in clinical samples (e.g., Candido & Romney, 1990; Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994). 
One possible explanation for these inconsistencies is differences in the 
conceptualisation and measurement of self-esteem across research (Bentall, 2003). 
Bentall et al. (2001) have distinguished between explicit and implicit self-esteem, 
suggesting that paranoia is associated with implicit low self-esteem, but that explicit 
self-esteem may be temporarily high as a result of paranoid self-serving attributions. 
This results in a ‘fragile’ and ‘unstable’ self-esteem. According to their theory, 
attempts to defend against negative self-perceptions, via paranoid attributions, are 
dysfunctional because they maintain perceptions of threat to the self (Bentall et al., 
2008). A further distinction has been made between the self-esteem of ‘poor-me’ vs. 
‘bad-me’ paranoia (Trower & Chadwick, 1995). Individuals who believe persecution 
is not deserved (‘poor-me’ paranoia) report relatively high self-esteem in comparison 
to individuals who believe persecution is deserved (‘bad-me’ paranoia) (Chadwick, 
Trower, Justii-Butler, & Maguire, 2005). 
Recent support for the paranoia as a defence hypothesis has also been drawn 
from studies that have investigated the dynamic relationship between self-esteem and 
paranoid ideation over time using experience sampling methodologies. In a ‘high risk’ 
non-clinical sample, increases in paranoid thinking was preceded by reductions in 
self-esteem, with a specific association reported between long-term fluctuations in 
self-esteem and changes in paranoia (Thewissen et al., 2007).  Investigating short-
term fluctuations in self-esteem also indicated a similar pattern, such that individuals 
with more paranoia generally reported lower levels of self-esteem, which tended to 
show greater fluctuations and less stability over time. Decreases in self-esteem also 
predicted increases in paranoia (Thewissen, Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-
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Germeys, 2008). These findings were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that 
paranoia serves as a dysfunctional strategy to regulate self-esteem in individuals with 
low self-esteem. 
In a further study using an experience sampling methodology with a mixed 
sample of clinical, high risk, and non-clinical participants, episodes of paranoia were 
found to be predicted by decreases in self-esteem and increases in anxiety (Thewissen 
et al., 2011). This may be considered to lend further support to the paranoia as a 
defence hypothesis. However, it was crucially observed that the episode of paranoia 
did not restore or raise self-esteem, as would be predicted by the defence model. 
Instead, self-esteem remained low despite the increase in paranoia. Therefore, the 
authors suggested that paranoia may arise as a result of congruence between negative-
self beliefs which makes perceiving malevolence in others more likely.  
Taking this idea further, delusions more generally may function as a way of 
avoiding negative emotions or thoughts about the self by creating a reality that does 
not exist, whilst at the same time escaping from a reality that does. This line of 
theorising has led to the suggestion that paranoia may be a strategy to avoid negative 
aspects of the self (so-called ‘experiential avoidance’). Udacina, Varesse, Myin-
Germeys and Bentall (2014) found that experiential avoidance was associated with 
unstable self-esteem. Experiential avoidance might contribute to paranoid thinking 
through attempts to avoid negative self-representations. However, Udacina et al. 
(2014) reported that in their research, they did not find any evidence in support of 
paranoia functioning as an effective strategy for preserving self-esteem. Similarly, 
Moutoussis, El-Deredy and Bentall (2015) predicted that individuals with poor-me 
paranoia would show more avoidance of negative self-representations, and therefore 
express relatively more positive self-beliefs than bad-me paranoia. On the other hand, 
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they predicted that bad-me paranoia would show more cognitive avoidance generally, 
and specifically when asked to confront self-discrepant characteristics. However, they 
found no difference in overt views about the self, in avoidance scores, or in 
behavioural avoidance, between the two sub-groups of paranoia.  
1.2.2.  Paranoia as building on negative self-appraisals.  
The findings reviewed in the previous section lend support to models of 
paranoia that consider paranoid beliefs as building directly upon negative self-
representations, rather than indirectly, as a means of avoiding them. According to the 
cognitive model of paranoia, paranoia is conceptualised as extensions of negative 
self-beliefs and negative self-schema, rather than as defending against these 
(Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2008). The model also draws on the role of negative affect in 
the generation of paranoid beliefs, proposing that when negative self-beliefs are 
activated in the context of an ambiguous social experience, cognitive and affective 
reasoning biases combine to make the generation of a paranoid interpretation both 
self-congruent and cognitively available. 
The cognitive model of paranoia has received considerable empirical support. 
Freeman et al. (2012) identified negative ideas about the self, and a self-focused 
cognitive style as being associated with paranoia. Cognitive (e.g., Freeman, Pugh, & 
Garety, 2008; So et al., 2010) and affective (e.g., Huppert & Smith, 2005; Johns et al., 
2004) biases have been consistently linked with paranoia along the continuum. For 
example, anxiety has been shown to prime individuals to feelings of vulnerability, 
threat anticipation and worry (Freeman et al., 2012), whilst depression increases 
rumination about negative schematic beliefs (Gilbert, Boxall, Cheung & Irons, 2005). 
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Both outcomes lead to behavioural changes, such as social withdrawal, that make 
paranoia more likely to occur and persist (Martinelli, Cavanagh, & Dudley, 2013).  
One experimental study used VR to manipulate the height of non-clinical 
participants and thereby alter their social rank perceptions (Freeman, Evans, et al., 
2014). Being relatively shorter elicited more negative self-perceptions, which in turn 
was associated with more paranoia. Another study compared explicit and implicit 
self-esteem (as measured using the Implicit Associations Test) and found globally low 
self-esteem to be associated with paranoia (Cicero & Kerns, 2011).  Further, Taylor et 
al. (2014) administered scales of positive and negative schemas, about the self and 
others, to a mixed group of individuals with positive symptoms of psychosis, 
individuals at risk of psychosis, and a non-clinical group reporting attenuated positive 
symptoms. They found that higher levels of negative beliefs about the self and others 
predicted symptom severity, distinguishing between clinical and non-clinical groups.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that appraisals about the self significantly 
contribute to the onset and maintenance of paranoia. Three recent systematic reviews 
each concluded that the weight of empirical evidence appears to support paranoia as 
an extension of negative self-beliefs, rather than a defence (Garety & Freeman, 2013; 
Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan, Tracey, & Shannon, 2014). Whilst the exact 
theoretical pathway between the negative self and paranoia remains a source of 
controversy and should be the subject of further research, it is clear that paranoia is 
closely related to negative perceptions about the self across the continuum. A key 
implication of this therefore, is that identifying ways to boost perceptions about the 
self may be a promising approach to attenuating paranoia (Moutoussis et al., 2015).  
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1.3. Targeting the Self to Reduce Paranoia 
Despite calls for interventions that target the self in psychosis (Barrowclough et 
al., 2003), clinical interventions that focus directly on the self in paranoia are 
relatively limited (Birchwood, Shiers & Smith, 2014). Chadwick, Birchwood and 
Trower (1996) argue that underlying beliefs about the self unify symptoms of 
psychosis and should therefore be a target of treatment. Person-Based Cognitive 
Therapy (PBCT) follows on from this theoretical standpoint, and combines CBT and 
mindfulness techniques to support individuals to relate differently to cognitive 
content, including psychotic experiences and self-relevant cognitions (Chadwick et 
al., 1996; Chadwick, 2006). Key to the PBCT approach is promoting self-acceptance 
and an integrated sense of self, allowing space for both positive and negative self-
schemata. Whilst this approach has received some empirical support in relation to the 
attenuation of distressing hallucinatory voices (e.g., Dannahy et al., 2011), there has 
been no empirical evaluation of this approach in relation to paranoia or other 
delusional symptoms.  
A small number of studies have investigated CBT interventions targeted at 
improving self-esteem in psychosis. Lecomte et al. (1999) found that a 12-week 
program of activities designed to increase self-esteem in patients with schizophrenia 
led to reductions in symptomology and improvements in coping strategies, although 
there was no change in reported self-esteem. In a similar vein, Hall and Tarrier (2003) 
piloted a self-esteem intervention that involved patients with psychosis eliciting 
positive statements about themselves, and then identifying evidence to support these 
statements. They reported decreased overall psychotic symptomology as well as 
improvements in self-esteem. Replicating Hall and Tarrier’s protocol, Laithwaite et 
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al. (2007) reported the same gains in self-esteem and reductions in psychotic 
symptoms in a forensic setting.  
However, to date, only one clinical study has measured specific changes in 
paranoia following an intervention targeted at the self (Freeman, Pugh, et al., 2014). 
The study trialled a six-session intervention to explicitly challenge negative and 
increase positive self-beliefs through cognitive and behavioural strategies. Significant 
improvements in wellbeing, and a non-significant trend towards a reduction in 
paranoia were reported, although these were not maintained at 12-week post-
intervention follow-up.  
These preliminary findings are promising and highlight the potential for further 
development of interventions that focus on the self in paranoia. Interestingly, 
Freeman, Pugh et al. (2014) reported that strategies aimed at bolstering positive 
aspects of the self, rather than diminishing negative aspects of the self, were better 
received by participants. This suggests that focusing on strengths and building 
positive self-representations may be the most effective way to intervene in the 
negative self in paranoia.  
 
1.4.  Self-Affirmation 
Self-affirmation is a well-validated psychological process that is theorised to 
bolster a positive sense of self in the face of self-threat (Steele, 1988). A self-
affirmation is any thought or action which maintains the perceived adequacy, stability 
and coherence of the self. Self-affirmation theory and processes have been 
extensively studied, and well-validated within social psychology literature (Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014; Steele, 1988), but only relatively recently in relation to mental health 
(Katz, Czech, & Orsillo, 2014). Given the role of the negative self in paranoia, some 
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recent studies have begun to look at the role of self-affirmations in reducing paranoia 
in non-clinical samples (e.g., Kingston & Ellett, 2014). The findings of these studies 
have provided some early indications that self-affirmation may be beneficial for 
reducing non-clinical paranoia, but this work is still in its infancy. In addition, the 
extent to which the social psychological process of self-affirmation might translate 
into clinical psychology contexts is yet to be fully explored (Katz et al., 2014).  
Before discussing the role of self-affirmation in reducing non-clinical paranoia in 
more detail, the following sections will first summarise self-affirmation theory, 
discuss self-affirmation procedures, outcomes, and the mechanisms that have been 
proposed to account for self-affirmation effects.  
1.4.1.  Self-affirmation theory.  
Self-affirmation theory purports that people are inherently motivated to 
maintain an integrated and coherent sense of self that is socially and culturally ‘good 
enough’ (Steele, 1988). Perceiving that one has failed to meet personal, social or 
cultural standards (e.g., by perceiving that one is excluded, inferior, or negatively 
targeted by others) therefore poses a psychological self-threat (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 
2012).  
To buffer against such threats, self-affirmation theory suggests that individuals 
can adopt either direct or indirect psychological responses. Direct responses reject and 
minimise the threat through dismissal, denial, or avoidance, directly defending against 
the threat by attacking its integrity (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Steele, 1988). 
Alternatively, indirect responses aim to buffer against the threat by affirming the self 
in another personally important yet unrelated domain. This bolsters self-resources and 
increases the capacity to approach, accommodate and respond to the threat (Cohen & 
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Sherman, 2014; Steele, 1988). Whilst a strength of the self-system is theorised to be 
its ability to respond to threat in different ways, direct defensive responses are 
considered less flexible and less adaptive. In contrast, self-affirmation frees up 
resources which enables a more flexible and adaptive response to self-threat (Sherman 
& Hartson, 2011).  
Self-affirmations are theorised to occur spontaneously as part of an inbuilt 
‘psychological immune system’ to buffer against the challenges inherent in daily life 
(Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). However, research has shown 
that there are individual differences in the tendency to self-affirm. For example, those 
with lower global self-esteem have fewer positive self-resources (e.g., positive-self 
thoughts, memories and images) with which to self-affirm (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 
1993). Therefore, they show less inclination to spontaneously self-affirm than those 
with higher global self-esteem (Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). Given the theoretical and 
empirical evidence that suggests that paranoid thoughts arise from negative appraisals 
about oneself (e.g., Bentall et al, 2001; Freeman et al., 2005), it follows that paranoia 
will be associated with a reduced tendency to employ self-affirming strategies. 
Conversely, it also follows that encouraging self-affirmation in individuals with 
paranoia may boost psychological resources and in turn attenuate paranoid thinking. 
1.4.2.  Self-affirmation procedures. 
Self-affirmation theory suggests that an unlimited range of cognitive and 
behavioural activities could achieve self-affirmation (Steele, 1988; Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014). Cognitive self-affirmations include reflecting on positive aspects of 
one’s identity, such as memories, images, life domains, and values, whereas 
behavioural self-affirmations involve enacting a positive aspect of one’s identity 
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(Steele, 1988). A range of experimental procedures have been developed to 
manipulate self-affirmation in the laboratory. The most common is value-affirmation, 
which involves reflection on personally meaningful values (McQueen & Klein, 2006).  
Value-affirmation procedures typically involve providing participants with a 
list of valued life domains (e.g., Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000), or a questionnaire 
listing a range of values, such as the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Values Scale (Allport, 
Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960), from which participants rank and identity their most 
important value. Typically, participants are then instructed to write an essay 
expressing why their specified value is personally important to them.  
Expressive writing has been shown to have a broad range of psychological 
benefits, in particular at times of stress and self-threat (Smyth, 1998; Stone, Smyth, 
Kaell, & Hurewitz, 2000). Two recent studies have indicated that self-affirmations are 
key to gaining benefit from expressive writing (Creswell et al., 2007; Niles, Haltom, 
Lieberman, Hur, & Stanton, 2016). For example, Creswell et al., (2007) analysed the 
contents of expressive writing essays written by individuals in recovery from breast 
cancer. The essays were written for 20 minutes each day over the course of three 
weeks. Content analysis revealed that physical recovery three months later was 
mediated by the number of self-affirming statements included in the essays. The 
finding that self-affirmations mediated the effect of expressive writing was replicated 
in a sample of students, where self-affirmations predicted lower anxiety three months 
later (Niles et al., 2016). These findings indicate that self-affirmations can be a potent 
and naturally occurring mechanism for buffering against stress and self-threat. In 
addition, these findings support the inclusion of expressive writing as an important 
component of self-affirmation procedures.  
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Control conditions typically replicate those of value-affirmation procedures 
but instruct participants to identify and reflect on their lowest ranked valued-domain, 
either from their own (e.g., Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowaski, 2008) or another’s 
perspective (e.g., Sherman et al., 2000). However, some have argued that as these 
control tasks involve reflecting on values, albeit in a personally unimportant way, 
they may inadvertently lead to self-affirmation (Cohen, Aronson & Steele, 2000). 
Therefore, some experiments have used a non-values control task, such as writing a 
food diary (Cohen et al., 2000), writing about daily routine (Burson, Crocker, & 
Mischkowski, 2012) or listing the contents of one’s wardrobe or car (Katz et al., 
2014). This type of control also has limitations, as it differs from value-affirmation in 
more than one way (Napper, Harris, & Epton, 2009). Nonetheless, the inclusion of 
control tasks in general strengthens the conclusions that can be drawn in the literature 
about the effects of affirmations (McQueen & Klein, 2006).  
Despite the widespread use of value-affirmation within the affirmation 
literature (McQueen & Klein, 2006), traditional value-affirmation procedures can be 
criticised for lacking clinical and ecological validity (Czech, Katz, & Orsillo, 2011). 
Firstly, values lists provided in value-affirmation studies are typically relatively brief, 
with a limited range of potential values offered. In one study, only five values 
(religion, social issues, politics, theory, and aesthetics) were available from which 
participants could select their most important (Creswell et al., 2005). Whilst the 
authors did find an effect of value-affirmation relative to control in this study, the 
relatively limited range of values provided is likely to lack validity across individuals, 
and may therefore have diluted the potential potency of value-affirmation effects.   
Additionally, pre-determined lists of a relatively brief range of values may 
increase the risk of social desirability effects, by providing only a narrow view of 
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potentially important values. These may be more or less valid depending on an 
individual’s cultural, social and personal experiences (Heine & Lehman, 1997). As 
such, pre-determined lists of values do not allow scope for individuals to identify and 
affirm their own personally meaningful value. This limits the extent to which 
experimental value-affirmations reflect spontaneous self-affirmations, and may also 
weaken the effectiveness of value-affirmation if the value identified as ‘most 
important’ within the list provided is not valid for an individual.  
In addition, values commonly used in value-affirmation procedures tend to 
represent life domains (e.g., art, fitness, politics, religion), rather than core personal 
values or traits with which one identifies. As a result, they may be tapping social 
constructs, rather than self-relevant valued characteristics. Stapel and van der Linde 
(2011) drew a distinction between ‘value’ affirmation and ‘attribute’ affirmation, 
finding that affirmation of personal values increased self-concept clarity and buffered 
against internal cognitive dissonance threats, whereas affirming personal attributes 
increased self-esteem and buffered against social comparison threats. Therefore, the 
type of value affirmed may have important consequences for the domain of threat 
buffered against, a facet not yet accounted for within traditional value-affirmation 
procedures. 
Although a range of themes, including spirituality, humour, and kindness, 
have been identified as values selected for affirmation (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998), 
research has shown that ‘family and friends’ is the most commonly affirmed valued-
domain (Crocker et al., 2008; Schnabel, Purdie-Vaughns, Cook, Garcia, & Cohen, 
2013). This may be a consequence of having a relatively narrow range of valued 
domains from which to choose. However, as a result, some researchers have 
questioned whether value-affirmation effects are better accounted for by reflection on 
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connections with meaningful others, rather than reflection on self-relevant values 
(Crocker et al., 2008; Shnabel et al., 2013). Shnabel et al. (2013) compared a 
belonging affirmation (writing about how a most important value enhances 
connections with others), with an individuating affirmation (writing about how a most 
important value enhances self-sufficiency), a standard value-affirmation, and a 
control. Content analysis of all essays indicated that in the context of identify threat, 
there were individuals in all affirmation conditions who wrote about belonging, and 
writing about belonging was directly related to reduced threat reactivity. Whilst this 
indicates that writing about belonging may be one active component of value-
affirmation procedures, results were not conclusive because the difference between 
the affirmation conditions in threat reactivity was only marginally significant, and 
therefore may not be reliable. 
Furthermore, the process of ranking values in traditional value-affirmation 
procedures differs from that used in clinical practice. In clinical practice, card-sort 
exercises are often used (e.g., Harris, 2013). Card-sorting permits initial allocation of 
values into relatively broad categories (e.g., important vs. unimportant), before 
narrowing down and focussing on just a small number of values that are the most 
personally meaningful. In contrast, current value-affirmation procedures typically 
constrain participants to ascribe a ranked order of importance, considering all the 
values. This may mean that time is spent reflecting on the order of importance of 
relatively unimportant values, rather than more quickly focusing on those that are the 
most personally meaningful. 
Finally, a further debate within the literature concerns whether value-
affirmation is effective if participants are aware that the procedure is expected to have 
beneficial effects. In a series of studies, Sherman et al. (2009) showed that 
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affirmations may be less effective when participants are aware of being influenced by 
them. One suggestion has been that awareness of the purpose of an affirmation may 
inadvertently increase reactivity to the threat (Sherman & Hartson, 2011). As such, 
most studies have not informed participants about the purpose of the affirmation 
procedures. This limits the extent to which value-affirmation procedures might be 
applied to clinical contexts, where openness and collaboration regarding the purpose 
of intervention is vital (e.g., Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007). However, more recent 
research has suggested that it is not conscious awareness of the purpose of value-
affirmation, but lack of choice in the value-affirmation, that reduces the effectiveness 
of affirmations (Silverman, Logel, & Cohen, 2013). In their studies, participants 
benefited if they were aware of the affirmation, and perceived choice within the 
process, whereas those who were aware but perceived little choice in the process did 
not. Such a finding suggests that choice is itself an essential component of the 
affirmation process, a notion that reflects with the importance of maintaining 
autonomy in self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988). In light of this research, it seems 
that informing participants about the purpose of the value-affirmation, whilst at the 
same time providing greater choice about the process of value-affirmation (e.g., by 
providing a broader, more flexible process for selecting the most important value) 
may be a useful development to traditional value-affirmation procedures.      
1.4.3.  Outcome and duration of self-affirmation effects. 
The potential for self-affirmations to be introduced as an intervention 
technique has been widely investigated in relation to a number of threat domains. 
These include physical health (see Harris & Epton, 2009), cognitive dissonance (e.g., 
Steele & Lui, 1983), social and interpersonal threat (e.g., Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & 
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Master, 2006), and more recently, mental health and wellbeing (e.g., Armitage, 2016; 
Nelson et al., 2014). Whilst a review of all outcomes is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the following section will focus on empirical findings that pertain to the utility 
of self-affirmations in buffering against interpersonal threats and supporting 
emotional wellbeing.  
Striking findings have been obtained in relation to buffering against 
interpersonal threat in the laboratory. For example, studies have shown that self-
affirmation protects individuals against perceiving social rejection by attenuating 
expectations about negative feedback in social settings (Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 
2001) and by helping individuals to retain positive self-representations despite 
receiving negative feedback from others (Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004, 
study 3). These cognitive changes following social threat have been associated with 
behavioural changes, such as reducing the tendency to avoid social interactions in 
response to interpersonal threats. In one study, value-affirmation reduced destructive 
behavioural intentions: undergraduate students with low self-esteem reported less 
intentions to withdraw from their relationships after a negative aspect of themselves 
was revealed to others (Jaremka, Bunyan, Collins, & Sherman, 2011). This research 
suggests that self-affirmation may reduce potentially destructive behavioural 
responses to threat in interpersonal contexts. Physiological changes have also been 
observed immediately following self-affirmation. Two studies have found that 
completing value-affirmation prior to facing a stressful social evaluation task reduced 
the cortisol-stress response (Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & 
Jaremka, 2009), whilst other studies have reported that value-affirmation reduced the 
startle eye-blink response to threatening images (Crowell, Page-Gould, & Schmeichel, 
2015), and promoted cardiovascular recovery following social stress (Tang & 
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Schmeichel, 2015). Such findings illustrate the potential for self-affirmation to 
interrupt physiological, cognitive and behavioural responses to threat in social 
contexts. 
The research reviewed above relates primarily to the immediate effects 
following value-affirmation in artificial social and laboratory environments. Self-
affirmation research has also investigated effects in the real world over time. A range 
of follow-up periods have been used, ranging from one week (e.g., in relation to 
change in exercise behaviours, Cooke, Trebaczyk, Harris, & Wright, 2014; During & 
Jessop, 2015) to up to three years (e.g., protection against academic stereotype threat, 
Brady et al., 2016). Reviewing the duration of effects reported in the self-affirmation 
literature indicates that brief self-affirmation manipulations can lead to sustained 
cognitive and behavioural changes, compared with control groups. For example, in 
one study, more positive emotions at work were reported by stressed primary school 
teachers two weeks after completing an affirmation of their work-related values 
(Morgan & Atkin, 2016). Self-affirmation has also been shown to augment the effects 
of an anti-aggression message presented to school pupils. Those that had completed a 
self-affirmation exercise presented with reductions in aggressive behaviour, compared 
to slight increases in aggression in the non-affirmation control group (Armitage & 
Rowe, 2016). In another study, Cooke et al. (2014) reported that one week after being 
given information about increasing physical exercise, those who had completed a 
value-affirmation had more positive attitudes towards exercise and went on to 
undertake more exercise, than their non-affirmed counterparts.  
Similar longer-term effects following self-affirmation have been found in 
relation to interpersonal and social threats. Stinson, Logel, Shepherd, and Zanna 
(2011) found that value-affirmation improved the relational security of individuals 
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who were prone to perceiving social rejection at four and eight weeks following 
value-affirmation. Of particular interest was that the improvement in relational 
security at four weeks predicted further improvement in relational security at eight 
weeks. This suggests that the interpersonal benefits of having affirmed core personal 
values appeared to grow, rather than diminish, over time.  
Long-term benefits observed in reducing the racial achievement gap in 
educational contexts have also been reported to grow over time. In educational 
settings, the negative social and academic outcomes associated with racial stereotypes 
can be negated by value-affirmation over the course of academic terms and years.  
Several replications have shown that value-affirmed ethnic minority students 
academically out-perform their non-affirmed counterparts, reducing the racial 
achievement gap by 40% (Brady et al., 2016; Cohen et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2009; 
Cook, Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, & Cohen, 2012). Walton, Logel, Peach, Spencer, and 
Zanna (2015) observed similar effects for women in male-dominated university 
programmes, in which value-affirmation closed the gender achievement gap, raising 
women’s grades. Affirming core values was found to reduce the tendency to interpret 
everyday stressors in education as an identity threat, thereby reducing avoidant coping 
strategies and increasing the tendency to approach challenges in education and 
learning (Sherman et al., 2013). Such findings have lead authors to conclude that 
relatively brief value-affirmation procedures can have potent effects on cognitive and 
behavioural responses. In turn, the way in which individuals relate to the social world 
is altered, creating a positive reinforcing cycle in which individuals are supported 
both internally and socially to approach, rather than avoid, interactions and activities 
that present a risk of self-threat (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). 
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Similar long-term benefits following self-affirmation have been identified in 
the field of emotional wellbeing. One study compared a value-affirmation 
intervention with a standard happiness intervention in undergraduate students (Nelson 
et al., 2014). Another study investigated wellbeing in a community sample of women 
aged over 45 years old and identified as being at risk for reduced wellbeing 
(Armitage, 2016). In both studies, self-affirmation increased subjective wellbeing, 
which was protected against decline over time, relative to controls. The apparent 
buffering effect of affirmation on subjective wellbeing was linked with a sustained 
sense of meaning in life. Interestingly, both studies reported that self-affirmation 
appeared to increase participant’s motivation to make behavioural changes. Self-
affirmation theory posits that affirmations can be cognitive (e.g., reflecting on core 
values) or behavioural (e.g., acting in a personally congruent way). It is therefore 
possible that the benefits of the initial cognitive self-affirmation were sustained 
following value-affirmation because reflecting on values increased motivation to 
perform self-affirming behaviours (Brady et al., 2016).  
1.4.4.  Mechanisms of self-affirmation effects.  
Self-affirmation theory posits that by maintaining a ‘good enough’ sense of 
self, self-affirmations increase access to internal psychological resources (Sherman, 
2013), which provide a buffer against the perceived threat (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). 
Specifically, individuals connect with personally meaningful aspects of the self 
beyond the source of the threat. This can bolster the sense of self in relation to the 
threat (Sherman & Hartson, 2011), bring the threat into a broader perspective 
(Critcher & Dunning, 2015; Sherman, 2013), and decouple the threat from 
meaningful aspects of the self-concept (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). This psychological 
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position reduces direct avoidance of the threat and increases the ability to move 
forward in meaningful ways despite its presence. Behaviours shown to occur 
following self-affirmation that indicate an increased ability to tolerate and respond 
adaptively to self-threat include improved problem-solving skills (Creswell, Dutcher, 
Klein, Harris & Levine, 2013) and increased receptiveness to behaviour change (e.g., 
Falk et al., 2015). Avoidance behaviours, such as rumination (Koole, Smeets, 
Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999), denigrating others to affirm the self, and 
substance misuse (see Sherman & Cohen, 2006, for a review) are reduced. Increased 
openness and flexibility to approach threat is therefore postulated to alter cognitive 
and behavioural responses, and in turn decrease the impact of the threat on wellbeing 
(Sherman, 2013).  
Some authors have suggested that dispositional traits, such as self-esteem and 
positive mood/optimism, can act as self-resources that facilitate coping with 
psychological threats (e.g., Creswell et al., 2005). Given the pivotal role of self-
perceptions in self-affirmation, early theoretical explanations considered whether self-
affirmation effects were the result of increases in global self-esteem. However, 
empirical research has not yielded consistent improvements in self-esteem following 
self-affirmations, suggesting that self-esteem is unlikely to be a mediator of self-
affirmation effects (Sherman, 2013; McQueen & Klein, 2006). More recent research 
has investigated different facets of self-esteem, rather than global self-esteem and has 
indicated moderation of self-affirmation effects. Haddock and Gebauer (2011) found 
that individuals with high explicit self-esteem, but low implicit self-esteem, benefitted 
the most from self-affirmation manipulations. Other studies have found that those 
who base self-appraisals on social contingencies also benefit more from self-
affirmation manipulations (Heppner & Kernis, 2011). These findings dovetail with 
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the theoretical purpose of value-affirmation, which aims to boost internal personally 
meaningful aspects of the self (Schimel et al., 2004). High levels of self-esteem have 
also been linked with spontaneous self-affirmation. Several studies have shown that 
self-affirmation manipulations are more effective for those with low self-esteem and 
those under the most threat (e.g., Brady et al., 2016; During & Jessop, 2015; Jaremka 
et al., 2011). It appears that high self-esteem may engender a wide range of readily 
available positive self-resources to draw upon to spontaneously affirm the self in the 
face of a threat. Those with low self-esteem may not have access to these self-
resources so readily, thus benefit from the opportunity to engage in self-affirmation 
procedures (Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, 2007). Therefore, whilst affirmation does not 
appear to boost self-esteem, self-esteem may indicate those who will benefit the most 
from affirmation manipulations. 
An alternative rival hypothesis for self-affirmation effects is that thinking 
about one’s values and reflecting on important aspects of oneself may cause people to 
simply feel good. In addition, some researchers have argued that value-affirmation 
procedures deliberately induce positive mood, by instructing participants to write 
about their specified value in relation to times when it made them feel good about 
themselves (Katz et al., 2014). Whether induced positive mood mediates self-
affirmation effects has been extensively debated. Some researchers have reported that 
self-affirmations lead to increased positive affect compared to control (e.g., Koole et 
al., 1999), although many others have reported no significant difference in positive 
affect between self-affirmation and control conditions (e.g., Klein, Harris, Ferrer & 
Zajac, 2011; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000; Spencer et al., 2001). Some authors 
have even reported a reduction in positive affect following self-affirmation (Steele & 
Liu, 1983). 
  41 
There is evidence from experimental studies to suggest that even if positive 
affect changes as a result of value-affirmation, these changes are not sufficient to 
account for the effects of value-affirmation. Research has shown that inducing 
positive mood and comparing this to value-affirmation, and accounting for change in 
positive affect in value-affirmation analyses, does not explain value-affirmation 
effects (e.g., Keough, Markus & Steele, 1997; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Sherman et 
al., 2000; Spencer et al., 2001). Therefore, it is unlikely that increased positive affect 
is sufficient to create self-affirmation effects. In addition, whilst affirmation has been 
shown to increase dimensions of emotional wellbeing (Nelson et al., 2014), the 
immediate effects of affirmation on positive affect did not persist over time, whilst 
self-affirmation effects did. Nevertheless, it has been recommended that researchers 
assess change in positive affect to better understand its potential role in self-
affirmation effects (McQueen & Klein, 2006).  
1.4.5.  Critique of self-affirmation.  
Taken together, evidence from theory and empirical research indicates that 
value-affirmations can have beneficial results at the physiological, cognitive, and 
behavioural levels. However, it is important to note that self-affirmations are not 
intended to be a panacea for social and emotional difficulties (Cohen & Sherman, 
2014), and indeed, not all studies have found self-affirmation to have beneficial 
effects. The authors of a recent systematic review concluded that the positive bias 
within the literature is suggestive of publication bias (McQueen & Klein, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that several published studies have reported 
limited or no psychological benefit of self-affirmation. In contrast to the work of 
Cohen et al. (2006), a recent study found that value-affirmation exerted no beneficial 
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effects in relation to improved academic achievement for negatively stereotyped 
students in the Netherlands (de Jong, Jellesma, Koomen, & de Jong, 2016). 
Furthermore, Burgess et al. (2014) found that black patients, who are at risk of 
stereotype threat, did not benefit from undertaking a 32-item value-affirmation 
questionnaire, and in fact, showed higher levels of negative mood, lower self-esteem 
and lower social self-esteem than patients in the control group.  
A range of factors have been proposed to account for such differential effects 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). These predominantly pertain to methodological 
constraints concerning the procedures used as discussed in Section 1.4.2. Such factors 
include differences in the timing of the affirmation in relation to the presentation of 
the threat, differences in the awareness of the purpose of the affirmation procedures 
(Sherman et al., (2009), cultural differences (Heine & Lehman, 1997), and constraints 
linked to the type and number of values affirmed. As it stands, the circumstances 
within which value-affirmations produce reliable effects remains unclear (Cohen & 
Sherman, 2014), and further research is required to better elucidate the mechanisms 
and circumstances within which value-affirmation is most and reliably effective.  
 
1.5.  Self-Affirmation and Non-Clinical Paranoia 
Following findings that have demonstrated benefits of self-affirmation in 
buffering interpersonal threats, research has begun to investigate the role of self-
affirmation in non-clinical paranoia specifically.  
Ellett and Chadwick (2007, study 3) tested the effects of an attribute based self-
affirmation procedure on non-clinical state paranoia. Thirty students were primed 
with either affirming self-cognitions (by listing ten positive characteristics about 
themselves) or non-affirming self-cognitions (by listing ten negative characteristics 
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about themselves). Participants were then exposed to a paranoia induction, during 
which they received failure feedback under conditions of high scrutiny. Significantly 
less paranoia was reported by participants who had been self-affirmed, suggesting that 
the positive-self statements induction had moderated the impact of the paranoia 
induction. However, there was no baseline measure of paranoia, so conclusions about 
the differences between groups following the paranoia induction rely on inferences 
that the groups were equivalent on paranoia at baseline.  
Two other studies have investigated the effect of priming positive self-cognitions 
on non-clinical paranoia, controlling for baseline paranoia and reporting similar 
effects. In one study (Atherton et al., 2016), 26 males who had reported experiencing 
at least one paranoid thought in the past month entered the same virtual reality social 
scenario twice, once primed with a positive and once with a negative self-concept. 
Self-concept was manipulated by instructing participants to select a time in their life 
where they had felt their most (affirming) or least (non-affirming) self-confident and 
elaborating on this memory using a visualisation exercise. The order of positive and 
negative self-concept induction was counterbalanced across participants. The 
induction of a positive self-concept, relative to a negative self-concept, caused more 
negative appraisals about the self in relation to others, and increased the incidence of 
paranoid thinking (Atherton et al., 2016). Similarly, another experimental study found 
that asking participants to hold positive, compared with negative, self-imagery in 
mind whilst completing state measures of mood, paranoia and self-beliefs lead to 
reductions paranoia, and increases in self-esteem and positive mood in individuals 
with high levels of non-clinical paranoia (Bullock, Newman-Taylor & Stopa, 2016).  
Only one study to date has investigated the effect of values-based self-affirmation 
on non-clinical paranoia. Kingston and Ellett (2014) randomly assigned 55 students to 
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either value-affirmation or control. Following traditional value-affirmation 
procedures, participants in both conditions ranked eleven value-domains in order of 
personal importance. Value-affirmation participants wrote an essay about why their 
top rated value was meaningful to them, whilst control participants wrote about their 
lowest ranked value, and why it might be important to the average student. 
Participants then entered the same paranoia induction as used by Ellett and Chadwick 
(2003). Immediately following the affirmation manipulation, but before the paranoia 
induction, value-affirmation participants reported significantly less paranoia than 
those that had not. The paranoia induction increased paranoia in both groups, but 
paranoia in the affirmed group remained significantly lower than control. This 
suggests that the value-affirmation reduced baseline levels of paranoia, although it did 
not protect against a subsequent increase in response to self-threat. State depression 
scores did not co-vary with state paranoia, suggesting that mood changes did not 
account for the attenuations in paranoia following value-affirmation. 
The short-term reductions in state paranoia reported following value-affirmation 
by Kingston and Ellett (2014) are promising. However, their results suggest that 
value-affirmation functioned by reducing baseline levels of paranoia, rather than 
buffering against future reactivity to threat, as following paranoia induction, paranoia 
returned to baseline. Despite research findings in other domains indicating the 
potential for value-affirmation to have psychological benefits over time (e.g., Stinson 
et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2009) whether value-affirmation would attenuate paranoia 
over time is not clear. In addition, whilst research has indicated some promising 
effects, research to date has only examined paranoia in laboratory settings, and no 
study has investigated whether the effects observed immediately following 
affirmation might attenuate paranoia in the face of naturalistic interpersonal stressors 
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over time. Such questions are of particular relevance to clinical contexts (Gregg, 
Namekata, Louie, & Chancellor-Freeland, 2014). Research investigating whether 
value-affirmation leads to durable attenuations in paranoia in naturalistic settings over 
time is therefore needed.  
 
1.6.  Enhancing Self-Affirmation Effects over Time: Value-based Goals  
Self-affirmation theory suggests that affirming a valued domain can lead to long 
term beneficial effects when the initial process of reflecting on a valued domain is 
followed by self-affirming behavioural changes (Section 1.4.3). In parallel with this, a 
large body of research from clinical psychology suggests that reflecting on values can 
increase motivation to make behavioural changes, reduce avoidance, and improve 
psychological wellbeing (Huguelet et al., 2016; Plumb, Stewart, Dahl, & Lundgren, 
2009; Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). However, whether the benefits following values 
reflection are sustained through ongoing behavioural affirmation of values has not yet 
been empirically tested. 
1.6.1.  Values as motivators to act.  
Verbally endorsing a value does not mean that one’s behaviour is congruent 
with it (Hitlin & Pillavin, 2004). However, acting in line with personally meaningful 
values is more predictive of psychological wellbeing than simply talking about 
personally meaningful values (Sheldon & Kreiger, 2014). In one value-affirmation 
study, Czech et al., (2011) predicted that writing about a most important value would 
lead to lower anxiety responses to giving a five-minute speech. Contrary to 
expectation, there was no difference in social anxiety between affirmation and control 
conditions. However, participants who scored higher on measures of valued-living 
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experienced lower anxiety, regardless of condition. This finding suggests that living 
in line with personally meaningful values may have powerful effects in buffering the 
self against social threat, over and above reflection on values. Valued-living may 
therefore provide ongoing protection from self-threats by acting as an affirmation of 
the self.  
In therapeutic contexts, making contact with personally meaningful values for 
the purposes of behaviour change and emotional wellbeing is an important aspect of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999, 2011). A significant 
component of treatment involves working with clients to clarify their core values and 
increase the extent their life is guided by these. ACT theory purports that increasing 
values-based action contributes to the development of ‘psychological flexibility’, 
whereby clients increase their ability to live a meaningful life in the face of life’s 
inevitable challenges. It is theorised that psychological flexibility is supported by a 
range of strategies (including mindfulness, acceptance, valued-living, and defusion 
from cognitive and emotional content). Psychological flexibility enables individuals 
to respond adaptively to challenges and find balance and meaning in life (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010).  In this way, psychological flexibility may be similar to the more 
open and flexible responses to threat that are observed following self-affirmation 
(Steele, 1988). 
One recent study of ACT treatment components compared mindful acceptance 
with committed values-based action. They found that whilst both approaches were 
associated with increases in psychological flexibility, values-based action was 
particularly associated with increases in wellbeing (Villatte et al., 2016). A meta-
analysis of research investigating individual components of ACT treatment reported 
an overall medium effect of values-clarification on a range of dependent variables 
  47 
linked to psychological flexibility (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012). This 
finding fits with existing research indicating that reflecting on personally meaningful 
values can have a powerful role in increasing one’s ability to respond more openly 
and flexibly to self-threats. However, only eight studies were identified, which were 
drawn predominantly from the value-affirmation literature, highlighting a relative 
paucity of empirical evidence relating to values-clarification in ACT. One study 
conducted since this meta-analysis (Gregg et al., 2014) compared value-affirmation 
using the Bulls Eye Values Survey (BEVS) with a control task (trivia quiz) on cortisol 
reactivity before and after giving a speech. The BEVS is a tool used clinically in ACT 
for purposes of value-clarification. Participants describe their personal values in 
relation to four life domains (relationships, education/employment, fun, and self-
care), identify a behavioural goal within each domain, then rate themselves on value-
consistency. The authors reported an overall significant interaction, with lower 
cortisol reactivity in the values-affirmation group, a finding which reflects the 
attenuations in physiological arousal previously reported following value-affirmation 
(Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman et al., 2009).  
There are some similarities between values-clarification in ACT and value-
affirmation, in that both processes aim to lead individuals to make psychological 
contact with their personally meaningful values in the service of responding in more 
flexible and adaptive ways to psychological threat. However, there are also some 
important differences. Firstly, within ACT, as part of values-clarification, clients are 
encouraged to consider a wide range of values to help prompt and determine what 
they most value (e.g., Hayes et al., 2011). This is in contrast to current methods of 
value-affirmation, whereby traditionally only limited selection of values is presented. 
Secondly, within ACT, values are employed as explicit motivators for committing to 
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act in meaningful ways (Wilson & Murrell, 2004), whereas in traditional value-
affirmation, individuals are not informed about the potential utility of values 
reflection, and are not encouraged to make behavioural changes in line with this value 
(see Section 1.4.2). A notable difference between the value-affirmation procedures of 
Gregg et al. (2014) and traditional value-affirmation procedures is that participants 
were not only encouraged to identity and reflect on their values, but also set a goal for 
acting in line with these. Values-based goal-setting significantly increases the 
effectiveness of goal-setting more generally (Ntoumanis et al., 2014; Fitzpatrick et al., 
2016), and is associated with increases in valued-living and psychological wellbeing 
(Dahl, 2016; Robb, 2007; Williams, Ciarrochi, & Heaven, 2015). Whilst 
neuroimaging research in relation to self-affirmation is in its infancy, a recent study 
has indicated that self-affirmation processes appear to be reinforced by future 
orientation (Cascio et al., 2016). In light of this theory and research, one question not 
yet addressed within the literature concerns whether harnessing the motivational 
qualities of values through values-based goal-setting could enhance the psychological 
benefits of value-affirmation procedures. 
1.6.2.  Value-based goal-setting. 
Research suggests that setting value-congruent goals promotes motivation and 
persistence in the face of self-threat. For example, framing behaviour in relation to 
personal values increased non-clinical participants’ ability to tolerate core negative-
self beliefs (Katz, Catane & Yovel, 2016). Similarly, setting values-based goals was 
associated with a reduction in cortisol and rumination in a non-clinical sample, which 
persisted over two days (Teismann, Het, Grillenberger, Willutzki, & Wolf, 2014). 
This suggests that simply setting values-based goals may have similar effects to 
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value-affirmation in relation to stress-reduction. However, what is not clear from 
these studies is the additional gains that may have been attained had participants also 
been encouraged to act on their goals.  
Setting values-based goals has been shown to lead to improvements in 
academic attainment in university students. In one randomised controlled study 
(Chase et al., 2013), value-affirmation followed by a values-based goal-setting task, 
was compared with a standard goal-setting task, and a no goal-setting control. After 
one term, there was no difference between the standard goal-setting and control, 
whilst the values-based goal-setting group showed significant improvements in 
grades, indicating the importance of values exercises in setting effective goals. 
However, the results are confounded by not having a value-affirmation alone 
comparison group, as value-affirmation has been shown to have therapeutic effects in 
and of itself. To date, no study has compared the effects of value-affirmation with 
values-based goal-setting. 
Only one study has directly investigated the role of values-based goal-setting 
in relation to interpersonal threat (Kashdan & McKnight, 2013). Individuals with 
social anxiety worked on values-based goals over the course of two-weeks. Working 
towards values-based goals enhanced wellbeing, and reduced the avoidance strategies 
which tend to maintain social anxiety. This study highlights how avoidant coping 
strategies, which maintain distress, might be overcome with values-congruent action. 
However, to date, no study has directly investigated values-based goal-setting in 
relation to paranoia.  
Research suggests that individuals experiencing paranoia show reduced 
future-directed thinking (Bennett & Corcoran, 2010; Goodby & MacLeod, 2016), and 
as a result may set fewer personally meaningful goals. Paranoia across the continuum 
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is associated with maladaptive, defensive coping strategies including substance 
misuse, avoidance, rumination and withdrawal (Bebbington, 2015; Freeman et al., 
2005; Freeman et al., 2007; Melo & Bentall, 2010). Avoidant and self-defensive 
responses are postulated to perpetuate paranoid thinking by reducing social 
integration and increasing the focus on the source of the threat (da Motta, Corvalho, 
Pinto-Gouveia, & Peixoto, 2014). For example, social avoidance leads to isolation 
and loneliness in individuals with paranoia (Riggio & Kwong, 2009), whilst reducing 
loneliness attenuates paranoia (Lamster, Nittel, Rief, Melh, & Lincoln, 2017). 
Research also suggests that the ability to approach rather than avoid sources of threat 
may also be one factor that differentiates between high and low non-clinical paranoia. 
Following laboratory induction, individuals with higher non-clinical paranoia 
employed more avoidant coping strategies (i.e., thought suppression and worry) 
compared to individuals with lower non-clinical paranoia (Flower, Newman-Taylor, 
& Stopa, 2015). These findings suggest that cognitive and behavioural responses 
focused on avoiding and defending against the perceived threat in paranoia are likely 
to perpetuate distress, whilst the ability to tolerate and approach sources of potential 
self-threat might attenuate paranoia.  
Whilst there is a growing evidence base for ACT approaches to be used within 
clinical psychosis populations (e.g., Bach, Hayes & Gallop, 2012; Bloy, Oliver & 
Morris, 2011; Johns et al., 2016; Ost, 2014), no study to date has specifically 
investigated the impact of valued-living on paranoia. In one recent study, values-
clarification and committed action was included in a four-session ACT group for 
psychosis (Johns et al., 2016). Whilst change in paranoia was not assessed, overall 
improvements in psychological flexibility were reported, with improvements in 
functioning noted at follow-up. Such research highlights the psychological benefits of 
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committing to values-based action in a psychosis population. Incorporating a values-
based goal-setting to value-affirmation procedures indicates potential for a novel 
integration with existing treatment components of ACT to augment the effects of 
value-affirmation in reducing responsiveness to threat over time (Cohen & Sherman, 
2014).  
 
1.7.  The Current Study 
Drawing together the reasoning from the theoretical and empirical strands 
discussed, this thesis intended to investigate whether attenuations in non-clinical 
paranoia observed following value-affirmation might be enhanced over time through 
the behavioral enactment of those values.  
Given the prevalence of non-clinical paranoia, and the central role that the 
negative self plays in the onset and maintenance of paranoia, further investigation 
concerning interventions for the self across the continuum of paranoia are warranted. 
Self-affirmations have shown promising benefits for a range of difficulties, including 
interpersonal threats and paranoia. In particular, uniting the two literatures relating to 
the potential benefits of value-affirmation, and values and committed action in 
attenuating non-clinical paranoia provides an interesting avenue of exploration.  
This thesis aimed to add to existing research in three key ways. Firstly, to 
investigate whether the attenuations in non-clinical paranoia reported following self-
affirmation in the laboratory are maintained over time, state paranoia was assessed 
immediately following and two-weeks post affirmation.  
Secondly, the value-affirmation procedure was adapted to increase the validity of 
the task and its applicability to clinical settings. Value-affirmation research is 
becoming increasingly interested in clinical problems, such as wellbeing (Nelson et 
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al., 2014), alcohol use (e.g., Harris & Epton, 2009), paranoia (e.g., Kingston & Ellett, 
2014), social anxiety (e.g., Kashdan & McKnight, 2013) and stress (e.g., Creswell et 
al., 2005) using methods that were initially developed to investigate social processes 
such as moral behaviour (Steele, 1989). It therefore feels pertinent to begin to 
consider developing the methods so as to adapt them for investigating clinical issues, 
and in time, use with clinical samples. In this study, an ACT-informed explanation of 
values (e.g., Chase et al., 2013) was provided to participants prior to the value-
affirmation procedures, and a broader range of values, drawn from a card sort exercise 
used in clinical practice for the purposes of value-clarification were provided (Harris, 
2013, Harris, 2011). These values represented a broad range of personal attributes, 
rather than valued-life domains, and aimed to provide participants with a greater 
choice when selecting their most important core personal value for value-affirmation.  
Thirdly, a new affirmation condition, which included a values-based goal-setting 
task immediately following value-affirmation, was developed. This condition 
represents the first empirical test of whether values-based goal-setting enhances the 
effects of value-affirmation over time. This reflects a novel integration of the value-
affirmation literature, which suggests that the effects of affirmations can lead to 
meaningful behavioural changes over time, and the ACT literature, which suggests 
that values-clarification is most meaningful when it leads to personally meaningful 
action by setting values-based goals (‘committed action’).  
There were therefore two experimental conditions, Value-Affirmation (VA) and 
Value-Affirmation plus Goal-setting (VAG), and a Non-Affirmation Control (NAC) 
condition. State paranoia was assessed immediately before (T1), immediately after 
(T2), and two-weeks following (T3) the affirmation manipulation. In the experimental 
affirmation conditions, participants identified their most personally meaningful value 
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and wrote an essay about this value from their own perspective. Following this, those 
in the VAG condition were also guided to set a value-based goal to work on over the 
two-week follow-up period. In the control condition, participants identified their least 
personally meaningful value and wrote an essay about this from the perspective of an 
average person.  
Given that self-esteem has been proposed as a potential moderator of affirmation 
effects, this was measured at T1, and positive affect was measured pre and post 
affirmation to ascertain whether any increases in positive mood associated with the 
affirmation procedures accounted for effects on state paranoia.  
1.7.1.  Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The primary hypothesis predicted a significant interaction 
between group allocation on state paranoia over time. Specifically: 
(a) Immediately following a value affirmation task (T2), state paranoia will be 
significantly lower in VA and VAG conditions, as compared to NAC condition. 
(b) Two weeks later, VAG participants will have significantly lower state 
paranoia than NAC participants. No predictions were made about the VA group. This 
was because Kingston and Ellett (2014) reported a rise back to baseline following a 
threat induction, yet non-paranoia based value affirmation research has reported 
continued benefits over time.  
(c) Within-subjects, it was predicted that there would be no change in state 
paranoia in the NAC condition. In the VA condition, it was predicted that there would 
be an immediate reduction in state paranoia but again, no directional predictions were 
made about changes from T2-T3. In the VAG condition, it was predicted that there 
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would be a progressive reduction in state-paranoia between T1-T2, and between T2-
T3. 
Hypothesis 2: It was predicted that the interaction between group allocation and 
state paranoia over time would remain significant when controlling for any change in 
positive affect between T1 and T2. 
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2. METHOD 
2.1.  Design 
A randomised-controlled mixed design was utilised. The between-subjects 
independent variable was affirmation condition. Participants were randomised to 
either (i) value-affirmation (VA); (ii) value-affirmation plus goal-setting (VAG); or 
(iii) non-affirmation control (NAC).  The within-subjects dependent variable was state 
paranoia, which was measured at three time points: (i) immediately pre-intervention 
(T1), (ii) immediately post-intervention (T2), and (iii) at two-week follow-up (T3). 
State positive affect was measured at T1, T2, and T3. Trait paranoia, mood, self-
esteem and valued-living were measured at T1 to check for group equivalences at 
baseline. 
 
2.2.  Sample 
An opportunity sample of N = 171 non-clinical adults was recruited. 
Approximately three-quarters (73%) were university students. At T1 and T2 there 
were n = 57 participants in each condition. At T3, there was an attrition rate of 7% (n 
= 12), therefore the final sample of participants completing the study was 159. One 
hundred and thirty-two participants were female (77%), and the mean age of the 
sample was 25.58 years (S.D = 8.08, range = 17 - 60 years). Further demographic 
information is reported in Results, see Table 3.1). 
 
2.3.  Power Analysis 
No study to date has investigated the effect of value-affirmation on paranoia over 
time, nor compared value-affirmation with a value-affirmation plus goal-setting 
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condition. To estimate sample size for the present study, the power analysis was 
conducted by first consulting research on the effect of value-affirmation compared 
with control on non-clinical paranoia, and then consulting studies that have 
investigated self-affirmations, and goal-setting over time. The planned analytic 
strategy involved multiple significance tests, both within and between-subjects, to 
decompose a significant Time*Condition interaction. To account for this, the power 
analysis was calculated based on the sample size needed to detect between rather than 
within-subjects effects, as between-subjects analyses require larger sample sizes than 
within-subjects analyses (Greenwald, 1976). 
Based on the means and standard deviations published by Kingston and Ellett 
(2014), a medium between-subjects effect size of d = .69 (Cohen, 1988) was obtained 
for reductions in state paranoia immediately following value-affirmation relative to 
control. Following exposure to a paranoia induction, this between-subjects effect 
remained of medium size (d = .61), with participants in the value-affirmation 
condition reporting less paranoia than those in the control. Medium to large effect 
sizes were also reported by McQueen and Klein (2006) in their literature review of 
the effects of value-affirmation on a range of dependent variables (e.g., stress 
management, risk evaluation, response to negative feedback) in non-clinical samples 
(mean effect size d = 0.70). Levin et al. (2012) also reported medium effect sizes in 
their meta-analysis of values-based experimental manipulations of ACT (Hedges g = 
.61), on a range of dependent variables (e.g., alcohol consumption, academic 
achievement, coping with pain). 
Furthermore, medium to large effect sizes have been obtained by research 
investigating the effects of self-affirmations over time. One week following value-
affirmation, Cooke et al. (2014) obtained a between-groups effect size of d = 1.06 for 
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increased physical activity, d = .89 for increased positive attitudes towards exercise, 
and d = 1.02 for increased positive intentions to exercise compared with control 
group. Similarly, Morgan and Atkin (2016) obtained an effect size of d = 1.11 at two-
weeks following self-affirmation for reduced anxiety in primary school relative to 
control. Within the goal-setting literature, an effect size d = .67 was obtained at two-
weeks for the effects of a daily goal-setting exercise on increased optimism compared 
with control (Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts, 2011).  
Taking these effect sizes into account, an expected overall medium effect size (d = 
0.60) was estimated for the effect of affirmation (VA and VAG) as compared to 
control. Power calculations based on an effect size of d = .60, power at .80 and alpha 
at .05, indicated a sample of 52 per condition (156 in total) to detect effects using a 
three group between-subjects ANOVA.  
Based on previous self-affirmation studies an attrition rate of approximately 10% 
was predicted (e.g., Creswell et al., 2007; Düring & Jessop, 2015). To reduce attrition, 
participants were asked to confirm their availability for the two-week follow-up 
before providing consent to participate. To minimise the effects of any attrition on 
power, an additional 10% was added to the 156 sample size. Thus the total sample 
size used for randomisation was 171.  
 
2.4.  Recruitment 
This study was one of two studies recruiting non-clinical participants and testing 
the effects of VA and VAG over time. Participants therefore completed two additional 
measures to those listed here. Each researcher was responsible for recruiting half of 
the sample. 
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The inclusion criteria were being 16 years or above, and a having a level of 
English sufficient to read and understand the information sheet, provide consent, and 
complete the questionnaires. The study was advertised to first year psychology 
undergraduates at Royal Holloway, who could participate to earn course credits (n = 
71). Interested students read information which described the research as a two-part 
study investigating the relationship between values and thoughts about the self and 
other people (see Appendix 2). Students could then sign up to available time-slots to 
attend the first appointment (T1/T2, worth three course credits). Students were 
emailed a password 10 days later, which enabled them to sign up to the second 
appointment (T3) and complete the follow-up questionnaires online on the appointed 
day, worth one course credit.  
The study was also advertised on the Royal Holloway online noticeboard, through 
the Royal Holloway research participation scheme, and on the researcher’s social 
media (Facebook) pages. Brief information was provided, which described the 
research as a two-part study investigating the relationship between values and 
thoughts about the self and other people. Interested individuals contacted the 
researchers by email to express interest and appointment dates for participation were 
arranged. All participants not taking part in the research for course credits (n = 100) 
were entered into a prize draw to win one of five £20 Amazon vouchers as an 
incentive for participation. 
2.5.  Measures 
2.5.1.  Demographics. 
Basic demographic information was collected concerning participants’ gender, 
age, ethnicity (using response categories based on the Office for National Statistics, 
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2016), current student status, history of mental health difficulties, and highest level of 
education achieved. A summary of descriptive statistics is presented in Table 3.1 
within the results section.  
2.5.2.  Trait measures. 
Measures were selected to assess for group equivalence in the relevant 
constructs of paranoia, mood, valued-living, and self-esteem at baseline (T1).  
2.5.2.1. Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). 
The Paranoia Scale is a 20-item questionnaire designed to estimate trait levels 
of non-clinical paranoid thinking. Example items include: Someone has it in for me; I 
sometimes feel as if I am being followed. Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale 
(1 = not at all applicable to me; 5 = extremely applicable to me). Total scores range 
from 20 to 100, with higher scores indicating higher levels of paranoia. Fenigstein and 
Vanable (1992) validated the Paranoia Scale with 581 students, and reported good 
internal reliability (a = .84). At least one paranoid item was endorsed by 62% of the 
sample, suggesting good sensitivity to non-clinical paranoia. The authors reported 
negative correlations with measures of interpersonal trust (r(150) = - .30, p < .01) and 
positive correlations with a ‘Control by powerful others’ scale (r(150) = .34, p < .01), 
indicating good construct validity. The Paranoia Scale has shown good test-retest 
reliability (a = .70) over six months when administered within a student sample 
(Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992), and is therefore considered an adequate trait measure 
of general paranoia levels in this population. The Paranoia Scale achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .91 in the present study, indicating good internal consistency. 
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2.5.2.2. Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; 
Lovibond & Lovibond 1995).  
The DASS-21 is 21-item scale designed to assess the core symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and stress. There are seven items in each subscale. All items are 
rated on a four-point Likert scale (0 = never; 3 = almost always) based on a timescale 
of over the last week. Responses are summed, with scores on each subscale ranging 
from 0 to 21 and total scores ranging from 0 to 63, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of stress, anxiety and depression. Antony et al. (1998) reported good 
reliability (a = .87 to .94) and concurrent validity (r = .46 to .85) with other scales 
assessing depression and anxiety in non-clinical samples. The DASS-21 achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .89 in the present study, indicating good internal consistency. 
 
2.5.2.3. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 
1965) 
The RSE is a 10-item measure of global self-esteem. All items are rated on a 
four-point Likert scale (0 = strongly disagree to 3 = strongly agree). Five statements 
describe aspects of positive self-esteem (e.g., on the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself), and five items indicate negative self-esteem (e.g., at times I think I am no 
good at all). Total scores can range from 10 to 40. The negative self-esteem items are 
reverse coded, so higher total scores indicate higher levels of self-esteem. In a non-
clinical sample of 508 undergraduate students, the RSE demonstrated good reliability, 
ranging from a = .88 to a = .90 (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001), which is 
consistent with previous investigations of the psychometric properties of the RSES 
generally indicating internal reliability of between a = .72 and a = .88 (Vispoel, Boo, 
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& Bleiler, 2001). Test-retest coefficients have been acceptable for both one week (a = 
.82; Byrne, 1983) and seven month (a = .67; Silber & Tippett, 1965) intervals, 
indicating the scale captures trait constructs that show stability over time. In the 
present study, the RSE achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .88, indicating good internal 
consistency.  
 
2.5.2.4. The Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson, 
Sandoz, Richards, & Roberts, 2010) 
The VLQ is designed to assess values-based living across ten domains 
(family, relationships, parenting, friendship, work, education, recreation, spirituality, 
citizenship, and physical self-care). Each domain is first rated for personal importance 
on a ten-point Likert scale (1 = not at all important to 10 = extremely important). 
Participants then rate how consistent their behaviour has been with each value over 
the past week (1 = not at all consistent to 10 = completely consistent). A composite 
score is derived by calculating the product of the importance and consistency scores 
within each domain, and then finding then mean of these scores. Composite scores 
range from 1 to 100, with lower scores indicating less valued living. The authors 
reported good overall internal reliability (a = .74), and total scores negatively 
correlated with measures of experiential avoidance, (r(251) = – .14, p < .05). Given that 
experiential avoidance is theorised to impede one’s ability to act in line with values 
(Hayes et al., 2011), this negative correlation indicates good construct validity.  
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2.5.3.  State measures. 
2.5.3.1. Paranoia and Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & 
Mikulincer, 1998).  
The PDS is a 17-item measure of state depressive (ten items) and paranoid 
(seven items) cognitions. The PDS scale was designed for non-clinical experimental 
research and is therefore considered sensitive to moment-to-moment cognitive 
changes (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). Bodner and Mikulincer derived items from 
existing scales of clinical symptoms of paranoia and depression psychopathology 
(e.g., Beck, 1967; Derogatis, 1979; Hathaway & Mckinley, 1983; Turkat & Maisto, 
1985) and made adaptations to the items to better suit non-clinical experimental 
research. The scale was validated with 149 undergraduate students, who rated items 
based on the timescale of the past two weeks. A factor analysis with varimax rotation 
identified two distinct factors, paranoia and depression, accounting for 18% and 28% 
of variance respectively (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998).  
Only the paranoia subscale was used in this study. Example items include I 
feel that people are hostile towards me; I do not trust other people’s intentions. Items 
are rated on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all to 6 = very often). Total scores range from 
7 to 42. In this study, as with previous experimental studies (e.g., Kingston & Ellett, 
2014), participants were instructed to rate the paranoia items based on the timescale 
of right now. The paranoia subscale has been reported to show good internal 
consistency (a = .84), and good convergent validity (r = .67,  p < .001) with the 
paranoia subscale of the Symptom Checklist-90 in a student sample (Bodner & 
Mikulincer, 1998). Test-retest reliability has been reported as good (interclass 
correlation coefficient = .75) across three time points over a ten-day period (Matias, 
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2015). In the present sample, the paranoia subscale of the PDS achieved a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.87 at T1, indicating good internal consistency. 
 
2.5.3.2. Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark & Tellegan, 1988). 
The PANAS is a 20-item scale consisting of two subscales measuring positive 
(PA) and negative affect (NA). Each subscale is comprised of ten single word 
descriptors of positive (e.g., Interested; Strong; Proud) or negative (e.g., irritable; 
ashamed; jittery) affect. Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly 
or not at all to 5 = extremely). The PANAS has been validated for use with seven 
different temporal time frames. For the purposes of this study, the timescale of right 
now, that is, at the present moment was utilised. Scores on each subscale can range 
from 10 to 50, with lower scores representing lower levels of positive and negative 
affect. The two subscales have been shown to be independent, such that no items had 
a secondary loading of more than .25 onto the opposite affect subscale (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegan, 1988). The authors reported normative data from 660 non-clinical 
adults (predominantly undergraduate students) which indicated good reliability (PA a 
= .89; NA a = .85) and adequate eight-week test-retest reliability (PA = .54; NA = 
.45) for the present moment version of the PANAS. Convergent validity was good for 
the today version of the PANAS, with significant correlations with the Hopkins 
Symptom Checklist “today” version (PA r = - .29; NA r = .65). The PANAS-PA 
subscale was used to assess change in positive affect over time. 
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2.6.  Experimental Manipulations of Self-Affirmation  
This study adapted a well-validated value-affirmation procedure utilised by 
Kingston and Ellett (2014) and developed by Sherman et al., (2000), with three 
modifications. The modifications aimed to increase the clinical applicability of the 
procedure by including aspects of clinical values interventions as follows: (i) 
providing a definition of values; (ii) using a list of values from clinical values-
clarification tasks; and (iii) using a card sort task for values-clarification. These 
changes are described in more detail below. The full text of the instructions is 
presented in Appendix 8. 
2.6.1.  Value-affirmation (VA). 
Participants read a brief description of values to introduce a definition of 
values prior to completing the value-affirmation exercise. This description was 
derived from explanations of values used clinically (e.g., Chase et al., 2013; Harris, 
2008; Harris 2011; Harris, 2013). The text defined values and made it clear that the 
task was not a test to see whether they have the ‘correct’ values: 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading 
principles that can guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, 
and the personal qualities you want to develop. Values are not the same as 
goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, whereas goals are what you 
want to achieve along the way. Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the 
same values, and this is not a test to see whether you have the "correct" 
values. 
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To increase the clinical validity of the value-affirmation task, participants then 
completed a card-sort rather than a pen and paper ranking of values. Fifty-eight value 
cards, plus two blank cards with a space for writing ‘other’ values, taken from a 
clinical values-clarification exercise (Harris, 2008, 2013, Appendix 9) were provided 
for sorting into one of three piles: very important to me; quite important to me; not 
important to me (Ciarrochi & Bailey, 2008; Harris, 2008; 2013). This list of values 
was chosen to provide participants with a broader range of values, and the values 
reflected personal attributes rather than life-domains, with the aim of addressing the 
limitations of existing value-affirmation procedures.  
Following Sherman et al., (2000), participants then wrote for up to ten minutes 
about their most important value, why it is meaningful to them and describing a time 
it made them feel good about themselves. After completing the essay, participants 
wrote the top two reasons why their chosen value was important to them (Sherman et 
al., 2000). 
2.6.2.  Value-affirmation plus goal-setting (VAG). 
The procedure replicated the VA condition, but was followed by a values-
based goal-setting task. Drawing on clinical approaches to values-based goal-setting, 
participants read a brief rationale for values-based goal-setting and were given 
guidance on setting a personally meaningful, achievable values-based SMART goal 
(Harris, 2008; 2013): 
  
Values can provide a deep motivation that helps us to pursue 
important goals in life. What could you do to help live your life in accordance 
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with this value? We would like you to set a short term goal to focus on over 
the next two weeks. Ideally, you want to set a ‘SMART’ goal.  
 
This is what ‘SMART’ means: 
Specific: what exactly will you accomplish? 
Meaningful: is this goal in line with your most important value? 
Adaptive: is this goal likely to improve your life? 
Realistic: can this goal be achieved in your life right now? 
Time-framed: can this goal be achieved within the next two weeks? 
 
Participants took a copy of their goal away as a reminder to work on their goal 
over the coming two weeks.  
2.6.3.  Non-affirmation control (NAC). 
Following validated procedures (e.g., Sherman et al., 2000), the control 
condition replicated the VA condition, except that participants were asked to write 
about their least important value and why this might be meaningful and important to 
someone else. The control task therefore matched the value-affirmation task, except 
that a non-personally meaningful value and someone else’s perspective was used to 
avoid inadvertent self-affirmation. 
2.6.4.  Manipulation checks. 
Participants completed a series of manipulation check questions following 
manipulation to assess whether they wrote about a personally important value (VA 
and VAG conditions) or personally unimportant value (NAC). Participants rated four 
statements on a six-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree): 
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This value or personal characteristic has influenced my life; In general, I try to live 
up to this value; This value is an important part of who I am; I care about this value 
(see Sherman et al., 2000). Total scores range from 0 to 20, with higher scores 
indicating greater personal significance of the value written about. It was predicted 
that the two affirmation conditions (VA and VAG) would have significantly higher 
scores than the control condition (NAC).  
An additional manipulation check was included at T3 for the VAG condition. 
Participants were asked to answer the following question: If you were asked to set a 
goal at the previous appointment, did you complete it? with response options of Yes; 
No; or Was not asked to set a goal. 
 
2.7.  Piloting 
To assess whether the adapted value-affirmation procedures prompted reflection 
on values in the affirmation conditions compared with control, the procedures were 
piloted with an opportunity general population sample. Five individuals completed 
VA and five completed NAC procedures, followed by the affirmation manipulation 
check. Manipulation check responses were examined to assess whether individuals in 
the VA condition reported that their chosen value was important and meaningful to 
them, and individuals in the NAC condition reported that it was not. Visual inspection 
suggested that the two groups responded differently on the questionnaire in the 
predicted direction. Therefore, the tasks were deemed effective and no changes were 
made.  
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2.8.  Randomisation 
Randomisation was carried out by a second person independent to the study to 
maintain researcher blindness. A randomisation key was generated using 
www.randomization.com. Using this key, sealed envelopes containing the instructions 
for the relevant condition were created and labelled sequentially with participant ID 
numbers. 
 
2.9. Procedure (see Figure 2.1.) 
Participation took place over two appointments. The frst appointment was face-to-
face, and took place either in a private room at Royal Holloway, or at a suitable 
location in the participant’s local community. Participants first read an information 
sheet and provided written informed consent (Appendix 3). The procedure was then 
verbally explained and the experimenter waited outside the room whilst the 
procedures were completed. Participants were informed that they could ask questions 
at any stage. All questionnaires were completed online using Qualtrics online survey 
software (Smith, Smith, Smith & Orgill, 2011) and used forced-choice questionnaire 
responses to minimise missing data. 
Participants sat at a table with a laptop, lined paper, a pen, and two envelopes. 
One envelope was labelled with their ID number and contained instructions for the 
condition to which they had been randomly assigned. The second envelope contained 
values for the card-sort. Participants were informed that they would first be required 
to complete questionnaires on the laptop. These questionnaires assessed 
sociodemographics, trait mood, trait paranoia, trait self-esteem, valued-living, and 
measures of state paranoia and state positive affect (T1).  
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 Figure 2.1. Diagram of procedure. 
 
Participants then opened the envelope labelled with their ID number and 
followed the enclosed instructions for the task (either VA, VAG, or NAC). It was 
explained to participants that one element of the task would involve sorting cards with 
values on, and another would involve writing, for which they should spend 10 
minutes. Participants were shown how to start and stop a timer for 10 minutes on the 
 
  
First Appointment: Face to Face 
Second Appointment: Online  
Pre (T1) 
Socio-demographics 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (Trait Mood) 
Paranoia Scale (Trait Paranoia) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Trait Self-Esteem) 
Valued-Living Questionnaire (Valued-Living) 
Paranoia items of the Paranoia and Depression Scale (State Paranoia) 
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (State Positive Affect) 
VA Condition 
N = 57 
NAC Condition 
N = 57 
VAG Condition 
N = 57 
Post (T2) 
Value-Affirmation Manipulation Check  
Paranoia items of the Paranoia and Depression Scale (State Paranoia) 
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (State Positive Affect) 
Two-Week Follow Up (T3) 
Paranoia items of the Paranoia and Depression Scale (State Paranoia) 
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (State Positive Affect) 
Value-Affirmation + Goals Manipulation Check  
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laptop, and instructed to pause the timer if they completed writing before the 10-
minute period had elapsed so that the duration of time spent writing could be 
measured. Participants were instructed to place their completed essay inside the 
numbered envelope to maintain experimenter blindness to condition. Conditions were 
matched for duration to complete (approximately 15-20 minutes). Participants then 
used the laptop to complete the manipulation check questions, measures of state 
paranoia and positive affect (T2), and provided their email address for receiving the 
online link to complete the second appointment. 
The second appointment (T3) took place online, two weeks after T1/T2. 
Participants completed measures of state paranoia and positive affect, and the one-
item VAG manipulation check (T3). Three days prior to this appointment, all 
participants were emailed a reminder which enabled participants taking part for 
course credit to sign up to the study. All participants also received an email on the day 
with instructions for completing the T3 appointment. Participants who had not 
completed the questionnaires on their appointed day were sent one reminder email 
encouraging participation, but also stating their right to withdraw. A debrief sheet 
(Appendix 4) was provided online at the end of the T3 questionnaires. All participants 
had the opportunity to enter their telephone number and receive a debrief telephone 
call from the researchers.  
 
2.10. Ethical Considerations  
The study was reviewed and received approval from the Royal Holloway 
Research Ethics Committee (REC ID: 82;  Appendix 1). The procedures were not 
anticipated to have any negative implications for participants. However, in clinical 
settings, values-clarification can be a potentially distressing experience (Hayes et al., 
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2011). In addition, completing questionnaires that ask participants to reflect on 
paranoia or negative mood may have negative emotional effects. As such, whilst none 
of the participants requested this, all participants were offered the opportunity for a 
telephone call debrief at the end of the study. The debrief sheet also included 
information about relevant sources of emotional support, and participants were 
encouraged to contact the researcher by email should they have any questions or 
concerns about any aspect of their participation in the study.  
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3. RESULTS 
3.1.  Overview 
This chapter begins with a description of the preliminary statistical procedures 
employed prior to hypothesis testing, including the procedures used to screen for and 
manage missing data, investigate the distributions of the data, and manage outliers. 
Where data were not normally distributed, transformations were performed so that the 
data met the assumptions for parametric tests. After this, descriptive and statistical 
analyses were computed to assess whether groups were equivalent at baseline on key 
study and demographic variables. Each hypothesis is then outlined in turn, with 
details of the statistical procedures used and the outcome.  
All data were processed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, 
version 21). All values are reported to two decimal places, except from percentages 
which are reported to one decimal place. Conventional levels of statistical 
significance were applied, with the alpha level p < 0.05 adopted throughout, unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
3.2.  Preliminary Statistical Procedures 
3.2.1.  Missing data. 
All questionnaires were completed online using forced choice responding, 
which minimised missing data. However, due to an administration error, four 
participants did not complete the Valued-Living Questionnaire (VLQ) at baseline, and 
18 participants did not report on the length of time they spent completing the 
affirmation essay (six participants from each condition). Where statistical analysis 
involved variables with missing data, cases were excluded using listwise deletion. 
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Listwise deletion is one method of managing missing data in which cases with 
missing data from any variable involved in an analysis are excluded from that 
analysis. The method of listwise deletion was selected given the relatively limited 
amount of missing data, and its relative simplicity (Schafer & Graham, 2002). 
3.2.2.  Attrition.  
Twelve participants (7.0%) were lost to T3 follow-up. There was no evidence 
of systematic attrition as an effect of group allocation, because attrition was similar 
across conditions (VA: n = 3; VAG: n = 5; NAC: n = 4). For analyses involving T3 
variables, cases lost to T3 were excluded using listwise deletion. 
3.2.1.  Outliers. 
Outliers are data points that lie well outside the area of variance expected 
amongst sample scores. Outliers may represent an error in measurement, responding, 
or data recording, but may also represent a legitimate extreme value, which occurs 
because an individual differs from the rest of the sample in a meaningful way (Field, 
2013). It is therefore important to identify and examine individual outliers and 
evaluate the best course of action for managing them in the data set (Field, 2013).  
Initially, boxplots were inspected to identify univariate outliers, and data 
points that fell outside of the upper or lower quartiles were examined. For this thesis, 
data points were investigated as potential outliers if they fell more than three standard 
deviations above or below the sample mean (Field, 2013). Given that the planned 
analysis involved between-group comparisons, all data were examined for outliers 
based on group means and standard deviations within each condition at each time 
point.  
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A total of 13 participants were identified as having extreme high scores on at 
least one study variable. High scores did not appear to be a systematic effect of 
condition (VA: n = 5; VAG: n = 6; NAC: n = 3). High extreme scores were obtained 
at T1 on measures of the DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales (n = 7) and 
on the measure of trait paranoia (n = 2). High extreme scores were also obtained on 
the state measure of paranoia at T1, T2, or T3 (n = 7). No participant had extreme 
high scores on more than three study variables.  
Inspection of the extreme high scores indicated that they were likely to reflect 
true data points and therefore represent valid and meaningful variation within the 
sample. Given the aim of recruiting an analogue sample, the inclusion of extreme high 
scores (which reflect the more severe, clinical end of the symptom scales) was 
considered meaningful and relevant to the study aims. In addition, excluding 
meaningful data can lead to a loss of power and therefore increase the likelihood of 
type 1 error (Bakker & Wichert, 2014). It was therefore decided to retain these 
extreme high scores within the dataset.  
One participant was identified as having extreme low scores on questionnaire 
responses at T3. Visual inspection of these scores indicated that this was likely to be 
the result of a response error, as the participant had provided the same responses to all 
items on all measures collected at that T3, irrespective of item content. This pattern of 
responding is suggestive of content non-responsivity, and threatens internal validity 
(Nichols, Greene, & Schmolck, 1989). As such, it was decided to exclude this 
participant from analyses involving T3 variables. Therefore, at T3, N = 158. 
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3.2.2.  Distribution of variance. 
Normality and homogeneity of variance are both key assumptions for the use 
of parametric tests. Normality of distribution was initially assessed by visually 
examining histograms with normal curves for all study variables within each group.  
After visually examining histograms, each variable was formally assessed for skew 
and kurtosis using z-scores obtained using the following formulas (Tabachnick & 
Fiddell, 2007): 
!"#$:	' = ! − 0+. #. +"#$ 
     
-./01+2+: ' = - − 0+. #. "./01+2+ 
 
Normality was accepted if z < 3.29 (p > .001), such that a significant score on 
skew or kurtosis (z > 3.29, p < .001) was taken to indicate significantly non-normal 
distributions. Histograms with normal curves, together with skew and kurtosis z 
scores, indicated that state paranoia at T1, T2, and T3 was positively skewed within 
all (VA, VAG, and NAC) conditions. Age and DASS-21 Depression were also 
positively skewed in all three conditions. Trait paranoia and DASS-21 Anxiety were 
positively skewed in the VAG and NAC conditions, and DASS-21 Stress was 
positively skewed in the VAG condition only.  
Square-root transformations successfully normalised the positive skew in 
DASS-21 variables, a log10 transformation successfully normalised trait paranoia, 
and reciprocal transformations normalised age and state paranoia at T1, T2 and T3. 
Reciprocal transformations inverse scores, such that high scores become low and vice 
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versa. To correct this, reciprocal transformed scores were then reversed by 
multiplying the scores by -1. For comparison purposes, variables that were 
transformed at any time point or within any condition had the same transformation 
applied to data at all time points and across all conditions. For skew and kurtosis 
scores for all variables, please see Appendix 10. 
Homogeneity of variance was assessed using Levene’s tests (for between-
subjects t-tests) and Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity (for repeated measures ANOVAs). 
Where these were found to be significant (i.e., equal variances or sphericity could not 
be assumed), repeated measures ANOVA results were reported using the Huynh-Feldt 
statistic, and t-tests were reported using t-values in which equal variances had not 
been assumed. These are stated where relevant. 
 
3.3.  Descriptive Statistics 
3.3.1.  Sociodemographic variables. 
The sociodemographic characteristics of the sample are presented in 
Table 3.1. The sample was predominantly white, female, at university, and without a 
mental health diagnosis. The mean age was 25.58 years (SD = 8.08). 
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Table 3.1. Sociodemographic variables. 
 Condition   
Sociodemographic Variables  
 (%) 
VA 
n = 57  
VAG 
n = 57 
NAC 
n = 57 
Total Sample 
N = 171 
Test Statistic 
Gender Female 40 (70.2%) 49 (86%) 43 (75.4%) 
13 (22.8%) 
1 (1.8%) 
132 (77.2%)  !2(4) = 6.17, p = .19 
Male 
Other 
17 (29.8%) 
0 (0%) 
8 (24.0%) 
0 (0%) 
38 (22.2%) 
1 (0.6%) 
  
Age M (SD) 23.74 (7.11) 25.44 (8.03) 27.56 (8.70) 25.58 (8.08)  F(2, 168) = 4.1, p = .02 
Ethnicity White  40 (70.2%) 41 (71.9%) 47 (82.5%) 
2 (3.5%) 
6 (10.5%) 
2 (3.5%) 
0 (0%) 
128 (74.9%)  !2(8) = 6.23, p = .62 
Mixed 1 (1.8%) 2 (3.5%) 5 (2.9%)   
Asian 14 (24.6%) 11 (19.3%) 31 (18.1%)   
Black 2 (3.5%) 2 (3.5%) 6 (3.5%)   
Other 0 (0%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (0.6%)   
Student Status Undergraduate 34 (59.6%) 28 (49.1%) 21 (36.8%) 
17 (29.8%) 
83 (48.5%)  !2(4) = 6.10, p = .19 
Postgraduate 11 (19.3%) 15 (26.3%) 43 (25.1%)   
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Not a student 12 (21.1%) 14 (24.6%) 19 (33.3%) 45 (26.3%)   
Highest 
Education 
No education 
0 (0%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (1.8%) 2 (3.5%) 
 !2(4) = 6.94, p = .54 
 GCSE 2 (3.5%) 0 (0%) 2 (3.5%) 4 (2.3%)   
 A-level 31 (54.4%) 28 (49.1%) 22 (38.6%) 81 (47.4%)   
 Bachelor Degree 9 (15.8%) 15 (26.3%) 15 (26.3%) 39 (22.8%)   
 Post-graduate  15 (26.3%) 13 (22.8%) 17 (29.8%) 45 (26.3%)   
Mental Health  
Diagnosis 
Yes 15 (26.3%) 17 (29.8%) 17 (29.8%) 
40 (70.2%) 
49 (28.7%)  !2(2) = .23, p = .89 
No 42 (73.7%) 40 (70.2%) 122 (71.3%)   
Mental Health 
Ongoing 
Yes 7 (12.3%) 10 (17.5%) 11 (19.3%) 28 (16.4%)  !2(2) = 1.09, p = .58 
No 8 (14.0%) 7 (12.3%) 6 (10.5%) 21 (12.3%)   
Recruitment  
Source 
Y Credit Scheme 31 (54.4%) 23 (40.4%) 17 (29.8%) 
1 (1.8%) 
14 (24.6%) 
71 (41.5%)  !2(6) = 11.45, p = .08 
Paid Pool 1 (1.8%) 3 (5.3%) 5 (2.9%)   
DClinPsy 8 (14.0%) 16 (28.1%) 38 (22.2%)   
 Family/Friends 17 (29.8%) 15 (26.3%) 25 (43.9%) 57 (33.3%)   
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Before hypothesis testing, a series of chi-square tests were computed to test 
whether conditions were equivalent across categorical sociodemographic variables. A 
one-way ANOVA was used to assess whether conditions were equivalent on the 
continuous socio-demographic variable of age. As illustrated in Table 3.1, conditions 
only differed significantly at baseline on age (F(2, 168) = 4.1, p = .018). Fisher’s 
protected independent t-tests were performed to investigate the significant F value for 
age. The results indicated that participants in VA were significantly younger (M = 
23.74 years) than those in NAC (M = 27.56 years) (t(112) = -2.82, p = .006). Age was 
not significantly different between VA and VAG (t(112) = -1.46, p = .15), nor between 
VAG and NAC (t(112) = -1.43, p = .16)1.  
Given this difference between conditions on age, it was important to test 
whether age was correlated with the key outcome variable of paranoia. A significant 
relationship between age and paranoia could affect the detection of differences in 
state paranoia by masking or strengthening the effect of group allocation. Negative 
correlations, with older age being correlated with lower paranoia, have previously 
been reported in the literature (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2013). Pearson’s correlations 
indicated that age was significantly negatively correlated with trait paranoia (r = -.48, 
p < .001) and state paranoia across group and time (range r = -.31 to r = -.41, p < 
.001) in the current sample. 
                                                
 
1 There were four outliers (older participants) on age, distributed across the three 
conditions. The difference between conditions remained significant when these four 
age outliers were removed (F(2, 164) = 3.98, p = .02). Fischer’s protected independent 
samples t-tests indicated that the pattern of significance remained the same (i.e., 
participants in NAC condition were significantly older than participants in VA, t(110) = 
-1.47,  p = .14). Therefore, the outliers were retained within the dataset. 
  
 
80 
Because age was significantly associated with the primary study variable 
(state paranoia) and was unequally distributed across groups, it was decided to run the 
main analyses involving between-subjects comparisons with and without age as a 
covariate to assess whether the difference between conditions on age would impact 
upon the hypothesised relationship between conditions and paranoia over time. 
3.3.2. Study variables at baseline 
Table 3.2. presents group descriptive statistics on study variables at baseline. 
Mean levels of trait and state paranoia were similar to those found by other authors 
(e.g., Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Kingston & Ellett, 2014). One-way ANOVAs 
conducted to assess for group equivalence on key variables at baseline indicated that 
conditions were not statistically different on any study variables at baseline.
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 Condition  
Study Variables  
(M, SD) 
VA 
n = 57 
VAG 
n = 57 
NAC 
n = 57 
Test Statistic 
Trait Variables     
Trait Paranoia  36.21 (11.87) 34.89 (13.21) 32.42 (10.23) F(2, 168) = 1.58, p = .21 
RSE 18.79 (5.42) 19.54 (4.63) 19.37 (5.09) F(2,168) = 0.35, p = .71 
DASS-21 Depression 3.05 (3.00) 3.14 (3.45) 3.25 (3.01) F(2,168) = 0.03, p = .97 
DASS-21 Anxiety 3.46 (3.00) 2.93 (2.88) 3.12 (3.17) F(2,168) = 0.45, p = .64 
DASS-21 Stress 5.68 (3.05) 5.16 (3.49) 6.00 (3.22) F(2,168) =  0.91, p = .40 
VLQ 53.96 (12.17) 51.39 (14.27) 51.32 (15.19)             F(2,164) = 0.66, p = .52 
State Variables     
T1 State Paranoia  12.28 (4.34) 13.04 (6.75) 12.18 (4.68) F(2, 168) = 0.12,  p = .89 
     
     
Table 3.2. Group Equivalence on Study Variables at Baseline. 
82
T1 PANAS-PA 25.30 (7.07) 26.32 (7.88) 26.93 (8.43) F(2,168) = 0.63, p = .53
Note. VA Ð Value-affirmation; VAG Ð Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; NAC Ð Non-affirmation control; 
DASS-21: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; RSE: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; PANAS-PA: Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule- Positive Affect; VLQ: Valued Living Questionnaire. For VLQ, VA: n = 57; VAG:  n
= 56; NAC: n = 54. Means reported are for untransformed scores; between-group comparisons based on 
transformed data where required to meet parametric assumptions. 
82
T1 PANAS-PA 5. 0 ( .07) 26.32 (7.88) 26.93 (8.43) F(2,168) = 0.63, p = .53
Note. VA Ð alue-affirmation; VAG Ð Value- ffirmation plus goal-setting; NAC Ð Non-affirmation control; 
DASS-21: Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; RSE: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; PANAS-PA: Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule- Positive Affect; VLQ: Valued Living Questionnaire. For VLQ, VA: n = 57; VAG:  n
= 56; NAC: n = 54. Means reported are for untransformed scores; betwee -group c mparisons based on 
transformed data where required to meet parametric assumptions. 
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3.3.3. Affirmation manipulation. 
3.3.3.1. Manipulation check. 
To ascertain whether VA and VAG participants had written about a value that 
was viewed as personally more important and meaningful than control participants, 
the manipulation check data were examined. This suggested that eight participants 
had incorrectly completed the manipulation check items. For example, four VA 
participants indicated on the Likert scale that they had written about a value that 
didn’t matter to them, but reviewing their essays suggested they had written about a 
value that did matter to them. This manipulation check data were therefore deemed a 
response error and was substituted with the sample mean.  
It was predicted that individuals in the VA and VAG conditions would score 
significantly higher on the value-affirmation manipulation check than participants in 
the NAC condition. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA indicated a significant 
difference on total score on the manipulation check between conditions (F(2,168) = 
261.53, p < .001; VA mean: 18.88; VAG mean: 18.39; NAC mean: 9.84). Fisher’s 
protected independent samples t-tests were performed, which confirmed that NAC 
participants scored significantly lower than VA (t(72.51) = 17.96,  p < .001) and VAG 
participants (t(76.99) = 16.65, p < .001), whilst there was no significant difference 
between the two affirmation conditions (t(110.23) = -1.82, p = .07). This supported the 
prediction and indicated that affirmation participants had written about a more 
personally important and meaningful value than control participants. 
3.3.3.2. Values selected for affirmation essays. 
To better understand how participants carried out the affirmation tasks, the 
values selected by affirmation and control participants were analysed. Frequencies 
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and percentages are presented in Table 3.3. Data were available for 159 (93%) of 
participants. Missing data were the result of participants choosing to keep their essay 
following the affirmation exercise, and was predominantly from participants in the 
VAG condition (n = 9).  
Within the affirmation conditions (VA and VAG), a total of 34 values were 
selected as most important, indicating a relatively broad range of most important 
values across participants. Love (n = 11; 19.3%) and Trust (n = 9; 15.8%) were the 
most commonly selected most important values. A relatively smaller range (n = 14) 
were selected across participants in the NAC condition as the least important value. 
Power (n = 27; 47.7%) was the most commonly selected least important value. One 
participant provided their own value in the VAG condition (Closeness/Belonging), 
and one participant provided their own value in the NAC condition (Disloyalty)2. 
  
                                                
 
2 Five other participants added ‘Other’ values to the card sort exercise, however, due 
to an error in data collection, the condition these values were associated with, or 
whether these values were chosen as the subject of affirmation essays is not known. 
The five values that were provided were Individuality: difference between people and 
celebrating it; Happiness; To be rational; To think critically; Realism: to think in a 
way that is logical and true to life while avoiding extreme pessimism.  
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Table 3.3. Values Selected for Affirmation Essays 
 Condition 
Value  
Frequency (%) 
VA 
n = 57 
VAG 
n = 57 
NAC 
n = 57 
Love 6 (10.5%) 5 (8.8%) - 
Trust 4 (7.0%) 5 (8.8%) - 
Open-mindedness 3 (5.3%) 4 (7.0%) - 
Kindness 2 (3.5%) 4 (7.0%) - 
Honesty 2 (3.5%) 4 (7.0%) - 
Authenticity 4 (7.0%) 1 (1.8%) - 
Contribution 1 (1.8%) 3 (5.3%) - 
Persistence 3 (5.3%) 1 (1.8%) - 
Self-development 2 (3.5%) 2 (3.5%) - 
Independence 2 (3.5%) 2 (3.5%) - 
Gratitude 3 (5.3%) 1 (1.8%) - 
Reciprocity 2 (3.5%) 1 (1.8%) 1 (1.8%) 
Forgiveness 3 (5.3%) - 1 (1.8%) 
Freedom 3 (5.3%) - - 
Compassion 2 (3.5%) 1 (1.8%) - 
Self-control 2 (3.5%) - - 
Flexibility - 2 (3.5%) - 
Respect - 2 (3.5%) - 
Supportiveness - 2 (3.5%) - 
Humility - 2 (3.5%) - 
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Industry 1 (1.8%) - - 
Humour 1 (1.8%) - - 
Friendliness 1 (1.8%) - - 
Fun 1 (1.8%) - - 
Acceptance 1 (1.8%) - - 
Caring 1 (1.8%) - - 
Courage 1 (1.8%) - - 
Curiosity 1 (1.8%) - - 
Equality 1 (1.8%) - - 
Excitement - 1 (1.8%) - 
Responsibility - 1 (1.8%) - 
Self-awareness - 1 (1.8%) - 
Other: 
Closeness/belonging 
- 1 (1.8%) - 
Romance - - 1 (1.8%) 
Justice - - 1 (1.8%) 
Mindfulness - - 1 (1.8%) 
Fitness - - 1 (1.8%) 
Other: Disloyalty - - 1 (1.8%) 
Beauty - - 2 (3.5%) 
Sensuality - - 3 (5.3%) 
Sexuality - - 3 (5.3%) 
Order - - 4 (7.0%) 
Conformity - - 4 (7.0%) 
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Adventure 1 (1.8%) - 5 (8.8%) 
Power - - 27 (47.4%) 
Missing data 2 (3.5%) 9 (15.8%) 1 (1.8%) 
Note. Values chosen as most important (VA; VAG), and least important (NAC). VA – 
Value-affirmation; VAG – Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; NAC – Non-
affirmation control. 
 
3.3.3.3. Time taken to write essay. 
To assess whether participants spent an equivalent amount of time writing the 
essay across conditions, a one-way ANOVA was computed using time taken as the 
dependent variable (a squaring transformation was applied to normalise skew). This 
indicated that participants spent an equivalent amount of time writing across 
conditions (VA Mean: 8 mins 11.02 secs, SD = 119.90; VAG Mean: 8 mins 9.27 secs, 
SD = 133.73; NAC Mean: 7 mins 36.53 secs, SD = 123.95); F(2,150) = 1.54, p = .22). 
 
3.3.3.4. Goals chosen by VAG participants. 
Data regarding the values-based goal set were available for 41 (71.9%) 
participants in the VAG condition (see Appendix 11). Of these, 24 (58.5%) goals 
mentioned improving relationships with other people in the service of their specified 
most important value (e.g., spending time with loved ones, being kinder, more 
tolerant, more helpful to others). Four related to academic goals in the service of the 
specified values (e.g., completing a coursework assignment, revising regularly), and 
13 related to other self-development or life goals associated with the participant’s 
specified most important value (e.g., to move house, to try something new, to let go of 
worries).  
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3.3.4.  T3 follow-up. 
3.3.4.1. Timing of T3 completion. 
Participants were requested to complete the T3 follow-up questionnaires 14 
days after completion of T2. The majority of participants (66.0%) completed T3 at 14 
days, with a range of 11 to 25 days across the response sample.  A leeway of seven 
days was considered acceptable. Three participants completed T3 responses outside of 
this seven-day window, but as no outliers were obtained in their responses, their data 
were retained. A one-way ANOVA confirmed there were no systematic differences in 
the timing of T3 completion by condition (F(2, 156) = 0.15, p = .87). 
 
3.3.4.2. Completion of Goals in VAG 
Thirty-four (65.3%) participants in the VAG condition reported having completed 
their value-based goal at T3.  
 
3.4.  Hypothesis Testing 
3.4.1.  Hypothesis 1: the effect of condition on state paranoia over time.  
The primary hypothesis predicted a significant interaction between group 
allocation and state paranoia over time. Specifically, the following between-groups 
differences were predicted: (a) At T2, state paranoia will be significantly lower 
immediately in VA and VAG than in NAC; (b) At T3, state paranoia will be lowest in 
the VAG condition. There was no a priori prediction concerning between-subjects 
differences between VA and NAC at T3; and (c) differences in within-groups changes 
in paranoia over time were predicted. Specifically, a reduction in paranoia between 
T1 and T2 was predicted within VA, with no a priori prediction concerning within-
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group change between T2 and T3. Within the VAG group, a progressive reduction in 
state paranoia between T1 and T2, and between T2 and T3 was predicted. No change 
in paranoia over time was predicted within the NAC group. 
These hypotheses were tested by computing a mixed 3 X 3 ANOVA, with 
Time as the within-subjects factor (three levels: T1, T2, T3), Condition as the 
between-subjects factor (three levels: VA, VAG and NAC) and State Paranoia as the 
dependent variable. The statistical analysis was run twice, both with and without age 
as a covariate in the model (see section 3.3.1). Raw means for state paranoia are 
presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. State Paranoia Scores for VA, VAG and NAC over Time (vertical lines 
depict standard error of means). 
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For both analyses, Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant. Without age 
entered as a covariate in the model (3 X 3 ANOVA), there was a significant main 
effect of Time within subjects (F(1.74, 270.01) = 6.15, p = .004), and a significant 
Time*Condition interaction (F(3.49, 270.01) = 2.63 p = .04). There was no significant 
main effect of Condition between-subjects (F(2, 155) = 2.09, p = .13).  
With age entered as a covariate in the model (3 X 3 ANCOVA), there was no 
significant main effect of Time within-subjects (F(1.75, 269.1) = 0.50, p = .59), a trend 
towards a main effect of Condition between-subjects (F(2, 154) = 2.98, p = .055), and a 
significant Time*Condition interaction (F(3.5,269.1 ) = 2.74, p = .04).  
Comparing the results of these analyses indicates that whilst the 
Time*Condition interaction was significant in both models, different results were 
obtained for the main effects, with the main effect of Time not significant and the 
main effect of Condition becoming a trend when age was entered as a covariate. This 
suggests that the significant difference between conditions on age at baseline may 
have had a potential impact on the hypothesised relationship between conditions and 
paranoia over time. It was therefore decided to retain age as a covariate and the 3 X 3 
ANCOVA analysis was interpreted. 
The significant Time*Condition interaction was fully decomposed according 
to a priori predictions (Clarke-Carter, 2004). First, to test the prediction that VA and 
VAG would have lower levels of state paranoia than the NAC condition at T2, two 
independent samples t-tests were computed. Contrary to prediction, these were not 
significant for NAC vs. VA (t(112) = -0.54, p = .59) or for NAC vs. VAG t(112) = -1.14, 
p = .29). Therefore, H1 (a) was not supported, as there was no significant difference 
in state paranoia between experimental and control conditions at T2.  
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To test H1 (b), a one-way univariate ANCOVA with least significant 
difference (LSD) planned comparisons was carried out to test for between-groups 
differences on state paranoia at T3. T3 State Paranoia was entered as the dependent 
variable, Condition was the fixed factor, and age was entered as the covariate. This 
revealed a significant difference between conditions on state paranoia (F(2, 154) = 4.90, 
p = .009, hp2 = 0.06) 3. Planned LSD contrasts showed that at T3, state paranoia was 
significantly lower in VAG vs. NAC (p = .004), and VAG vs. VA (p = .02). There 
was no significant difference between VA and NAC, (p = .54). Therefore, H1 (b) was 
partially supported. The prediction concerning VAG was supported in that state 
paranoia was significantly lower in VAG than in both VA and NAC groups. Given 
that there was no a priori prediction concerning the VA condition at T3, the analysis 
supported a null hypothesis, as there was no difference between VA and NAC at two-
week follow-up. 
Taken together, these results indicate that state paranoia was significantly 
lower following affirmation in VAG compared with the VA and NAC conditions, and 
that this between-subjects difference was only significant at T3 follow-up, not 
immediately following affirmation at T2.   
To test H1 (c), the interaction was also decomposed by assessing for within-
group change in state paranoia scores over time. Repeated measures ANOVAs were 
performed for each condition to test for within-subjects change over time. There was 
no overall significant change in state paranoia over time in VA (F(1.45, 76.75) = 1.71, p = 
.19, sphericity not assumed) or NAC (F(1.80, 91.83) = 0.61, p = .53, sphericity not 
                                                
 
3 Running this analysis without age as a covariate did not significantly alter p-values 
(F(2, 158) = 4.94, p = .008, hp2 = 0.06). 
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assumed). In the VAG condition, a repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant 
change in state paranoia scores over time (F(2, 102) = 8.23, p < .001). Paired-sample t-
tests adjusted for family-wise error using Bonferroni correction (p = .017) showed a 
significant reduction in state paranoia between T1 and T2 (t(56) = 2.69, p = .009), and 
between T1 and T3 (t(51) = 3.95, p < .001), but the reduction in state paranoia from 
T2-T3 did not reach statistical significance  (t(51) = 1.77, p = .08). Therefore, H1 (c) 
was partially supported. Consistent with prediction, there was no overall effect of 
time in the NAC condition, and there was an overall significant progressive reduction 
in paranoia over time in the VAG group, although the reduction did not reach 
statistical significance between T2 and T3. Contrary to prediction, analysis did not 
indicate any within-subjects reduction in paranoia in the VA condition between T1 
and T2. 
Taken together, these results indicate that the beneficial effects of value-
affirmation on state paranoia were only apparent over time in the VAG condition.  
 
3.4.1.1. Exploratory post-hoc analysis. 
To examine whether goal completion (i.e., rather than simply stating a goal at 
T2) was a mechanism that contributed to the superior effects of VAG on state 
paranoia at T3, exploratory analyses were computed to assess whether there were 
different effects on state paranoia within the VAG condition according to whether the 
value-based goal was completed or not. Given the relatively small sample size and 
unequal groups, change in state paranoia between T2 and T3 on state paranoia was 
assessed within-subjects using paired-samples t-tests. There was a significant 
reduction in state paranoia between T2-T3 for participants completing their goal (t(33) 
= 2.14, p = .04), but no significant change for participants who did not complete their 
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goal (t(16) = - 3.12, p = .76). These post-hoc analyses indicate that goal completion, 
over and above simply stating a goal, may have made a contribution to the 
significantly lower state paranoia scores in VAG at T3. However, loss of 
randomisation in this analysis means that third variables (i.e., a moderator) cannot be 
excluded.  
3.4.2.  Hypothesis 2: impact of positive affect on the interaction between 
condition and state paranoia over time. 
Given that previous research has queried whether changes following value-
affirmation are the result of the value-affirmation procedures inducing positive mood 
(e.g., Koole et al., 1999), the second hypothesis predicted that differences in state 
paranoia as an effect of condition allocation would remain, even after controlling for 
any change in positive affect between T1 and T2. 
Means and standard deviations for positive affect across time per condition 
(see Table 3.4.) indicate that positive affect did increase between T1 and T2 in the VA 
and VAG conditions, but then decreased at T3. Paired-sample t-tests with alpha level 
adjusted for family-wise error, using a Bonferroni correction (p = .008), showed that 
the increase in positive affect between T1 and T2 was only significant in the VA 
condition (t(53) = -2.91, p = .005). There was no statistical increase in positive affect in 
the VAG condition (t(56 )= -1.03, p = .31), and there was a trend towards a significant 
reduction in positive affect in the NAC condition (t(56) = 2.18, p = .03). Between T2 
and T3, there was a significant reduction in positive affect in both the VA (t(53) = 3.13, 
p = .003) and VAG (t(51) = 3.41, p = .001) conditions, but no significant change in 
affect in the NAC condition (t(51) = 1.70, p = .10).  
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The primary analysis was re-run to control for the changes in affect between 
T1 and T2. Change in positive affect was calculated by subtracting positive affect at 
T2 from positive affect at T1. This variable was entered as a covariate alongside age 
in the 3 X 3 ANCOVA with state paranoia. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was 
significant. The Time*Condition interaction remained significant (F(3.45, 264.17) = 3.08, 
p = .02) indicating that the changes in state paranoia presented in section 3.4.1 were 
independent of changes in positive affect occurring immediately following 
affirmation.  
 
Table 3.4. State Positive Affect: Means and Standard Deviations 
 Condition 
Variable (M, SD) VA VAG NAC 
T1 PANAS-PA 
25.30 
(7.07) 
26.32 
(7.88) 
26.93 
(8.43) 
T2 PANAS-PA 
27.32 
(7.46) 
27.11 
(8.70) 
25.68 
(9.29) 
T3 PANAS-PA 
24.22 
(8.54) 
22.50 
(7.77) 
24.06 
(8.61) 
PANAS-PA Change T1 to T2 
2.02 
(5.23) 
0.79 
(5.80) 
-1.25 
(4.31) 
Note. VA – Value-affirmation; VAG – Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; 
NAC – Non-affirmation control. PANAS-PA – Positive and Negative Affect 
Scales: Positive Affect. At T1 and T2, n = 57 per condition. At T3, VA: n = 
54; VAG: n = 52, NAC: n = 52.  
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4. DISCUSSION 
4.1.  Overview 
This thesis made novel theoretical and methodological contributions to the 
paranoia and self-affirmation literatures by investigating adaptations to value-
affirmation procedures, and their effect on non-clinical paranoia both immediately 
and over time. Specifically, this thesis predicted that there would be differential 
effects on state paranoia across the value-affirmation (VA and VAG) and control 
(NAC) conditions immediately following affirmation (T2), and at two-week follow-
up (T3), with VAG having superior effects in reducing state paranoia at T3 as a result 
of the addition of values-based goal-setting. It was also predicted that the interaction 
between conditions and state paranoia over time would be independent of any change 
in positive affect resulting from the value-affirmation procedures.   
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported, as there was a significant interaction 
between state paranoia over time across conditions. State paranoia was significantly 
lower at the two-week follow-up in the VAG condition as compared with VA and 
NAC conditions. However, contrary to prediction, there was no significant difference 
in state paranoia between conditions immediately following value-affirmation. 
Although there was no directional a priori prediction concerning the long-term effects 
of VA, state paranoia was also not significantly lower in VA as compared with NAC 
at two-week follow-up. Within-subjects analysis indicated that there was no overall 
benefit of VA in reducing state paranoia, but that state paranoia reduced over time in 
the VAG condition. Exploratory analysis indicated that goal completion, over and 
above setting a values-based goal, may have contributed to the superior effects of 
VAG in attenuating paranoia over time. 
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Hypothesis 2 was supported. Whilst there was an increase in positive affect 
immediately post-affirmation in the VA condition, the interaction between condition 
and state paranoia over time remained significant when accounting for this increase in 
positive affect. In addition, and contrary to expectations, positive affect reduced 
between T2 and T3 in the VAG condition, indicating that increased positive affect did 
not account for the effects of the value-affirmation over time.  
This chapter will discuss these findings in relation to theory and research, before 
considering their research and clinical implications. The strengths and limitations of 
the study will then be discussed. The findings of the thesis will then be drawn 
together with conclusions. 
 
4.2.  Values-based Self-Affirmations and Non-Clinical Paranoia 
Based on the theory that paranoid thoughts build on negative self-perceptions, 
boosting positive self-perceptions has been investigated as a possible means of 
attenuating non-clinical paranoia. Initial research has indicated that self-affirmations 
may reduce non-clinical paranoia in laboratory settings. For example, Ellett and 
Chadwick (2007, study 3) found that undergraduate students who had been primed 
with positive self-statements prior to a paranoia induction task had significantly lower 
state paranoia after the task than participants who had been primed with negative self-
statements. Similarly, Atherton et al. (2016) reported that males with high levels of 
non-clinical paranoia reported less state paranoia and increased self-confidence when 
entering a neutral VR social scenario after being primed with a positive self-
representation compared with a negative self-representation. Further, Kingston and 
Ellett (2014) found that after completing a value-affirmation exercise, undergraduate 
students experienced an immediate reduction in state paranoia relative to controls. 
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This reduction in paranoia was subject to a subsequent increase following a laboratory 
paranoia induction. Despite this, state paranoia following affirmation remained 
significantly lower than in the control. 
These studies have indicated some promising findings, suggesting that boosting 
psychological self-resources may have a role in buffering non-clinical paranoia. 
However, existing findings were limited in external validity due to having only 
investigated cross-sectional effects in laboratory contexts. This constrains the extent 
that conclusions can be drawn concerning the longevity of affirmations in the real-
world. The present thesis aimed to address this limitation by measuring naturalistic 
state paranoia two-weeks after the affirmation manipulations, to assess whether any 
immediate gains following value-affirmation are maintained over time. This thesis 
also aimed to develop existing value-affirmation procedures to address some of their 
limitations, and more closely resemble values interventions used in clinical contexts 
(Czech et al., 2011, Harris, 2010). This was done by providing participants with a 
brief rationale concerning values, providing a broader list of values from which to 
affirm, and using a card-sort rather than a pen-paper ranking exercise for identifying a 
personally meaningful value (e.g., Harris, 2011). A final, and central adaptation to 
traditional value-affirmation procedures was the addition of a values-based goal-
setting exercise following value-affirmation. Previous research investigating the effect 
of affirmations on non-clinical paranoia has been limited to cognitive affirmation, 
such as reflecting on values, rather than investigating the role of self-affirming values-
based behaviours (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; McQueen & Klein, 2006). A large 
literature, both within self-affirmation specifically, and mental health more generally, 
suggests that acting in line with personally meaningful values has psychological 
benefits in buffering against threats and stressors (e.g., Cohen & Sherman, 2014; 
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Hayes et al., 2011; Villatte et al., 2016). In the current study, the potential benefits of 
self-affirming actions in attenuating non-clinical paranoia was investigated within the 
VAG condition, in which participants set a values-based goal to complete before the 
T3 follow-up.  
The primary hypothesis predicted a significant interaction between conditions 
(VA, VAG, and NAC) over time on state paranoia. This prediction was supported, in 
that a significant interaction was found between conditions over time on state 
paranoia. Decomposing this interaction showed that specific predictions concerning 
the attenuation of paranoia within VAG relative to other conditions at T3 were 
supported, whilst other predictions concerning between-groups differences and the 
pattern of change in state paranoia across the study were only partially supported. The 
following sections will discuss each key finding in turn.  
4.2.1.  The effect of value-affirmation plus goal-setting.  
Investigating the longevity of value-affirmation on attenuations in real-world 
paranoia was central to the study aims, with the effects of value-affirmation being 
compared to a value-affirmation plus goal-setting condition (VAG) for the first time. 
Following empirical and theoretical evidence, VAG was predicted to have superior 
effects in attenuating paranoia over time, compared with VA alone. This prediction 
was supported. Participants in VAG reported significantly less paranoia at two-weeks 
as compared with VA and control.  
This is consistent with literature reporting on the psychological benefits of 
values-based goal-setting for other social and emotional difficulties. For example, 
relatively brief goal-setting interventions have been shown to significantly improve 
psychological wellbeing in both depressed and general population samples (e.g., 
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Coote & MacLeod, 2012; MacLeod, Coates & Hetherton, 2008). There is also 
evidence to show that writing about goals improves psychological wellbeing, positive 
affect, and physical health (e.g., King, 2001; Teismann et al., 2014). Values-based 
goal-setting has also been shown to lead to psychological benefits in individuals 
perceiving interpersonal threats (Kashdan & McKnight, 2013). The present finding 
adds to this literature in demonstrating the benefits of goal-setting for reducing 
paranoia. This is consistent with self-affirmation theory, which postulates that being 
able to reflect and act on internal strengths buffers against a range of self-threats 
(Steele, 1988).  
In support of predictions, value-affirmation plus goal-setting appeared to have 
progressive effects in reducing non-clinical paranoia over time. State paranoia scores 
were not only protected from increasing back to baseline in the goal-setting condition, 
but continued to fall over the course of the study, although the reduction in paranoia 
between T2 and T3 did not reach statistical significance. The progressive attenuations 
of paranoia in the VAG condition is in contrast to the effects observed following 
value-affirmation by Kingston & Ellett (2014), in which paranoia reduced initially, 
but was not protected against subsequent increases in response to threat. This raises 
interesting questions concerning what happens over time if value-affirmation occurs 
as a one-off cognitive event, and does not translate into meaningful behavioural 
changes. According to self-affirmation theory, both cognitive and behavioural 
changes contribute to the process by which affirmations buffer against self-threats 
over time (Steele, 1988; Cohen & Sherman, 2014). The present finding extends 
empirical evidence and suggests that making explicit plans for values-based 
behaviours augments traditional cognitive value-affirmation. Importantly, in this 
study, setting a value-based goal maintained the initial benefits of value-affirmation, 
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despite potential exposure to naturalistic stressors that might trigger and maintain 
non-clinical paranoia over time.  
The exploratory analysis conducted in this study offers some indications about 
the mechanisms responsible for the progressive reduction of paranoia over time in the 
VAG condition. It showed that only participants who reported completing their value-
based goal had a significant reduction in paranoia. This suggests that the superior 
effects of VAG may have been due to participants acting on their values-based goal, 
rather than simply setting it. This is consistent with existing research, which has 
shown that cognitively reflecting on personally meaningful values is more powerful 
when combined with valued actions (Armitage, 2016; Cohen & Sherman, 2014; 
Nelson et al., 2014; Sheldon & Kreiger, 2014). In addition, this finding is consistent 
with empirical and theoretical evidence that valued-living confers psychological 
benefits (e.g., Huguelet et al., 2016; Villatte et al., 2016). In their value-affirmation 
study, Czech et al., (2011) found that valued-living moderated participants’ anxiety 
response to an interpersonal self-threat induction, irrespective of whether they had 
completed a value-affirmation prior to the threat induction or not. Similarly, Kashdan 
and McKnight (2013) found similar results in relation to social anxiety. They reported 
that over two weeks, individuals with social anxiety experienced boosts in wellbeing 
in direct association with their engagement in behaviours that reflected what was 
personally important to them. Consistent with the present finding, this suggests that 
behavioural forms of engaging with values intensifies the cognitive reflection on 
personally meaningful action in buffering against interpersonal threats to the self.  
Theory suggests that engaging in meaningful behaviours may enable threat to 
be perceived from a broader perspective (Baumeister, 1992; Critcher & Dunning, 
2015; Sherman, 2013), thus reducing the overall impact of the threat in relation to the 
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self (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Individuals experiencing non-clinical paranoia have an 
increased tendency to self-attack in relation to self-threats (Mills et al., 2007). It is 
possible that this is due to having access to fewer psychological resources with which 
to self-reassure when things go wrong (Hutton, Kelly, Lowens, Taylor, & Tai, 2013). 
Whilst cognitive affirmation of values provides a space for reflecting on existing 
psychological resources, it is possible that behavioural enactments of values might be 
a powerful mechanism through which individuals generate new evidence of their 
psychological resources. This, in turn, increases the resources available for self-
affirmation in the face of threat. Indeed, Cohen and Sherman (2014) have argued that 
the behaviour of self-affirmed individuals might perpetuate itself over time through 
positive feedback loops, in which access to new self-affirming resources (e.g., 
memories, thoughts and experiences) grows over time. As a result, access to resources 
with which to spontaneously self-affirm in the face of threats would increase over 
time (Gilbert et al.,1998; Marigold et al., 2007; Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012), 
engendering ongoing protection against perceptions of self-threat. 
Alternatively, it may be that completing value-based goals interrupts negative 
cycles of self-defensive responses to self-threat (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). An 
interesting theoretical link between the present findings and those of Kashdan and 
McKnight (2013) is the maintaining role of avoidance in theoretical models of both 
paranoia and social anxiety. Avoidance behaviours are conceptualised as 
understandable direct survival responses to perceived self-threat (e.g., Allden & 
Taylor, 2011; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010), but in the long-term, function to 
maintain distress (Hayes et al., 2011). Cognitive models of paranoia identify 
avoidance behaviours (such as withdrawal, rumination, and self-focussed attention) as 
directly maintaining paranoia by preventing disconfirmation of paranoid beliefs 
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(Freeman, 2007; Freeman et al., 2007). Avoidance therefore perpetuates negative 
affect, negative thoughts about the self, and increased attentional focus on the source 
of perceived threat (da Motta et al., 2014; Flower et al., 2015; Fornells-Ambrojo et 
al., 2015; Freeman et al., 2005; Melo & Bentall, 2010). In contrast to self-defensive 
avoidance, acting in line with personal values is characterised by motivation to 
behave in ways that despite the potential risks, ultimately provide greater meaning 
and purpose in life (Elliot, 2006). Thus, in this study, it is possible that values-based 
goal completion increased engagement in personally meaningful behaviours, which in 
turn lead to an attenuation of paranoia over time by interrupting the maladaptive 
cycles of avoidance behaviours that maintain paranoid thinking. 
Such a mechanism would be consistent with ACT theory, which purports that 
setting values-based goals contributes to developing psychological flexibility through 
committed action. ACT theory supports the findings of this thesis in that it suggests 
that it is not just thinking about personal values that is important, but acting in line 
with them (Hayes et al., 2011). Committing to act in line with personally meaningful 
values is theorised to reduce the tendency to respond to distress with avoidance, and 
instead increase motivation to perform behaviours that are inherently rewarding and 
promote wellbeing (Hayes et al., 2011; Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). In this way, values-
based goal-setting may directly interrupt cycles of avoidance by providing a verbal 
prompt for approach, rather than avoidance, despite the presence of the self-threat 
(Gregg et al., 2014; Ntoumais et al., 2014). Alternatively, it may be that engaging 
with personally meaningful values acts to attenuate paranoia indirectly, by increasing 
wellbeing and reducing stress. High levels of stress are associated with non-clinical 
paranoia (Freeman et al., 2011). Therefore, reducing stress by increasing wellbeing 
may provide an indirect route to reducing paranoid appraisals. Although it is well 
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established that increased symptomology is associated with reductions in valued-
living, to date no research has examined the links between valued-living and paranoia. 
This study presents the first initial evidence that setting values-based goals, and acting 
on these, might be a key skill for attenuating paranoia in non-clinical samples. Future 
research should therefore also seek to examine the links between valued-living and 
paranoia, including factors that might facilitate or prevent acting in line with one’s 
values whilst experiencing clinical or non-clinical paranoia.  
Discussion is warranted concerning the type of values affirmed, given that in 
this study, despite a broader range of values being available for affirmation, the most 
frequently affirmed values related to connections with others (e.g., love and trust). In 
addition, a large majority of goals set by participants related to improving 
relationships with other people, irrespective of the value affirmed. This finding is 
consistent with theories which suggest that self-affirmation may function by 
enhancing psychological resources in relation to connections with others (‘self-
transcendence’), as opposed to self-enhancement (Crocker et al., 2008; Schnabel et 
al., 2013; Schwartz, 1994). Burson et al. (2012) found that affirming a self-
transcendent value, as opposed to a self-enhancement value, attenuated the effects of 
intentional social exclusion. Similarly, Kingston and Ellett (2014) reported that family 
and friends was the most commonly affirmed value by participants in their study. In 
this study, nearly half of participants in the control condition selected a self-
enhancement value (power) as their least important value, whilst self-transcendent 
values were selected most commonly in both value-affirmation conditions. Thus, 
value-affirmation appeared to frequently affirm aspects of self-transcendence, or 
connection with others. This is of particular pertinence to paranoia, given that 
paranoia is associated with loneliness (Riggio & Kwong, 2009), and reductions in 
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loneliness attenuates paranoia (Lamster et al., 2017). Social support might provide an 
avenue for being able to regulate emotions and provide an alternative perspective on 
self-threats that might otherwise trigger paranoia (Allen-Crooks & Ellett, 2014). 
Future research could therefore investigate whether affirmations for attenuating 
paranoia are more effective when they encourage connections with others in 
meaningful ways, or whether affirmation and action on any personally meaningful 
aspect of the self is effective.  
Given that acting on a values-based goal appears to have been the most 
important factor in attenuating paranoia in this study, it is important to note that not 
all participants in the goal-setting condition reported completing their goal. Although 
an assessment of the factors associated with goal-completion was beyond the scope of 
this thesis, a number of factors are potential candidates for contributing to the 
likelihood of goal-completion. Future investigation of these factors is important for 
clinically understanding the barriers and facilitators to completing personally 
meaningful goals. One potential factor is confidence in one’s ability to achieve the 
goal. Rodebaugh and Shumaker (2012) showed that having low confidence in one’s 
ability to achieve an important goal was predictive of higher negative affect during a 
stressful social situation (giving a speech). This suggests that in the current study, 
even if participants set personally meaningful goals following value-affirmation, if 
they had low confidence in their ability to achieve them, they may have experienced 
greater negative affect than participants who did not set personally meaningful goals.  
A range of other factors are linked to goal-completion (Wade, 2009). In their 
application of ACT in a psychosis population, Johns et al., (2016) used values-
clarification and committing to act in personally meaningful ways as a significant 
component of the four-session treatment. To support participants to engage with their 
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behavioural commitments, a weekly ‘check in’ phone call was made by the therapists. 
Strategies suggested to overcome the cognitive and emotional barriers to valued-
living included acceptance and mindfulness of one’s experience. Such strategies 
promote the ability to take an observer view of one’s experience and therefore make a 
conscious effort to reduce ineffective and avoidant coping. In turn, these skills 
enhance one’s ability to make behavioural connections with personal values. Future 
research could profitably investigate whether the addition of further transdiagnostic 
emotion regulation skills, such as those incorporated within ACT, might further 
augment the effect of cognitive and behavioural affirmations of values on reducing 
paranoia, by better equipping individuals to be able to achieve their values-based 
goals. 
4.2.2.  The effect of value-affirmation.  
Contrary to prediction, there was no significant difference between groups on 
state paranoia immediately following the value-affirmation procedures. Specifically, 
no significant reduction in state paranoia in either value-affirmation, or the value-
affirmation plus goal-setting conditions, relative to control, was found immediately 
following value-affirmation. This is in contrast to previous findings, which have 
shown that self-affirmations have led to lower levels of non-clinical paranoia relative 
to controls, when paranoia has been measured immediately following self-affirmation 
(e.g., Atherton et al., 2016; Kingston & Ellett, 2014). In addition, there was 
apparently no benefit of value-affirmation alone in attenuating paranoia over time. 
This is in contrast to previous empirical work which has suggested that the effects of 
value-affirmation confer psychological benefits that grow and extend over time in 
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relation to a range of self-threats (e.g., Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Cohen et al., 2009; 
Nelson et al., 2014; Stinson et al., 2011).  
Specifically, Kingston and Ellett (2014) found that immediately after value-
affirmation, state paranoia was significantly decreased relative to controls. The failure 
to replicate this finding is somewhat surprising, given the methodological similarities 
between the present study and that of Kingston and Ellett (2014). Both studies invited 
participants to participate in the value-affirmation in a similar laboratory setting, used 
the same measures to assess change in non-clinical paranoia, and employed the same 
manipulation check for value-affirmation. In addition, in both studies, the effects of 
value-affirmation were measured before exposure to self-threats, either in the form of 
a paranoia-induction (Kingston & Ellett, 2014), or prior to assumed exposure to 
naturalistic interpersonal stressors (the present study). Therefore, the possible 
confound of timing of affirmation in relation to exposure to self-threat (Critcher & 
Dunning, 2010) was controlled for in this study.  
However, there were also a number of methodological differences that may 
account for the difference in findings. One difference is the sample used. Most 
affirmation research to date has used homogenous samples, either comprised of 
university students, or a group of individuals facing the same or a similar self-threat 
(see Cohen & Sherman, 2014; McQueen & Klein, 2006). The present sample was 
comprised of students and members of the general population, and was therefore 
relatively heterogeneous, representing a diverse range of ages and life circumstances. 
Cohen and Sherman (2014) have suggested that affirmation interventions may have 
larger benefits if timed to occur during key developmental transitions, for example, at 
the start of adolescence, or at the beginning of university. Such transitional periods 
present challenges that are typically experienced as threatening, stressful, and 
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unpredictable, thus rendering affirmation procedures more relevant and their effects 
more potent. It is possible that as a result, that value-affirmation was more effective 
within a homogenous sample of first year undergraduate students (Kingston & Ellett, 
2014) than in the present sample.  
This explanation would be consistent with research that has only found 
significant effects of value-affirmation among a sub-group of participants facing the 
greatest self-threat. In a recent study, Layous et al. (2017) recruited an undergraduate 
sample and, contrary to other studies, found no immediate benefit of value-
affirmation on improving performance in a threatening maths test. However, long-
term benefits following affirmation were observed in a sub-group of the affirmation 
participants who were identified as experiencing the most chronic self-threat. 
Similarly, During and Jessop (2015) found that no benefit of value-affirmation in 
increasing openness to self-threat amongst individuals with high self-esteem, 
suggesting that impact of self-threat may moderate value-affirmation effectiveness. 
Indeed, Cohen and Sherman (2014) have argued that experimental self-affirmation 
studies have typically demonstrated specific effects on specific domains of self-threat 
because affirmations only appear to benefit individuals for whom the self-threat is 
most salient. It is therefore possible that subgroup responses in the value-affirmation 
group may have been present in the current sample, although analysis did not account 
for the effects of moderation in this thesis. Future studies could consider the potential 
role of age, life-stage, and threat levels on the effectiveness of affirmations. 
In addition, for affirmation to have effects over time, it has been suggested 
that self-threats should not only be salient, but chronic, thereby exerting detrimental 
effects over time that value-affirmations can reverse (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). 
Given that self-affirmation theory purports that the effect of affirmation is to buffer 
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against self-threats by increasing a person’s perception that they are good enough, 
there is the potential for ‘ceiling effects’ of self-affirmations if individuals already 
perceive themselves to be ‘good enough’, or are not experiencing persistent self-
threat. In this study, baseline levels of self-esteem and trait paranoia were assessed for 
the purposes of ensuring that randomisation was successful between groups. 
However, it is possible that the sample may not have been experiencing chronic or 
salient self-threat sufficient to show benefits from value-affirmation alone. This could 
be in contrast to value-based goal-setting, which may have relatively diffuse 
psychological benefits within the general population (Meevissen et al., 2014; 
MacLeod et al., 2008).  
Linked with this, the increased heterogeneity within the present sample may 
have introduced more extraneous variability, leading to larger standard deviations in 
mean scores as compared with other research investigating the immediate effects of 
self-affirmation on attenuating paranoia. Although there was no significant difference 
in paranoia between groups at T2, the pattern of change within the value-affirmation 
conditions is very similar to that reported by Kingston and Ellett (2014). This 
suggests that the variance in the present sample may be masking possible effects. 
Comparing the raw degree of change in paranoia scores between the present study and 
that of Kingston and Ellett (2014) shows that similar, relatively small, mean 
reductions of approximately one point on the state paranoia scale were obtained in 
both studies between T1 and T2. Given this similarity in the within-subjects raw 
changes following affirmation, one explanation is that this study lacked the power to 
detect statistical differences between-subjects. Given that the power analysis for this 
study was computed based on mean differences in the context of standard deviations 
(Cohens d measures of effect size, Cohen, 1992), the larger standard deviations in the 
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present study may have reduced the power to detect effects. Indeed, in the present 
study, although similar degrees of raw mean change were observed within the VA 
condition, the between-subjects effect size between VA and control at T2 was d = 
0.08. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the changes made to the value-affirmation 
procedures rendered them less effective at reducing state paranoia in the immediate 
term. Several changes to the procedures warrant consideration in this regard.  
Firstly, in this study, a larger number of values were presented from which 
participants could choose to affirm, and the values presented to participants were of 
personal characteristics or attributes (e.g., honesty, kindness, trust), rather than valued 
life domains (e.g., religion, family, politics). This change was intended to increase 
both the clinical validity of the affirmation task (Czech et al., 2011), and to increase 
the choice of values (Silverman et al., 2013; Harris, 2013). Theory and research also 
suggests that the type of value affirmed might differentiate the type of threat buffered 
against. Personal attribute affirmation has been found to bolster self-esteem resources 
against social comparison threat, whereas affirmation of life-domains bolsters self-
concept clarity against cognitive dissonance threat (Stapel & van der Linde, 2011). 
Theories concerning paranoia and the self suggest that both social comparison (i.e., 
negative self-other beliefs) and cognitive dissonance (i.e., self-discrepancies) might 
give rise to paranoia (Bentall et al., 2001; Garety & Freeman, 2013; Kesting & 
Lincoln, 2013; Tiernan et al., 2014). In the context of the present study procedures 
(i.e., being alone in the laboratory as a research participant), it is possible that 
paranoia was triggered by cognitive dissonance, rather than social comparison threat. 
In Kingston and Ellett’s study, 75% of participants affirmed a life-domain (‘family 
and friends’, Kingston, 2011), whereas in this study, the values available for 
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affirmation represented personality traits and attributes. It is therefore possible that 
participants in Kingston and Ellett’s study experienced greater benefit in response to 
cognitive dissonance threat as a result of affirming a life-domain. Future research 
could directly compare traditional value-affirmation procedures, in which participants 
affirm valued life domains, with the values used in the present affirmation procedures. 
This would better tease apart potential differentiating effects of the type of values 
affirmed on the immediate reductions of non-clinical paranoia. 
Secondly, theory purports that affirmations must be within a domain unrelated 
to the source of threat in order to be effective (Steele, 1988). Concerning the lack of 
effect of value-affirmation at T3, in Kingston and Ellett’s study, the paranoia-
induction manipulated conditions of high self-awareness under conditions of 
academic failure, a threat purportedly unrelated to the most commonly affirmed 
domain of family and friends. In this study, there was a greater range of values 
affirmed by participants, which may have introduced variance into the effects of 
value-affirmation. In addition, exposure to self-threat was naturalistic over time, and 
was therefore uncontrolled. Thus, it is possible that participants faced threat in the 
value with which they had affirmed, and therefore did not benefit from value-
affirmation alone. That this was not measured in this study represents a limitation. It 
would be interesting for future research to assess exposure to naturalistic threat, and 
to further explore how the addition of values-based goal-setting may protect against 
this, as participants in VA and VAG affirmed similar values, yet VAG participants 
still gained benefits and showed reduced paranoia at follow-up.  
Thirdly, in the current study, participants were provided with an introduction 
into the clinical utility of values prior to the affirmation task, whereas in Kingston and 
Ellett (2014), participants completed the affirmation without prior explanation about 
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values or the affirmation task. It is therefore possible that in the present study, 
participants had a greater conscious awareness about the task, which rendered it less 
effective (Sherman et al., 2009). However, more recently it has been suggested that 
awareness of affirmation does not eradicate the effects, so long as individuals are able 
to maintain their autonomous participation in the affirmation experience by retaining 
choice (Silverman et al., 2013). This study aimed to provide greater choice in the 
experience of affirmation, by providing an increased number of values from which to 
affirm, therefore it is unlikely that this reduced the effectiveness of the value-
affirmation.  
Aside from these methodological differences, an alternative explanation for 
the present finding is that the immediate effect of value-affirmation in reducing state 
paranoia is not robust or reliable. Whilst the finding that affirmation did not have a 
significant immediate effect on state paranoia relative to the control condition was 
contrary to expectation, this finding is in line with other published studies that have 
failed to replicate immediate benefits of value-affirmations. For example, Burgess et 
al. (2014) found that black healthcare patients, who are at risk of stereotype threat, did 
not benefit from undertaking a value-affirmation. In fact, affirmed patients reported 
higher levels of negative mood, lower self-esteem and lower social self-esteem 
relative to controls immediately after affirmation. Similarly, in an attempt to replicate 
the effects of value-affirmation in academic settings, Layous et al. (2017) found that 
amongst a white undergraduate student sample, affirmed and non-affirmed 
participants performed equally well on a threatening maths test, suggesting that there 
was no immediate advantage conferred from undertaking value-affirmation in facing 
the threat.  
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The literature concerning the effectiveness of affirmations continues to face 
many questions about how value-affirmation exerts effects (Cohen & Sherman, 2014) 
and the extent to which extraneous variables might have moderated the effectiveness 
of value-affirmation on state paranoia is not clear. Whilst behavioural enactment of 
values has been flagged as a potential mediator in the present study, the 
methodological limitations and lack of empirical evidence concerning the 
mechanisms of value-affirmation mean that future work must investigate potential 
moderator and mediator variables to better understand how value-affirmation leads to 
attenuations of paranoia. 
4.2.3.  The effect of control procedures. 
Some researchers have queried whether ranking values in order of personal 
preference may in and of itself be sufficient to lead to value-affirmation (e.g., Cohen 
et al., 2000; Burson et al., 2012). However, in this study, there was no significant 
change in state paranoia across time within the control condition. Methodologically, 
this study therefore adds to the empirical evidence in showing that reflecting on 
personally unimportant values does not lead to changes associated with self-
affirmation, and can therefore be considered an effective control condition for 
experimental value-affirmation studies.  
 
4.3.  The Role of Positive Affect  
The second hypothesis predicted that positive affect would not account for 
reductions in paranoia following value-affirmation. This hypothesis was supported, as 
co-varying for change in positive affect pre-post value-affirmation did not alter the 
significance of the interaction between state paranoia and value-affirmation over time. 
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In line with some theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Koole et al., 1999), positive 
affect did increase immediately following value-affirmation, although this was only 
found to be significant in the VA condition. Given that the interaction between 
condition and state paranoia remained significant when controlling for changes in 
positive affect immediately following affirmation, changes in positive affect as a 
result of value-affirmation is unlikely to account for the effects observed on levels of 
state paranoia in this study. This finding replicates that of Kingston and Ellett (2014), 
who did not find any differential effects of mood following value-affirmation between 
conditions on state paranoia. It also joins a body of research which has indicated that 
increases in positive mood do not account for the effects observed following value-
affirmation (e.g., Keough et al., 1997; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Sherman et al., 
2000; Spencer et al., 2001).  
In reviewing the patterns of change in positive affect across the study, one 
intriguing and unexpected finding emerged. Overall, across all conditions, positive 
affect decreased across the course of the study, with the most striking reductions in 
positive affect observed in the VAG condition. Whilst some studies have found a 
decrease in positive affect following value-affirmation (e.g., Steele & Lui, 1983), 
overall, research supports the view that values-based reflection and valued-action 
improves wellbeing and maintains positive affect (e.g., McQueen & Klein, 2006; 
Kashdan & McKnight, 2013). One possible explanation for this overall decrease in 
positive affect could be the context in which the positive affect questionnaires were 
completed. Items in the positive affect scale used to assess positive affect in this study 
primarily include described activated mood states (e.g., attentive; alert; active; 
interested; enthusiastic.). On a very practical level, it is possible that attending a study 
and entering a novel situation in the laboratory may have been associated with 
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increased positive affect as operationalised on the scale used, than was associated 
with completing questionnaires online at T3.  
There are also theoretical reasons which may account for the reduction in positive 
affect over the course of the study. Within ACT, values are theorised as being 
inherently rewarding, but consequently, also inherently painful if attention is drawn to 
the discrepancy between one’s actual and idealised values (Harris, 2011). ACT theory 
purports that given the personal significance of values, there are likely to be important 
reasons why individuals have not already taken steps to live in line with them. In 
particular, inherent to all approach behaviours is the risk of failure, whereas 
avoidance of personally meaningful challenges brings short-term safety. Whilst 
successful enactment of values, through completion of goal-directed approach 
behaviours, boosts self-resources (Katz, Catane, & Yovel, 2016), it is possible that the 
contemplation of these risks and undertaking these challenges lead to reductions in 
positive affect over the course of the study. 
 
4.4. Implications for Future Research  
In light of the findings described above, there are several areas in which future 
research is needed.  Given the lack of replication of the immediate benefits of value-
affirmation in reducing baseline levels of paranoia, future research should attempt to 
replicate this finding with consideration to the potential methodological factors 
described above. As discussed in earlier sections, these would pertain primarily to the 
methods used to bring about self-affirmation through reflection on personally 
meaningful values, such as type of values affirmed, the characteristics of the sample 
with whom value-affirmation might fruitfully be applied, and the level of awareness 
and choice participants have during the affirmation process. In order to more fully 
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investigate the robustness of the effect of value-affirmation on attenuating non-
clinical paranoia, research could compare the affirmation procedures in the present 
sample with those of Kingston and Ellett (2014). This would help to clarify the 
variance caused by the methodological differences between these two studies and 
thereby determine with greater clarity the benefits of value-affirmation alone on non-
clinical paranoia.  
In addition, replicating this research with a sample high in non-clinical paranoia, 
and with a sample of clinically paranoid participants, would indicate whether there is 
scope for the present conclusions to extend to clinically paranoid samples. Utilising a 
sample with higher levels of clinical paranoia might provide greater insights into the 
magnitude of the effects. As discussed above, the reductions in paranoia observed 
following value-based affirmations to date are relatively small, and therefore may not 
have clinical significance. Whether this is in proportion with the relatively low levels 
of paranoia experienced in non-clinical samples, such that samples with higher levels 
of paranoia might experience larger reductions, is not known. Replicating the present 
research, with a sample that provides a closer analogue to a clinical sample, would 
provide important insights into the clinical significance of the reductions in paranoia 
observed following affirmation.  
In addition, there are likely to be clear differences between clinical and non-
clinical populations in terms of the way that paranoia is experienced and therefore the 
ability to engage in value-affirmation as a psychological intervention. It is known that 
the tendency to spontaneously self-affirm varies in the population as a function of 
self-esteem (Gilbert et al.,1998; Marigold et al., 2007; Pietersma & Dijkstra, 2012). It 
is therefore likely that individuals with clinically significant distress associated with 
paranoia might be less able to use affirmation techniques, and may require more 
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support to develop the psychological skills required to enable the process of self-
affirmation to feel genuine. Developing the skills required to be able to genuinely 
identify and draw on personal strengths and resources in the face of threat is central to 
many third-wave CBT approaches to psychosis, including compassion-focussed 
therapy (CFT; e.g., Ascone, Sundag, Schlier, & Lincoln, 2016), and ACT (e.g., Johns 
et al., 2016). In both approaches, acceptance and mindfulness form key components 
of treatment. Future research could therefore replicate this study, but consider 
including a mindfulness or acceptance component to test whether this adds further 
benefits in terms of enhancing value-affirmation and supporting value-based goal 
completion.  
Such research would also advance the literature concerning the application of 
ACT-based engagement with values, a component of ACT treatment which has yet to 
be directly empirically tested in a clinically paranoid sample. The rationale for 
incorporating values work into clinical practice is growing (e.g., Grumet & 
Fitzpatrick, 2016). A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of mindfulness and 
acceptance based interventions (Cramer, Lauche, Heidemarie Haller, Langhorts & 
Dobos, 2016) has recommended ACT based interventions for psychosis. However, as 
identified in this thesis, as it stands, the number of studies pertaining to values-
clarification and committed action components of treatment is relatively small. 
Therefore, further research, to replicate the promising results seen, is required to 
support existing findings and provide convincing evidence to recommend components 
of ACT treatment to clinical practice.  
Whilst positive affect was considered in this study, future research should seek to 
understand the mechanisms by which affirmation has its effects in reducing paranoia. 
There are several possible methodologies which could shed light onto this question. 
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For example, a qualitative analysis of the experience of affirmation, either by 
conducting a content analysis of the essays, or an interview process concerning the 
experience of the affirmation procedures, may give rise to themes concerning 
potential mechanisms of change arising from the procedures. Alternatively, mediation 
and moderation analyses could be planned, exploring likely candidates for change 
following affirmation, such as self-esteem (e.g., During & Jessop, 2015), the tendency 
to spontaneously self-affirm (e.g., Emanuel et al., 2016; Brady et al., 2016), 
awareness of the purpose of the affirmation (e.g., Sherman et al., 2009), age, gender, 
ethnicity, and current level and type of psychological threats being experienced by the 
sample (e.g., Layous et al., 2017), the chronicity vs. acute nature of the threat (Cohen 
& Sherman, 2014), the type of values used for value-affirmation (e.g., Burson et al., 
2012; Stapel & van der Linde, 2011; Crocker et al., 2008; Schnabel et al., 2013), and 
valued-living. Alternatively, an experience-sampling methodology would assist 
researchers in tracking the moment-to-moment changes in paranoia and its potential 
links with spontaneous self-affirmations, providing insights into how self-affirmation 
may attenuate paranoia in naturalistic settings. 
Given that much self-affirmation research has looked at follow-up periods 
significantly longer than two-weeks for other dependant variables (e.g., Cooke et al., 
2014; During & Jessop, 2015; Brady et al., 2016), future research could also 
investigate whether the reductions in paranoia observed in this study are durable, or 
continue to grow, beyond the two-week follow-up period assessed in the present 
research. In line with clinical practice, studies employing a longer follow-up period 
could compare a condition with reminders of the value-affirmation and values-based 
goals (e.g., Johns et al., 2016), with a condition in which no reminders are given. 
Similarly, future research could investigate whether there are additional reductions in 
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paranoia from instructing participants to perform multiple affirmations over time, as 
has been found in some educational and workplace settings (Cohen et al., 2009; 
Morgan & Atkin, 2016). This may be of particular relevance for samples experiencing 
more chronic threats, or experiencing paranoia at a higher intensity than in the current 
sample. Such research would provide insights into whether repeating the affirmations 
over time may enhance their effects in buffering against ongoing self-threat. 
A final research implication from this study is whether increasing valued-living 
through values-based goal-setting leads to attenuated clinical paranoia. Research has 
shown that paranoia across the continuum is associated with a number of negative 
lifestyle correlates, including substance misuse, poverty, mental health difficulties and 
physical health problems (e.g., Freeman et al., 2005; Bebbington et al., 2013). It can 
therefore be inferred that greater paranoia is likely to be associated with lower levels 
of valued-living. No research has looked at the associations between paranoia, valued-
goals and valued living in clinical or non-clinical samples. Given the findings 
reported in this thesis, this is likely to be a profitable area for future research. 
 
4.5.  Implications for Clinical Practice 
The primary implication from the present thesis is that whilst reflection on 
personal values may be beneficial in buffering against increases in paranoia, 
encouraging individuals to set values-based goals and act in line with their values may 
lead to greater benefits, acting as an intervention for reducing paranoia over time.  
The key implication from these findings is that values-clarification and 
committing to values-based actions may be a means for attenuating paranoia in non-
clinical populations. The design and implementation of preventative community 
psychology interventions is an increasingly prominent clinical task (Wolff, 2014). It 
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has been suggested that the presence of paranoia in the general population is an 
indicator of the health and success of society as a whole, as society depends on 
functional relationships between its members in order to operate (Freeman et al., 
2011; Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997). Whilst some low-level 
paranoia may be of evolutionary value in interpersonal interaction (Green & Phillips, 
2004), the reduction of paranoia in non-clinical samples is considered important in its 
own right (Freeman et al., 2011). Even brief and mild paranoid thoughts have been 
shown to be distressing (Freeman et al., 2005) and are predictors of dysfunction, life 
stress, and poor health (Freeman et al., 2011; Freeman, Startup, et al., 2014; Melo & 
Bentall, 2010). Furthermore, the presence of non-clinical paranoia increases the odds 
of later experiencing clinically significant symptoms and distress (e.g., Kaymaz et al., 
2012). Given the brief nature of values-based affirmation procedures, one implication 
following the present work concerns whether the widespread use of values-based 
affirmations would be of benefit to reducing paranoia in non-clinical samples (Cohen 
& Sherman, 2014). Self-affirmation procedures have already been found to be 
effective, when trialled in large community samples, at buffering against reductions in 
wellbeing (Armitage, 2016), stress in the workplace (Morgan & Harris, 2015; Morgan 
& Atkin, 2016), and underachievement in education (e.g., Cohen et al., 2009; Brady 
et al., 2016; Walton et al., 2015). The present findings indicate that values-based 
affirmation techniques may be usefully applied in community settings associated with 
increased paranoia, an area which could be explored in future research.  
If the findings were replicated in a clinical sample, they would have implications 
concerning the utility of value-affirmation and valued action in the reduction of 
paranoia symptoms. The present findings indicate that increasing valued-living may 
be an effective target for early change amongst individuals with clinically distressing 
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paranoia symptoms. Chronic exposure to stressors and ongoing mental health 
difficulties is associated with a loss of positive identity and sense of meaning in life 
(Huguelet et al., 2016). Furthermore, levels of valued-living have been shown to 
mediate the relationship between a range of outcome variables (including self-esteem, 
depression, psychosis, and hopelessness) and life meaning (Huguelet et al., 2016). 
Increasing valued-living should therefore be a key component of treatment in those 
experiencing clinical levels of distress and dysfunction. Traditional psychological 
approaches to treating psychosis including Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy (CBTp) 
have recently been criticised for their focus on symptom reduction instead of service-
user defined recovery (Thomas, 2015). Qualitative studies of service users show that 
affirming identity and increasing personally meaningful activities is a priority for 
service users in terms of treatment outcome (Byrne, & Morrison, 2014). Consistent 
with this, a recent and brief goal-setting and planning intervention has been shown to 
improve wellbeing for individuals with psychiatric disorders (Farquharson & 
MacLeod, 2014). The move towards finding personal meaning through recovery is a 
position reflected in current mental health policy (e.g., Department of Health, 2001; 
Leamy, Bird, Le Boutiller, Williams, & Slade, 2011; Shepherd, Boardman, & Slade, 
2008). These contemporary directions in psychological treatments for psychosis 
dovetail with the findings of this thesis that increasing valued-action should be an 
early target in psychological therapy. 
As such, the findings from the present thesis overlap with a number of existing 
approaches to intervention, most notably, ACT. Reductions in paranoia were observed 
in the value-affirmation plus goal-setting condition, thus representing the first direct 
evidence that values-based goal-setting leads to attenuations in paranoia. However, 
the finding that not all participants completed their values-based goal also links in 
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with ideas from ACT that the teaching of other skills, such as mindfulness and 
acceptance, might increase the ability to accomplish values-based goals, and thereby 
attain the psychological benefits (Hayes et al., 2011). 
Despite the overlap between the clinical implications of the present research and 
existing ideas within clinical practice, it is important not to overstate the current 
findings.  Future research is needed to replicate the findings with larger samples and 
address the limitations of the present work, in order to be able to draw firm 
conclusions regarding the benefits of values-based affirmations on the attenuation of 
paranoia.  
A final clinical implication of the findings from this research is that they add to 
the growing literature indicating that paranoia is present in non-clinical populations. 
The findings of the present research are therefore in support of the view that paranoia 
exists along a continuum with common interpersonal experiences such as 
suspiciousness and feelings of vulnerability (e.g., Freeman et al., 2005; Bebbington et 
al., 2013). A direct clinical implication of this finding is the normalisation of 
paranoia. Internalised and social stigma is high amongst individuals presenting to 
services with psychotic symptoms (Chen et al., 2016) and is a significant predictor of 
help-seeking, engagement with services, and recovery (Munoz, Sanz, Perez-Santos, & 
de los Angeles Quiroga, 2011). Therefore, presenting a rationale to individuals who 
are experiencing clinical distress that paranoid experiences can be understood in terms 
of normal, everyday experiences is important to facilitate engagement (Wood, Burke, 
Byrne & Morrison, 2016) and reduce distress and conviction (Freeman et al., 2005). 
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4.6. Strengths and Limitations 
This research has a number of methodological strengths, but also limitations, 
which constrain the conclusions that can be drawn. This section will consider the 
strengths and limitations of different aspects of the current research in turn. 
4.6.1.  Design.  
The present design was unique within the affirmation and paranoia literature. 
This was the first study to measure the effects of affirmation on state paranoia over 
time. The unique design therefore adds to existing research concerning the extent that 
value-affirmations make meaningful differences to attenuating paranoia in the longer-
term, as is relevant to clinical settings. In addition, a number of features of the design 
increased the internal validity of the study, strengthening confidence in the 
conclusions that can be drawn. The use of a randomised controlled design eliminates 
sources of potentially confounding bias in the allocation of participants to condition. 
In addition, all participants completed baseline measures prior to randomisation, 
which showed that the groups were equivalent on all study variables at baseline. The 
design also permitted the inference of temporal causality by measuring state paranoia 
and positive affect both pre and post affirmation. Further, the randomisation was 
carried out by an individual who was independent to the study, such that the 
researchers remained blind to group allocation. This reduced experimenter bias and 
the possibility that participants experienced the study in a systematically different 
way.  
However, an unfortunate outcome of the randomisation in the current study is 
that randomisation of age was not successful; participants in the NAC condition were 
significantly older than participants in the VA condition. In line with the findings of 
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other research (Freeman et al., 2005; Bebbington et al., 2013), age was significantly 
negatively correlated with both state and trait paranoia. It was therefore possible that 
age introduced systematic between-groups confounds. To manage this, the analytic 
strategy was adjusted and age was included as a covariate within the analysis. 
However, the appropriateness of using covariate-adjusted analyses to account for 
group differences at baseline has been debated within the literature (Pocock, Assman, 
Enos, & Kasten, 2002). Despite this, it is important to note that age was not 
significantly different in VAG as compared with VA and NAC groups, thus, age is 
unlikely to have impacted the key finding of the study, which was that state paranoia 
was lower within the VAG as compared with both VA and NAC at T3 follow-up. 
4.6.2.  Sample.  
The final sample size at T1/T2 slightly exceeded that indicated by the power 
analysis, whilst the final sample at T3 matched that indicated by the power analysis. 
This suggests that the sample used was sufficiently powered to detect significant 
effects, whilst reducing the likelihood of Type II error. However, given that the 
effects of value-affirmations at two-weeks were relatively unknown, particularly in 
relation to non-clinical paranoia, and the heterogeneity of the sample actually 
recruited, it is possible that the power analysis underestimated the sample size 
required. The actual effect sizes achieved in this study were smaller than expected at 
T3 (VAG vs. NAC d = 0.33; VAG vs. VA d = 0.34). Therefore, future research would 
benefit from recruiting a larger sample to ensure adequate power to detect significant 
effects.  
This study benefitted from relatively low levels of attrition at T3 (7%). Whilst 
attrition did not appear to be a systematic effect of condition, it is not clear whether 
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those that dropped out from providing data at T3 differed from the rest of the sample 
in any meaningful ways. This is particularly important, given that between-subjects 
differences were only significant at T3. Given that missing data were managed using 
listwise deletion, rather than, for example, intention to treat analysis, power was lost 
in T1 and T2 analysis, as cases that dropped out at T3 were not included at any stage 
of multivariate analysis. If the participants that dropped out were different in some 
meaningful way, this may have led to bias in the results. Analysis was not carried out 
to determine whether attrition was a function of a process related to the main study 
variable of paranoia, for example, higher levels of paranoia, lower mood or lower 
levels of valued-living. Were this to be the case, those that dropped out may have 
reported different results to the sample that did not drop out, thereby limiting the 
generalisability of the findings.  
Attention should also be drawn to limitations concerning the sample as a 
whole. On the one hand, the current sample could be considered relatively diverse, as 
a combination of both students and non-students were recruited. This is a relative 
strength in comparison to the majority of value-affirmation research, which is 
typically conducted within undergraduate student samples (Armitage, 2016; McQueen 
& Klein, 2006). In other respects, the sample was fairly homogenous in that the 
majority of participants were white, female, and well educated. In addition, whilst the 
convenience sampling methodology facilitated the recruitment of a relatively large 
sample, it is likely to have led to a self-selecting and idiosyncratic sample. This bias 
within the sample constrains the generalisability of the findings. In particular, the 
characteristics of the present sample may be in contrast with those populations most 
in need of affirmation procedures, such as those identified at greater risk of 
experiencing paranoia, both within the general population, and in clinical groups. 
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Therefore, the extent to which the findings from this research can be conclusively 
generalised to other groups, particularly within populations with high levels of 
paranoia, remains limited, and should be interpreted with caution.  
4.6.3.  Measures. 
A strength of the study is that well-validated measures with good 
psychometric properties were used to measure the study variables. Change in state 
paranoia was assessed both between and within-subjects, which increased the ability 
to draw conclusions about the causal effects of the affirmation procedures on state 
paranoia. These aspects of the design increased the internal validity of the study. 
In addition, naturalistic paranoia, rather than paranoia following a laboratory 
induction was measured at T3. Measuring paranoia in a participant’s real-world 
environment increases the external validity of the study, supporting inferences 
concerning the real-world relevance of value-affirmation procedures. However, the 
limitation of this approach is that it was not possible to falsify the paranoia reported. 
The ability to demonstrate that paranoia is unfounded is central to its definition 
(Freeman, 2007; Freeman & Garety, 2000). Although unlikely, it is therefore possible 
that the rates of paranoia obtained in this study were inflated by participants’ 
experience of actual persecution. In addition, the lack of a controlled paranoia 
induction introduces potential confounds, as participants may have been differentially 
exposed to naturalistic stressors, and no assessment of daily perceptions of 
persecution or suspiciousness was made. On the one hand this is a strength, in that the 
repeated use of self-report measurements can alter the experience of psychological 
phenomenon through measurement reactivity (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). However, it 
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does limit the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the daily experiences 
of the participants in relation to paranoia. 
Furthermore, the operationalisation of attenuations in paranoia, in terms of 
reduced frequency of paranoid thoughts, could limit the clinical validity of the 
findings. Perhaps more pertinent to clinical samples would be operationalising 
attenuations in paranoia in relation to the distress and conviction associated with those 
thoughts, and the impact of paranoia on daily functioning (Haddock, McCarron, 
Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999). Future research could assess these different dimensions of 
paranoia for change, and in so doing, potentially elucidate further insights concerning 
the mechanisms of change in paranoia following values-based affirmations. The 
external validity of the measurements of paranoia could also be further increased 
using an experience sample methodology in which momentary assessment of non-
clinical paranoia using diary methods could increase the validity of measurements of 
paranoia. This would also allow more precise measurement concerning the factors 
that might be implicated in the generation, maintenance or attenuation or paranoia. 
4.6.4.  Value-affirmation procedures. 
A strength of this study is that it utilised well-validated value-affirmation 
procedures (Sherman et al., 2000), and developed aspects of these in order to address 
some of their limitations. Specifically, this study aimed to increase the clinical 
applicability of the affirmation procedure, bringing them more in line with values 
exercises already used in clinical practice (Czech et al., 2011; Harris, 2008; 2011; 
2013). In this study, participants were presented with a rationale for values work 
(Harris, 2011), a broader choice of values (Silverman et al., 2013), and values which 
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reflected personal attributes as opposed to life-domains (Stapel & van der Linde, 
2011). 
However, limitations in the current value-affirmation procedures remain, and 
require future research to address. Firstly, as already discussed, it is not clear whether 
these adaptions may have reduced the effectiveness of value-affirmation alone on 
immediate reductions of non-clinical paranoia. Secondly, whether existing affirmation 
procedures would be accessible to a wider range of community populations is not 
clear. This sample was predominantly highly educated, white, and a large proportion 
of participants had studied psychology at degree level and so may have been more 
able to engage with the idea of values presented in the study. Thirdly, completion of 
value-affirmation procedures requires a good level of academic ability to complete the 
reading and writing exercises. Whether the same results would be obtained in a 
community sample that is less biased towards psychological academia is an important 
question relating to the generalisability of the current findings and their applicability 
to clinical practice. Only one study to date has considered how self-affirmation 
procedures could be adapted to be more accessible to individuals with low literacy 
skills (Hall, Zhao & Shafir, 2014), using an audio recorder rather than a pen and paper 
writing task for the affirmation essays. Further research is therefore required to 
investigate ways to make value-affirmation tasks accessible to a wider range of 
sample characteristics. 
A fundamental strength of the procedures used is that this study was the first 
to introduce an active goal-setting task and compare this with value-affirmation. This 
is a novel advance in the literature, joining together the theory and empirical evidence 
supporting the utility of values for self-affirmation from social psychology (e.g., 
Steele, 1988; Cohen & Sherman, 2014) with contemporary theories from clinical 
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psychology (e.g., Hayes et al., 2011). The apparent advantages of this unique goal-
setting component of value-affirmation opens up new possibilities for future 
researchers to develop ways to attenuate paranoia in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples. This study also represents the first direct empirical comparison of values-
clarification exercise with a values-based goal-setting exercise, providing tentative 
support for the importance of acting in line with values, and not simply reflecting on 
them and clarifying them, when values are used as a component of treatment within 
ACT (Wilson & Murrell, 2004). However, a limitation of the present study is that 
there was no goals-only condition. Other research has shown that there is a difference 
in outcomes between goal-setting conditions as compared with a value-clarification 
followed by goal-setting (e.g., Chase et al., 2013). The lack of this comparison 
condition constrains the extent to which it can be conclusively inferred that the values 
component of the value-affirmation plus goal-setting condition contributed to the 
superior effects, rather than goal-setting alone.  
A final consideration in relation to the existing affirmation procedures is the 
lack of value-consistency ratings in the present study. Obtaining consistency ratings is 
common within ACT (e.g., Lundgren, Luoma, Dahl, Strosahl, & Melin, 2012). In 
clinical practice, consistency ratings provide an indication of the discrepancy between 
personal values and current ratings of value consistent living, thereby aiding values-
based goal-setting. In this study, it could be assumed that individuals who reported 
completing their value-consistent goal increased value-consistent living in relation to 
that specific value. However, having no pre-post measures of value-consistency limits 
the extent that conclusions about this change can be drawn. Obtaining pre-post ratings 
of value-consistency would also provide an indication regarding whether individuals 
tend to value-affirm in domains in which they are already living relatively 
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consistently, or whether affirmation takes place in domains of relative value-
discrepancy. Such findings would advance the current understanding concerning the 
types of values that individuals might fruitfully affirm in order to buffer against self-
threats. 
4.6.5.  Exploratory analysis. 
A strength of this study is that post-hoc exploratory analysis was carried out to 
better understand the superior effects of VAG on attenuating paranoia at T3. This 
revealed theoretically important insights about the potential added benefit of acting on 
personally meaningful values and completing values-based goals on the attenuation of 
state paranoia following value-affirmation. However, these findings should be 
interpreted with caution. Carrying out unplanned subgroup analysis has statistical 
limitations, including unequal groups and relatively small sample sizes, which 
consequently have implications for statistical power. In addition, the elimination of 
randomisation in the sub-group analysis means that other variables (e.g., moderators) 
cannot be excluded as having accounted for the effects. It has been argued that sub-
group p-values can therefore be misleading (Pocock et al., 2002). Although the risk of 
type I error is purportedly reduced if the subgroup differences are compatible with the 
hypothesised main effects (Pocock et al., 2002), the extent to which the subgroup 
comparisons should affect the interpretation and conclusions of the current findings 
should be limited. Future research could set out to determine whether goal completion 
is a factor which affects the attenuation of paranoia a priori, and therefore overcome 
many of the statistical limitations inherent in the present exploratory analysis. 
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4.6.6.  Role of affect. 
One strength of the current study is that positive affect was measured and 
considered as a potential cause of variation in state paranoia following affirmation 
procedures, enabling more conclusive inferences to be drawn about the effects of 
value-affirmation on state paranoia. However, a limitation in this study is that 
negative affect, or depressed mood, was not assessed.  
According to theoretical and empirical evidence, positive and negative affect 
are the two dominant and independent dimensions of affect (Watson, Clark & 
Tellegan, 1988). Whilst high positive affect (e.g., feeling active, alert, engaged, 
motivated) has been considered a potential outcome and mediator of self-affirmation, 
high levels of negative affect (e.g., distressed, ashamed, nervous) is implicated in 
cognitive models of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Freeman & Bebbington, 2001). In particular, higher levels of negative affect have 
been shown to be strongly linked with state paranoia by increasing the availability of 
negative self-other representations (i.e., increasing depressive thoughts about self and 
the world, and anxiety based threat-based appraisals about others, Freeman et al., 
2013). These theoretical accounts concerning the contribution of negative affective in 
the generation and maintenance of paranoia are supported by correlational evidence 
showing that the link between persecutory delusions and cognitive biases is partially 
explained by anxiety and depression (Freeman et al., 2012), and by the finding that 
negative affect precedes the onset of paranoid thinking (Fowler et al., 2011). In light 
of the links between negative affect and paranoia discussed above, it is possible that 
the value-affirmation procedures may have had an impact on negative mood, 
particularly in the goal-setting condition where reductions in state paranoia were 
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observed. That these changes were not tracked is a limitation of the present study, and 
should be addressed in future research. 
4.6.7.  Mechanisms of change. 
Whilst this thesis was able to exclude change in positive affect as a confound 
of the effects of affirmation on state paranoia, the mechanisms of change in value-
affirmations remain unknown (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). This thesis has not sought 
to elucidate the mechanisms of change observed, and this is a significant limitation in 
terms of the extent that conclusions can be drawn about how the observed reductions 
in state paranoia came about. Therefore, the interpretations concerning the effects 
observed rely on theoretical inferencing and speculation. 
This thesis has provided initial indications that setting and completing a 
values-based goal leads to significant reductions in state paranoia over the course of 
two weeks. Much literature concerns correlational improvements in psychological 
flexibility and wellbeing with valued-living, but no research has investigated the 
mediators in how this process comes about. In relation to paranoia for example, it 
may be that valued-living acts as an ongoing behavioural affirmation of the self, 
bolstering the self from potential threats (Steele, 1988). Alternatively, it may be that 
valued-living increases the ability to refocus away from threats and gain meaning in 
life, despite its challenges (Hayes et al., 2011). The ability to elucidate the processes 
through which an effect occurs will be key in making decisions about how to target 
and develop effective interventions for attenuating paranoia. 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
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Notwithstanding the limitations discussed, the findings of this thesis indicate that 
a value-affirmation exercise followed by a values-based goal-setting task leads to 
reductions in non-clinical paranoia over the course of two weeks. In contrast to 
previous research, in this study, there was no buffering effect of value-affirmation 
alone on state non-clinical paranoia. However, setting a values-based goal appeared to 
intervene in levels of non-clinical paranoia, leading to reductions from baseline at 
two-week follow-up. Taken together, the findings from this thesis suggest that living 
in line with personally meaningful values may have powerful effects in buffering 
against self-threat, over and above reflection on personally meaningful values.  
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The research will be written up for Nicole and Becci’s doctoral theses. 
 
Any incentives?  
You will be entered into a prize draw to win one of five £20 Amazon vouchers!  
 
Can anyone do it? 
Yes! Anyone 18 years or older 
Any questions?  
Just message us and ask! 
 
Want to take part? 
Just message us and we will arrange a date and time to suit you.  
 
Is it safe? 
There are no known risks involved in taking part. The study has been approved by the 
Royal Holloway University Research Ethics Committee (Study ID 64 and 82).  
  
 
165 
6.3. Appendix 3: Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
Information Sheet 
'The study of how values relate to our thinking style and thoughts about other 
people' 
 
Before you decide to take part, it is important for you to fully understand what the 
study involves and all relevant information. Please take time to read the following 
sheet carefully. 
 
1. What is the study about? 
We are interested in finding out how our values relate to thoughts about ourselves and 
other people. In this study, values are aspects of life that are important and 
meaningful to someone. Examples of values include: achievement, family, freedom, 
spirituality, power, humour, etc.  
 
2. What does the study involve? 
Taking part in this study will involve two appointments two weeks apart, one at Royal 
Holloway (or a suitable location within your local community) and one online. At the 
first appointment, you will be asked to complete a set of questionnaires about your 
mood, your thinking style, and your thoughts about others. You will then be asked to 
complete a short piece of writing that is related to values.  The exact piece of writing 
will be one of three possible ones, decided at random.  There are no right or wrong 
answers when completing the tasks and your work is not marked. Immediately after 
completing the task, you will be asked to complete another set of questionnaires about 
your mood, your thinking style and your thoughts about others. This first appointment 
will take between 45-60 minutes. 
 
Two-weeks later, at the second appointment, we will ask you to complete the same set 
of questionnaires again, which can be done online. The second appointment will take 
around 20 minutes. 
 
3. Who is involved in this study? 
The principal investigators for this study are Rebecca Carpenter and Nicole Evans, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologists. Other investigators are Professor Andy Macleod, Dr 
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APPENDIX 7: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Two weeks in the life of a university student: thoughts, feelings and 
experiences 
 
The study 
My name is Carla Matias and I am a Clinical Psychology doctoral student at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. I am carrying out a study focusing on thoughts, 
feelings and experiences in university students over a 2-week period, supervised by 
Dr. Jessica Kingston and Dr. Lyn Ellett.  
Contact information 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research, you can contact me on 
Carla.Matias.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk or call me on 01784 414105. If you need to 
contact Dr. Jessica Kingston, you can contact her by email on 
Jessica.Kingston@rhul.ac.uk or by phone on 01784 414105. 
Your participation in this research study would be greatly appreciated.  
How long will the study last? 
The study will be carried out over the course of 2 weeks. 
What do I have to do if I take part? 
The study consists of three main stages. 
Stage 1 will involve meeting with you at the Clinical Psychology Department (Bowyer 
Building) for approximately 1 hour. The plan for this meeting is to first introduce you 
to th  study and answer any questions you may have about participating. You will 
then be asked whether you consent to take part. As part of consent, you will be 
asked to opt in to receiving an email prompting you to complete stage 2 of the study. 
Therefore, if you consent to taking part, you will be asked to confirm your email 
address. After you provide consent, I will then ask you to complete 6 questionnaires 
online and you will be given access to a departmental computer to do this. 
Completion of online measures will take about 30mins, after which I will give you 3 
questionnaire packs in a sealed envelope, labelled ‘pack 1’, ‘pack 2’, and ‘pack 3’, for 
you to take home with you to be ble to complete stage 2 of the study.  We will also 
agree a time to meet for stage 3. 
In stage 2 you will receive 3 emails on random days during the 2-week period, 
following the completion of stage 1. After receiving the first email, you will need to 
complete the questionnaire pack labelled ‘pack 1’, which was given to you in stage 1.  
Equally, ‘pack 2’ and ‘pack 3’ will need to be completed after you receive the second 
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Jessica Kingston and Dr Lyn Ellett, lecturers in Clinical Psychology at Royal 
Holloway University. 
 
4. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide if you would like to take part in the study. You can withdraw 
at any time without giving a reason. The data you have supplied up to that point can 
be removed and won’t be used in the study. 
 
5. What are the incentives to complete the study? 
If you are a first year undergraduate psychology student you earn 4 course credits for 
your participation in this study. If you are not, you will be entered into a prize draw to 
win one of five £20 Amazon vouchers. 
 
6. How will my data be used? 
All information that is collected during the course of the research will be kept 
confidential. The questionnaire scores and task data will be anonymised and stored 
securely on a database, separate from your personal details. Only the researchers will 
have access to the information you give during the study. Two different aspects of the 
research study will be written up and submitted in two separate Doctoral Theses.  
 
7. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the Royal Holloway University of London 
Department Research Committee. 
 
8. Who is organizing the funding of the research? 
The research is a requirement of Nicole Evans’ and Rebecca Carpenter’s doctoral 
training in Clinical Psychology. Their training is funded by Camden and Islington 
NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
9. How can I get more information? 
Please do not hesitate to contact Rebecca Carpenter or Nicole Evans via email 
(Rebecca.carpenter.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk; Nicole.evans.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk) should 
you need any further information about the study.  
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Consent Form 
 
 
'The study of how values relate to our thinking style and thoughts about other 
people' 
 
 
ID number: ……………………………….. 
 
 
You have been asked to participate in a study about how values relate to 
thoughts about ourselves and other people. 
 
Have you (please circle yes or no): 
 
Read the information sheet about the study? Yes No 
Had an opportunity to ask questions? Yes No 
Got satisfactory answers to your questions? Yes No 
Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving a reason (and without it affecting your 
care/education if applicable) 
Yes No 
Understood that you are free to deny answering any questions that 
you do not want to? 
Yes No 
Do you agree to take part in the study? Yes No 
 
 
 
Name: _____________________________________ 
 
Signature: __________________________________ 
 
Date: ______________________________________ 
 
 
This consent form will be stored separately from the anonymous information 
you provide. 
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6.4. Appendix 4: Debrief Sheet 
 
 
'The study of how values relate to our thinking style and thoughts about other 
people' 
   
This study is being written up as part of two Doctoral theses: one about rumination, 
which is a particular type of thinking style involving repetitive patterns of negative 
thinking; the other is about paranoia, which is unfounded thoughts that others intend 
you harm. Rumination and paranoia are both common and distressing, so we are 
seeking to understand factors that may help reduce them. 
  
This study is looking at one potential intervention, known as value-affirmation. 
Value-affirmation involves reflecting on personally meaningful values, and has been 
shown to lead to self-affirmation. Self-affirmation refers to any event that boosts the 
perception of the self as being sound, moral, capable and cohesive. Previously, 
research has found that when people are self-affirmed they respond more adaptively 
to experiences and information that could threaten their self-concept. Rumination and 
paranoia are two ways that people might respond to such negative experiences, 
however, these responses are usually maladaptive and lead to further distress. We are 
interested in whether self-affirmation might reduce the tendency to respond in these 
ways. 
  
In this study, there were two experimental conditions: value-affirmation, where you 
selected and wrote about your most important value; and value-affirmation plus goal-
setting, where you did the same, but also set two value-consistent goals to achieve in 
the following two weeks. These conditions were compared to a standardized control 
condition, where you were asked to write about a personally unimportant value. The 
experimenter does not know which treatment group you were in. 
  
We predicted that both value-affirmation conditions would reduce rumination and 
paranoia over the two-week period. We also thought that value-affirmation with the 
additional component of setting values-consistent goals would result in further 
reductions. We measured these changes by asking you to complete questionnaires at 
different time points. If you are interested in hearing about the results and conclusions 
of the study, please inform the principal researcher via email 
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APPENDIX 7: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Two weeks in the life of a university student: thoughts, feelings and 
experiences 
 
The study 
My name is Carla M tias and I am a Clinical Psychology doctoral studen  at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. I am carrying out a study focusing on thoughts, 
feelings and experiences in university students over a 2-week period, supervised by 
Dr. Jessica Kingston and Dr. Lyn Ellett.  
Contact information 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research, you can cont ct me on 
Carla.Matias.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk or call me on 01784 414105. If you need to 
contact Dr. Jessica Kingston, you can contact her by email on 
Jessica.Kingston@rhul.ac.uk or by phone on 01784 414105. 
Your participation in this research study would be greatly appreciated.  
How long will the study last? 
The study will be carried out over the course of 2 weeks. 
What do I have to do if I take part? 
The study consists of three main stages. 
Stage 1 will involve meeting with you at the Clinical Psychology Department (Bowyer 
Building) for approximatel  1 hour. The plan for this meeting is to irst intr duce you 
to the study and answer any questions you may have about participating. You will 
then be asked whether you consent to take part. As part of consent, you will be 
asked to opt in to receiving an email prompting you to complete stage 2 of the study. 
Theref re, if you consent to taking part, you will be asked to confirm your email 
address. After you provide consent, I will then ask you to complete 6 questionnaires 
online and you will be given access to a departmental computer to do this. 
Completion of online measures will take about 30mins, after which I will give you 3 
questionnaire p cks in a sealed envelope, labelled ‘pack 1’, ‘pack 2’, and ‘p ck 3’, for
you to take home with you to be able to complete stage 2 of the study.  We will also 
agree a time to meet for stage 3. 
In stage 2 you will receive 3 emails on random days during the 2-week period, 
following the completion of stage 1. After receiving the first email, you will need to 
complete the questionnaire pack labelled ‘pack 1’, which was given to you in stage 1.  
Equally, ‘pack 2’ and ‘pack 3’ will need to be completed after you receive the second 
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(Rebecca.carpenter.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk; Nicole.evans.2014@live.rhul.ac.uk) who 
will send you a summary once the research is complete. 
  
We do not expect people to feel worse after completing this study, but if you do feel 
you would like some support to help with difficult emotions, please contact your GP 
and inform the principal researcher via email. The university also offers a counselling 
service, and you may also wish to contact the Samaritans: 
  
Royal Holloway Counselling Service 
Website: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/ecampus/welfare/counselling/home.aspx 
Telephone: 01784 443 128 
Email: counselling@rhul.ac.uk 
Location: FW171 
  
Samaritans 
Website: http://www.samaritans.org/ 
Telephone: 08457 90 90 90 (UK) or 1850 60 90 90 (ROI) 
Email: jo@samaritans.org 
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6.5. Appendix 5: Trait Measures  
6.5.1.  Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995). 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not 
spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all- NEVER 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time- SOMETIMES 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time- OFTEN 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time- ALMOST ALWAYS 
 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid 
breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (e.g. in my hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and 
make a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
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16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of 
physical exertion 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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6.5.2. The Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). 
Here are some statements below about certain feelings and beliefs that people usually have 
concerning themselves, others, and certain situations. Your task is to choose how well each 
statement is applicable to you. Please note that all information provided by you is 
confidential. Please use the following scale to indicate your answers: 
 
1= not at all applicable to me 
2= slightly applicable to me 
3= somewhat applicable to me 
4= applicable to me 
5= extremely applicable to me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Someone has it in for me.      
I sometimes feel as if I'm being followed.      
I believe that I have often been punished without cause.       
Some people have tried to steal my ideas and take credit for them.      
My parents and family find more fault with me than they should.      
No one really cares much what happens to you.      
I am sure I get a raw deal from life.      
Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an 
advantage, rather than lose it. 
     
I often wonder what hidden reason another person may have for 
doing something nice for you. 
     
It is safer to trust no one.      
I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically.      
Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to 
them. 
     
Someone has been trying to influence my mind.      
I am sure I have been talked about behind my back.      
Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out tohelp other 
people.  
     
I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhatmore 
friendly than I expected.  
     
People have said insulting and unkind things about me.       
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People often disappoint me.       
I am bothered by people outside, in cars, in stores, etc. watching 
me. 
     
I have often found people jealous of my good ideas just because they 
had not thought of them first. 
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6.5.3. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your GENERAL feelings about yourself.  
If you strongly agree, tick 'strongly agree'. If you agree with the statement, tick 'agree'. If you 
disagree, tick 'disagree' and if you strongly disagree, tick 'strongly disagree'. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
On the whole I am satisfied with myself.     
At times, I think I am no good at al.     
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.     
I am able to do most things as well as other people.     
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.     
I certainly feel useless at times.     
I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an 
equal plane with others. 
    
I wish I could have more respect for myself.     
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.     
I take a positive attitude toward myself.     
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6.5.4.  Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson et al. 2010). 
Self-Care Assessment Part 1 
 
Below are areas of life that are valued by some people. This questionnaire will help 
clarify your own quality-of-life in each of these areas. One aspect of quality-of-life 
involves the importance you put on different areas of living. Rate the importance of 
each area (by circling a number) on a scale of 1-10. A “1” means that area is not at all 
important. A “10” means that area is very important. Not everyone will value all of 
these areas, or value all areas the same. Rate each area according to your own 
personal sense of importance.  
 
Area:    not at all important              extremely important 
 
1) Family (other than   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
marriage or parenting) 
 
2) Marriage/couples/   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
intimate relationships 
 
3) Parenting    1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
4) Friends/social life   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
5) Work    1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
6) Education/training   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
7) Recreation/fun   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
8) Spirituality/meaning 1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
& purpose in life  
 
9) Citizenship/    1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
Community Life 
 
10) Physical self-care   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
(nutrition, exercise/ 
movement, rest/sleep) 
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Valued Living Questionnaire 
Self-Care Assessment Part 2 
 
In this section, please give a rating of how consistent your actions have been with 
each of your values. Please note that this is not asking about your ideal in each area, 
nor what others think of you. Everyone does better in some areas than in others. 
People also do better at some times than at others. Please just indicate how you 
think you have been doing during the past week. Rate each area (by circling a 
number) on a scale of 1-10. A “1” means that your actions have been completely 
inconsistent with your value. A “10” means that your actions have been completely 
consistent with your value.  
 
During the past week… 
 
Area:    not at all consistent              completely consistent 
 
1) Family (other than   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
marriage or parenting) 
 
2) Marriage/couples/   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
intimate relationships 
 
3) Parenting    1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
4) Friends/social life   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
5) Work    1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
6) Education/training   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
7) Recreation/fun   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
 
8) Spirituality/meaning 1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
& purpose in life  
 
9) Citizenship/    1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
Community Life 
 
10) Physical self-care   1       2        3       4       5       6        7       8       9        10 
(nutrition, exercise/ 
movement, rest/sleep) 
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6.6. Appendix 6: State Measures  
6.6.1.  Paranoia and Depression Scale: paranoia items (Bodner & 
Mikulincer, 1998). 
 
Please indicate on the scale below how much you agree each statement describes 
your thoughts and feelings RIGHT NOW: 
1= not at all                  6= very often 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. I feel that my behaviour is being analysed,        
2. I feel that people talk about me.       
3. I feel that people are hostile to me.       
4. I feel that others are picking on me.       
5. I feel that others are examining my actions.        
6.I feel that others influence my performance.        
7.1 do not trust other people's intentions.       
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6.6.2.  Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then choose the number on the scale below to indicate to what 
extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW, that is, at the present moment. 
 
1 = Very slightly or not at all 
2 = A little 
3 = Moderately 
4 = Quite a bit 
5 = Extremely 
 
_________ 1. Interested  _________ 11. Irritable 
_________ 2.  Distressed  _________ 12. Alert 
_________ 3. Excited  _________ 13. Ashamed 
_________ 4. Upset  _________ 14. Inspired 
_________ 5. Strong  _________ 15. Nervous 
_________ 6. Guilty  _________ 16. Determined 
_________ 7. Scared  _________ 17. Attentive 
_________ 
8. Hostile  
_________ 
18. Jittery  
_________ 9. Enthusiastic  _________ 19. Active 
_________ 10. Proud  _________ 20. Afraid 
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6.7.  Appendix 7: Value-affirmation Manipulation Check (see 
Sherman et al., 2000). 
 
  
 1= strongly disagree 
6= strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. This value or personal characteristic has influenced 
my life 
      
2. In general, I try to live up to this value       
3. This value is an important part of who I am       
4. I care about this value       
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6.8. Appendix 8: Experimental Manipulations 
6.8.1.  Task instructions (VA) 
This task is about values.  Please read the following information and complete the 
task. Once you have completed the task, you will be asked to complete some more 
questionnaires on the computer. 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that can 
guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, and the 
personal qualities you want to develop. 
Values are not the same as goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, whereas 
goals are what you want to achieve along the way. 
Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test to 
see whether you have the "correct" values.  
 
1. On the table in front of you is a pack of cards listing aspects of life that are 
valued by some people. Please read each card and sort it into one of three piles: 
 
Very important to me 
Quite important to me 
Not important to me 
 
If you wish to include a value that you feel is missing, you can do so by writing it on 
one of the “other” cards in the values pack. 
 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT TASK 
2. Now you have sorted the cards, please discard the values in the ‘quite 
important’ and ‘not important’ pile, so you only have values that are ‘very 
important’ left. 
 
Which of these values is the most important to you?  Choose the one value that is the 
most important to you. 
 
3. Please use the lined paper to describe why this value is important and 
meaningful to you. Think about a time in your life that this was particularly 
important to you and made you feel good about yourself. Write as much or as 
little as you wish and don’t worry about how well it’s written. Just focus on 
expressing your memory of the event and the feelings that you had at the time.  
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Please do your best to think and write about this event and your feelings about this 
value for the next 10 minutes. This is personal to you. There are no right or wrong 
answers.  
Set the timer for 10 minutes. If you complete the task before the 10 minutes is up 
please ‘pause’ the timer- please do not close the timer window. 
 
4. Again, think about your most important value. Below your essay, list the top 
two reasons why this value is important to you.  
 
5. Now you have finished writing, please leave the cards on the table and place 
these instructions and your lined paper in the envelope.  
 
You can now complete the next set of questionnaires on the computer. 
 
6.8.2.  Task Instructions (VAG) 
This task is about values.  Please read the following information and complete the 
task. Once you have completed the task, you will be asked to complete some more 
questionnaires on the computer. 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that can 
guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, and the 
personal qualities you want to develop. 
Values are not the same as goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, whereas 
goals are what you want to achieve along the way. 
Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test to 
see whether you have the "correct" values.  
 
1. On the table in front of you is a pack of cards listing aspects of life that are 
valued by some people. Please read each card and sort it in to one of three piles: 
 
Very important to me 
Quite important to me 
Not important to me 
 
If you wish to include a value that you feel is missing, you can do so by writing it on 
one of the “other” cards in the values pack. 
 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT TASK 
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2. Now you have sorted the cards, please discard the values in the ‘quite 
important’ and ‘not important’ pile, so you only have values that are ‘very 
important’ left. 
 
Which of these values is the most important to you? Choose the one value that is the 
most important to you. 
 
3. Please use the lined paper to describe why this value is important and 
meaningful to you. Think about a time in your life that this was particularly 
important to you and made you feel good about yourself. Write as much or as 
little as you wish and don’t worry about how well it’s written. Just focus on 
expressing your memory of the event and the feelings that you had at the time.  
 
Please do your best to think and write about this event and your feelings about this 
value for the next 10 minutes. This is personal to you. There are no right or wrong 
answers.  
Set the timer for 10 minutes. If you complete the task before the 10 minutes is up 
please ‘pause’ the timer- please do not close the timer window. 
 
4. Again, think about your most important value. Below your essay, list the top 
two reasons why this value is important to you.  
 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT TASK 
5. Values can provide a deep motivation that helps us to pursue important goals 
in life.  
What could you do to help live your life in accordance with this value?  
We would like you to set a short term goal to focus on over the next two weeks. 
 
Ideally, you want to set a ‘SMART’ goal. This is what ‘SMART’ means: 
Specific: what exactly will you accomplish? 
Meaningful: is this goal in line with your most important value? 
Adaptive: is this goal likely to improve your life? 
Realistic: can this goal be achieved in your life right now? 
Time-framed: can this goal be achieved within the next two weeks? 
 
Please write your goal here:  
 
Please also write your goal underneath your essay.  
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Please take this piece of paper home with you as a reminder of the goal you have set 
today, to be completed in the next two weeks. 
 
6. Now you have finished writing, please leave the cards on the table and place 
these instructions and your lined paper in the envelope. Please take this piece of 
paper with your goal written on home with you. 
 
You can now complete the next set of questionnaires on the computer. 
 
6.8.3.  Task Instructions (NAC) 
This task is about values.  Please read the following information and complete the 
task. Once you have completed the task, you will be asked to complete some more 
questionnaires on the computer. 
 
Values are a life direction, an internal compass. They are leading principles that can 
guide you and motivate you as you move through life. 
Values are what matter to you in the big picture, what you want to stand for, and the 
personal qualities you want to develop. 
Values are not the same as goals. Values are directions you keep moving in, whereas 
goals are what you want to achieve along the way. 
Values are unique to you. Not everyone has the same values, and this is not a test to 
see whether you have the "correct" values.  
 
1. On the table in front of you is a pack of cards listing aspects of life that are 
valued by some people. Please read each card and sort it in to one of three piles: 
 
Very important to me 
Quite important to me 
Not important to me 
 
If you wish to include a value that you feel is missing, you can do so by writing it on 
one of the “other” cards in the values pack. 
 
ONCE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, PLEASE TURN OVER FOR THE NEXT TASK 
2. Now you have sorted the cards, please discard the values in the ‘quite 
important’ and ‘very important’ pile, so you only have values that are ‘not 
important’ left. 
 
Which of these values is the least important to you?  Choose the one value that is the 
least important to you. 
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3. Although this value is not important to you, please use the lined paper to 
describe why this value might be important and meaningful to someone else. 
Describe a time in someone else’s life that this may have been particularly 
important to them and made them feel good about themselves. Write as much or 
as little as you wish and don’t worry about how well it’s written.  
 
Please do your best to think and write about why this value might be important to 
someone else for the next 10 minutes. There are no right or wrong answers.  
Set the timer for 10 minutes. If you complete the task before the 10 minutes is up 
please ‘pause’ the timer- please do not close the timer window. 
 
4. Again, think about your least important value. Below your essay, list the top 
two reasons why this value is NOT important to you.  
 
5. Now you have finished writing, please leave the cards on the table and place 
these instructions and your lined paper in the envelope.  
 
You can now complete the next set of questionnaires on the computer.  
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6.9. Appendix 9: Values List (Harris, 2011) 
1. Acceptance: to be open to and accepting of myself, others, life, etc. 
2. Adventure: to be adventurous; to actively seek, create, or explore novel or 
stimulating experiences 
3. Assertiveness: to respectfully stand up for my rights and request what I want 
4. Authenticity: to be authentic, genuine, real; to be true to myself 
5. Beauty: to appreciate, create, nurture or cultivate beauty in myself, others, the 
environment etc. 
6. Caring: to be caring toward myself, others, the environment, etc. 
7. Challenge: to keep challenging myself to grow, learn, improve 
8. Compassion: to act with kindness towards those who are suffering 
9. Connection: to engage fully in whatever I’m doing and be fully present with 
others 
10. Contribution: to contribute, help, assist, or to make a positive difference to 
myself or others 
11. Conformity: to be respectful and obedient of rules and obligations 
12. Cooperation: to be cooperative and collaborative with others 
13. Courage: to be courageous or brave; to persist in the face of fear, threat, or 
difficulty 
14. Creativity: to be creative or innovative 
15. Curiosity: to be curious, open-minded, and interested; to explore and discover 
16. Encouragement: to encourage and reward behavior that I value in myself or 
others 
17. Equality: to treat others as equal to myself and vice versa 
18. Excitement: to seek, create, and engage in activities that are exciting, 
stimulating or thrilling 
19. Fairness: to be fair to myself or others 
20. Fitness: to maintain or improve my fitness to look after my physical and 
mental health and wellbeing 
21. Flexibility: to adjust and adapt readily to changing circumstances 
22. Freedom: to live freely; to choose how I live and behave, or help others do 
likewise 
23. Friendliness: to be friendly, companionable, or agreeable toward others 
24. Forgiveness: to be forgiving toward myself or others 
25. Fun: to be fun loving; to seek, create, and engage in fun-filled activities 
26. Generosity: to be generous, sharing and giving, to myself or others 
27. Gratitude: to be grateful for and appreciative of myself, others, and life 
28. Honesty: to be honest, truthful, and sincere with myself and others 
29. Humour: to see and appreciate the humorous side of life 
30. Humility: to be humble or modest; to let my achievements speak for 
themselves 
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31. Industry: to be industrious, hardworking, and dedicated 
32. Independence: to be self-supportive, and choose my own way of doing things 
33. Intimacy: to open up, reveal, and share myself, emotionally or physically in 
my close personal relationships 
34. Justice: to uphold justice and fairness 
35. Kindness: to be kind, compassionate, considerate, nurturing, or caring toward 
myself or others 
36. Love: to act lovingly or affectionately toward myself or others 
37. Mindfulness: to be conscious of, open to, and curious about my here-and-now 
experience 
38. Order: to be orderly and organized 
39. Open-mindedness: to think things through, see things from other’s points of 
view, and weigh evidence fairly. 
40. Patience: to wait calmly for what I want 
41. Persistence: to continue resolutely, despite problems or difficulties. 
42. Pleasure: to create and give pleasure to myself or others  
43. Power: to strongly influence or wield authority over others, e.g. taking charge, 
leading, organizing 
44. Reciprocity: to build relationships in which there is a fair balance of giving 
and taking 
45. Respect: to be respectful towards myself or others; to be polite, considerate 
and show positive regard 
46. Responsibility: to be responsible and accountable for my actions 
47. Romance: to be romantic; to display and express love or strong affection 
48. Safety: to secure, protect, or ensure safety of myself or others 
49. Self-awareness: to be aware of my own thoughts, feelings and actions 
50. Self-care: to look after my health and wellbeing, and get my needs met  
51. Self-development: to keep growing, advancing or improving in knowledge, 
skills, character, or life experience.  
52. Self-control: to act in accordance with my own ideals 
53. Sensuality: to create, explore and enjoy experiences that stimulate the five 
senses  
54. Sexuality: to explore or express my sexuality 
55. Skillfulness: to continually practice and improve my skills and apply myself 
fully when using them 
56. Supportiveness: to be supportive, helpful, encouraging, and available to 
myself or others  
57. Trust: to be trustworthy; to be loyal, faithful, sincere, and reliable 
58. Other: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
59. Other: 
______________________________________________________________ 
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6.10. Appendix 10: Skewness and Kurtosis z scores pre-post 
transformation 
 
 
 Variable 
Pre-Transformation Post-Transformation  
Skew (z) Kurtosis (z) Skew (z) Kurtosis (z) 
Transformat
ion 
VA 
Trait Paranoia 
2.53 
(p >.001) 
-0.62  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
DASS-21-D 
5.33* 
(p <.001) 
0.55  
(p >.001) 
0.69  
(p >.001) 
0.55  
(p >.001) 
Square-root 
DASS-21-A 
3.01 
(p >.001) 
1.03  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
DASS-21-S 
0.84 
(p >.001) 
-1.10  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
Age 
5.99* 
(p <.001) 
3.01  
(p >.001) 
 1.63  
(p >.001) 
 -1.23 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
RSE 
0.46 
(p >.001) 
-1.15  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
VLQ 
0.91 
(p >.001) 
-0.82  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T1 State Paranoia 
4.64* 
(p <.001) 
2.25  
(p >.001) 
1.69  
(p >.001) 
-0.31 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T1 PANAS-PA 
-0.80 
(p <.001) 
-1.19  
(p <.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 State Paranoia 
4.84*  
(p <.001) 
2.18  
(p >.001) 
-0.27  
(p >.001) 
-1.16  
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T2 PANAS-PA 
1.84  
(p >.001) 
0.49  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 Manipulation 
Check 
-3.22  
(p >.001) 
0.18  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 Time Spent 
Writing Essay  
2.06 
(p >.001) 
-1.08 
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T3 State Paranoia 
4.15* 
(p <.001) 
1.48  
(p >.001) 
0.08 
(p >.001) 
-0.31 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T3 PANAS-PA 
0.29 
(p >.001) 
-1.10  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
VAG 
Trait Paranoia 
4.59* 
(p <.001) 
1.77  
(p >.001) 
2.35 
(p >.001) 
-0.47 
(p >.001) 
Log10 
DASS-21-D 
7.98* 
(p <.001) 
3.64* 
(p <.001) 
1.94 
(p >.001) 
1.41 
(p >.001) 
Sqare-root 
DASS-21-A 
4.08* 
(p <.001) 
1.67  
(p >.001) 
-0.18 
(p >.001) 
-1.09 
(p >.001) 
Sqare-root 
DASS-21-S 5.60* 2.72  -0.25 1.76 Sqare-root 
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(p <.001) (p >.001) (p >.001) (p >.001) 
Age 
6.60* 
(p <.001) 
3.16  
(p >.001) 
 1.15 
(p >.001) 
 -1.03 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
RSE 
-0.33  
(p >.001) 
0.57  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
VLQ 
0.25  
(p >.001) 
0.79  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T1 State Paranoia 
5.08* 
(p <.001) 
1.71  
(p >.001) 
0.65  
(p >.001) 
-1.66 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T1 PANAS-PA 
1.94  
(p >.001) 
0.59  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 State Paranoia 
6.38*  
(p <.001) 
2.36  
(p >.001) 
1.44  
(p >.001) 
-0.87  
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T2 PANAS-PA 
0.88  
(p >.001) 
-1.11  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 Manipulation 
Check 
-0.83  
(p >.001) 
-1.49  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 Time Spent 
Writing Essay 
-3.58* 
(p <.001) 
0.66 
(p >.001) 
-0.79 
(p >.001) 
-1.01 
(p >.001) 
Squaring 
T3 State Paranoia 
7.68*  
(p <.001) 
3.42*  
(p <.001) 
2.17 
(p >.001) 
-0.61 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T3 PANAS-PA 
1.46 
(p >.001) 
-0.78  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
NAC 
Trait Paranoia 
3.96*  
(p <.001) 
1.84  
(p >.001) 
1.51 
(p >.001) 
-0.62 
(p >.001) 
Log10 
DASS-21-D 
4.21*  
(p <.001) 
1.52  
(p >.001) 
-0.02 
(p >.001) 
-0.64  
(p >.001) 
Sqare-root 
DASS-21-A 
4.63*  
(p <.001) 
1.99  
(p >.001) 
0.23  
(p >.001) 
-0.92 
(p >.001) 
Sqare-root 
DASS-21-S 
1.16  
(p >.001) 
-0.57  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
Age 
4.65*   
(p <.001) 
2.37 
(p >.001) 
-0.70 
(p >.001) 
-1.18 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
RSE 
-0.84  
(p >.001) 
-0.58  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
VLQ 
1.88  
(p >.001) 
-0.84  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T1 State Paranoia 
3.76*  
(p <.001) 
1.25  
(p >.001) 
-0.32  
(p >.001) 
-0.73 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T1 PANAS-PA 
-0.04  
(p <.001) 
-1.20  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 State Paranoia 
4.00* 
(p <.001) 
1.64  
(p >.001) 
-0.48 
(p >.001) 
-1.08  
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T2 PANAS-PA 0.50  -1.08  No transformation required - 
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(p >.001) (p >.001) 
T2 Manipulation 
Check 
1.16  
(p >.001) 
-0.49  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T2 Time Spent 
Writing Essay 
-2.30 
(p >.001) 
0.84 
(p >.001) 
No transformation required - 
T3 State Paranoia 
7.86*  
(p <.001) 
3.85*  
(p <.001) 
-0.06 
(p >.001) 
-0.97 
(p >.001) 
Reciprocal 
T3 PANAS-PA 
0.88  
(p >.001) 
-1.18  
(p >.001) 
No transformation required 
 
- 
Note. VA – Value-affirmation; VAG – Value-affirmation plus goal-setting; NAC – Non-affirmation 
control; DASS-21: Depression (D), Anxiety (A) and Stress (S) Scale; RSE: Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale; PANAS-PA: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- Positive Affect; VLQ: Valued Living 
Questionnaire. For VLQ, VA: n = 57; VAG:  n = 56; NAC: n = 54. 
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6.11. Appendix 11: Goals Set (VAG Condition) 
 
Value Freque
ncy 
Percentage Goal 
Love 5 8.8 % 1. Unknown  
2. Take time every day to tell someone that I 
love them and give them a compliment. 
Every day remember something good I did.   
3. To tell my close friends and family that I 
love them at least once a week out loud or 
via text  
4. To love those I encounter on the street: the 
homeless, the beggars etc. To stop, to engage 
with them, to help them, to care for them, to 
love them. 
5. To enable my husband to have a 
better/longer nights’ sleep by going to bed 
earlier myself thereby not preventing his 
early night. Aim for 10-10.30 except bridge 
nights when it would have to be 11. 
Trust 5 8.8 % 1. I will arrange with my partner time for us 
to spend together (quality time) over the next 
two weeks. I will also arrange to spend 
quality time to see friends, meanwhile he 
will no doubt spend time away from me. 
2. Do at least one hour of maths revision a 
day until Jan 14th to help me hopefully pass 
my maths test first time. 
3. Unknown.  
4. Open up properly to the people that I live 
with about how I feel and make them 
understand that equally it is not their fault.  
5. To contact two friends via text/call to have 
a catch up and see how they're doing 
Honesty 4 7.0 % 1. Share my thoughts when I really want to 
share my feelings or thoughts but feel 
prohibited for no good reason (by fear of 
being too straightforward, or the answer I 
will get) I will just do it, as long as it does 
not affect others negatively. 
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2. Always try to be honest to myself. If I 
don't want to stay with my friends, have a 
time to be alone. Don't hesitate to tell my 
friends that I'm tired and want to stay in my 
room. When I want to stay with my friends, 
just enjoy time with my friends.  
3. To be honest with my boyfriend about 
how I am feeling when we speak about 
making plans for the next year. 
4. To talk to accommodation on Monday 
about doing a room swap, as living at X is 
doing more damage to my mental health than 
good, and to see if they will let the room 
swap happen after the Christmas holidays. 
Kindness 4 7.0 % 1. I will only buy organic dairy products 
over the next two weeks.  
2. I will try to help my Dad convert the 
videos to DVD to save him time over the 
next week.  
3. Becoming volunteer tutor for young 
refugees in the local area by completing the 
application form asap. 
4. I will be more tolerant of people I don't 
know (public!). Be kinder to them and their 
needs. Take a deep breath when frustrated 
and smile. 
Open-
mindedness 
4 7.0 % 1. To have written up notes to begin my next 
assignment. 
2. Not quickly attribute blame to someone 
when something goes wrong. 
3. In the next two weeks I will engage with 
the American news (read article?) regarding 
Trump/Clinton election. I am not currently 
open-minded about this - could do to weigh 
up some evidence more fairly.  
4. Reading up on things that I have deep 
interest for and developing my knowledge 
which I can apply to my character and life 
experiences. 
Contribution 3 5.3 % 1. To start looking into voluntary charity 
work over the next fortnight, specifically 
those which only require a few hours a week. 
  
 
192 
2. Unknown. 
3. Unknown. 
Flexibility 2 3.5 % 1. Get a job  
2. I will be flexible in coming up with a plan 
for moving house, taking all the information 
into account. The plan will be agreed on in 
the next two weeks 
Freedom 2 3.5 % 1. To immerse myself in books, education 
and learning without being distracted or 
restricted by social obligations.  
2. To try something new that I haven't done 
before, so that I can find and express who I 
truly am. 
Humility 2 3.5 % 1. Unknown. 
2. When I receive my grade for my next 
assignment which should be in the next two 
weeks, I will not boast about my result if I 
do well and only tell my friends/peers if they 
ask. 
Independence 2 3.5 % 1. Spend time with my 6 year old little 
brother  
2. Unknown. 
Respect 2 3.5 % 1. To try and understand people's opinions 
which aren't the same as mine so that I can 
see their point of view more clearly  
2. To be respectful towards myself and 
others. To help other people who are in need 
if it is achievable for me and give others and 
myself positive feedback 
Self-
development 
2 3.5 % 1. To focus on my degree by studying and 
catching up 
2. To research cultural things to do with 
Madrid and make a plan for our trip 
Supportiveness 2 3.5 % 1. Support my ex boyfriend and help him 
achieve his mental and physical goals whilst 
being friendly.  
2. I wish to spend more quality time with my 
family, without distractions that are trivial 
(phones, social media). They need to feel 
that I am always there even if I'm away at 
university 
Authenticity 1 1.8 % 1. Feel happier about myself as a person. 
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Notice specific behaviours, such as 
judgement of others, and make a concerted 
effort to change them (behaviours which are 
not in line with who I am) 
Compassion 1 1.8 % 1. Speak to a homeless person to understand 
their history and background. This will help 
me to understand what other people go 
through 
Excitement 1 1.8 % 1. Unknown  
Gratitude 1 1.8 % 1. At the end of each day, think of one thing 
I am grateful for. 
Other: 
closeness 
/belonging 
1 1.8 % 1. I will arrange to meet with my close 
friends in London and do a christmas night 
together 
Persistence 1 1.8 % 1. To try and not get so worked up about 
events in my life I cannot change. To 
pinpoint when they are affecting me and to 
try and not let them worry me or make me 
anxious. 
Reciprocity 1 1.8 % 1. To encourage and allow others to help me, 
I do not need to keep all my worries to 
myself and panic when I have supportive 
people around me 
Responsibility 1 1.8 % 1. To show my children I am responsible for 
the way I act by admitting when I don't act in 
line with one of my important values e.g. 
patience, kindness 
Self-awareness 1 1.8 % 1. Within the next two weeks, I would like to 
have done my best with my coursework 
essay, been preparing further for my lab 
report and enjoyed my weekend away 
without feeling over run or anxious. I want 
to make time for myself, as well as my 
family, friends, and work. I would like to 
make progress instead of dwelling on 
previous weeks. 
Unknown 9 15.8 %  
 
